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Abstract
This thesis explores the apparent paradox of information technology (IT) evaluation 
methods not being broadly employed despite their seemingly innate qualities of 
assisting organisations in improving their management of IT costs and benefits. This 
is paradoxical since a multitude of evaluation methods exist and both academic and 
professional literature argue that their use will lead to beneficial effects.
The thesis aims to deepen understanding of the employment process of IT evaluation 
methods in organisations. Building on diffusion theory and actor-network theory 
(ANT), it is an in-depth case study o f the employment process o f an IT evaluation 
method at a Dutch insurance company. The diffusion theory is a good initial 
candidate for understanding the phenomenon of underutilisation, but fails to unravel 
the paradox. An ANT analysis suggests that during a process o f mutual translation 
both the evaluation method and its surrounding actors enter into a dynamic 
negotiation mutually translating each other. The evaluation method is appropriated 
by its surrounding actors in a black-boxing attempt. These actors capitalise on 
weaknesses in the method’s inscriptions, increase their strength and follow anti- 
programs. The method also appropriates these surrounding actors, assigning them 
new roles (changing their work processes, responsibilities and prerogatives) and 
moving them to new positions in the actor-network. The resulting employment 
process has emergent properties and is characterised by improvisation rather than 
blue-print planning. When employed, the method is unlikely to resemble its initially 
planned outcome.
The origin of the paradox is based on the assumptions that evaluation methods are 
neutral and have innate qualities and that their employment proceeds according to 
planned outcomes. This thesis undermines the paradox by arguing that a limited 
understanding of evaluation methods and unrealistic assumptions about evaluation 
employment are why such methods do not manifest their expected employment.
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Chapter 1: The Paradox of Utilisation of IT Evaluation Methods in 
Organisations
1.1 In t r o d u c t io n  A]\D BACKGROUND
This research attempts to develop an understanding of the employment process of 
information technology (IT) evaluation methods in organisations. Since the 
widespread ^plication of computerised systems in business, organisations have been 
struggling to improve how they manage their IT from a cost / benefit perspective. 
This struggle continues despite the fact that numerous researchers over the last 
decades have provided various methods, concepts and approaches to assist 
organisations in improving their grip on IT costs and benefits \  Surprisingly, the 
dissatisfaction with managing the contribution of information systems (IS) to 
organisations has not led to the expected use o f formal IT evaluation methods which 
specifically take into account the IT characteristics such as intangible benefits and IT 
investment risks. This paradox is central to this thesis.
Our analysis is based on the premise that a deeper understanding o f the process of IT 
evaluation method employment is needed to gain insight into how organisations 
employ an IT evaluation method to improve their IT cost / benefit management. 
Understanding this process of employment is, at the very least, as important to the 
improvement o f IT cost / benefit management as is understanding the characteristics 
(i.e. content, such as the criteria) such a method requires to be successful in 
achieving its goals. The characteristics of IT evaluation methods are a topic that is 
widely discussed from various theoretical perspectives in the existing literature 
relating to IT evaluations. However, the matter o f how to incorporate such a method 
in an organisation remains largely unexplored in the field of academic research.
' In this thesis, IT evaluation methods are interpreted quite broadly as to point to any evaluation 
method, methodology, concept or approach designed to (economically) assess the costs and benefits 
o f IT or an information system. An IT evaluation method could therefore also be read as IS / IT 
evaluation methodology, concept or approach. Thus, the use o f ‘IT’ in this thesis can be seen to denote 
both hardware, software and related technical routines (commonly referred to as IT), as well as the 
organisational applications, increasingly based on information technology, that deliver the 
information needs of an organisation’s stakeholders (commonly referred to as IS) (Willcocks and 
Lester 1999b).
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In this chapter we will give a brief overview of the need and justification for this 
research. We will also touch on some relevant topics in order to establish the 
background for the research questions. These topics will be discussed further in the 
following chapters.
1.1.1 Management of IT costs and benefits: an issue of growing importance
With the increase o f expenditure in IT, the topic o f IT evaluation continues to be an 
important issue in the management o f IS. Statistics in the Netherlands show that in 
1999 expenditures relating to IT in businesses and government were estimated at 
over € 12 billion, an increase of almost 17% compared to 1997 (CBS 1999). 
Comparable growth figures have been reported in other developed countries 
(Willcocks and Lester 1999a), and throughout the last decade. Moreover, a large 
portion o f IT costs can be seen as wasted due to the failure o f IT projects (i.e. 
projects that are aborted or fail to deliver their expected benefits). An estimate by 
Berghout (2002) shows that approximately € 4 billion o f the total € 23 billion in 
Dutch IT expenditures^ are wasted by such failures on an annual basis.
With growing IT costs, the notorious reputation o f costly IT failures, together with 
the notion that IT has become a critical component o f business, senior managers seek 
evidence verifying the contribution o f IT to the success of the business (Thorp 1998). 
The desire for this evidence is strengthened by current fears o f economic recession in 
many Western countries, driving the need for justification of the high IT costs.
Since the introduction of computers in organisations, there have been considerable 
developments in IT, allowing for new applications to be made available. These new 
applications have significantly impacted the way in which organisations use IT. 
More than just supporting functional processes, IT has been increasingly applied to 
the cores of businesses (Scott Morton and Rockart 1984). Farbey, Land et al. (1993) 
note three distinct phases in IT that have manifested during the last few decades. The 
first phase started when IT was applied to functional areas. It brought efficiency and
 ^ The approximation of € 23 billion includes expenditures on computers, computer services, 
telecommunication services and embedded systems in technical products.
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effectiveness benefits. For example, automating the payroll reduced staff costs and 
automating stock control provided better information on stockouts and deliveries. In 
the second phase, IT became part o f the individual workplace in organisations and 
was typified by the benefits associated with using microcomputers (e.g. word 
processing brought improvement to office workers). The third and present phase 
shows IT being associated with transformations and effecting the whole organisation 
in its business processes, services and products. A more detailed account of the 
changes effecting IT evaluation is given in section 3.2.3.
With organisations becoming increasingly dependent on IT (Earl 1989), management 
o f IT has become more crucial through the years. Steadily rising IT costs and higher 
expectations with regard to the benefits associated with IT have increased the need 
for understanding the costs and benefits related to IT.
As IT was generally accepted as being more strategically important to organisations, 
it demanded large sums of capital and it proved to be much harder to determine the 
exact value o f it. These difficulties started with the growing awareness that the 
economic management o f IT no longer concerned management of costs, but rather 
the management of investments concerning high future costs and benefits. Though 
the term economics is commonly associated with money or other financial means, an 
economic perspective in this thesis relates to an allocation o f any scarce resource 
(including financial means, IT capacity, etc.) to obtain certain goals. The change in 
economic management from costs to investments means a shift in staff involved in 
organisational IT (Galliers 1991 a): from programmers and IT managers to IS 
business directors and members o f the board of directors. Moreover, considering IT 
expenditures as investments broadens the scope of IT evaluation: it no longer is 
confined within the boundaries of an IT project but spans the complete life cycle of 
the information system. A life cycle from birth to death o f the system, which starts 
with just an idea, which continues as IT project when drawn up, the creation and 
implementation o f the system itself, moves on to using the system in practice and 
concludes with dismissing the related information system after it has become 
obsolete (Swinkels 1997).
15
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The issue of IT evaluation as an important topic both for managers and for 
researchers is not new. Keen (1991, p. 11) stated at the beginning o f the nineties: 
“Many senior managers feel caught in a trap. They feel that their firm carmot afford 
not to invest in IT, for many reasons o f competitive necessity; but they also think that 
they cannot afford to invest without clearer evidence o f its impact on financial 
performance.” He argues that senior managers lack a well-established management 
process for taking charge of IT. Farbey, Land et a l (1993, p. 4) stated that “for the 
past three decades managers have expressed concerns about the value they are 
getting fi-om IT investments, and for the past three decades they have been searching 
for an ideal way of solving the problems. [...] The problem o f finding convincing 
methods of justifying expenditure on information systems appeared high on [...] the 
list [of critical management issues].” A recently published journal for senior 
executives states on the topic: “[Today] it is hard to pick up an IT-oriented 
publication that does not devote lots o f ink (or pixels) to cost /benefit analysis and 
justification for investments. [...] We have seen it before. Recessions from 1970 on 
have brought forth lots o f methodical approaches to IT cost-justification” (Clermont 
2002). It is debatable whether such a development is strictly related to economic 
recession. Van Eekeren and Nijland (2003) argue that IT cost / benefit management 
continues to be a topic o f concern for organisational managers, irrespective of the 
economic climate. They note that in an economic depression cost-justification might 
receive more attention, but in economic better times, managers still face the task of 
proving insight into the potential benefits of IT investments and allocating scarce 
resources to them -  with IT capacity rather than financial means as the scare 
resource.
In academic research, the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) 
held its first conference on the Economics o f Informatics in 1961. Today, in the 
editorial o f the special issue on information systems evaluation fi-om the Information 
Systems Journal October 2002, it is said that “the number o f papers submitted was 
among the highest for any Information Systems Journal call” (Irani and Fitzgerald 
2002, p. 263).
16
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In sum, we can conclude a growing importance o f economic management of IT and 
inherently connected to it, the topic of IT evaluation. The importance is noted both in 
organisational practice as well as in academic research.
1.1.2 Problems in evaluating IT
The literature suggests that organisational managers as well as IS professionals 
recognise IT evaluation to be one of the important unresolved concerns in 
information management (e.g. Farbey, Land et al. 1993; Grembergen and Bloemen 
1997). Evaluation of IT investments is problematic not only because o f the inherent 
difficulties of evaluation (such as making estimates for future situations), but also 
due to typical characteristics o f such investments in comparison with other 
investments (Ballantine, Galliers et al. 1995). IT projects typically have numerous 
intangible costs and benefits, and they have a significant impact on many aspects 
within the organisation. These projects remain innovative and often involve (non­
proven) technology. Moreover, IT investments have a shorter life cycle due to 
continuous technology development. Whether IT projects really are different from 
other business projects remains a topic of debate (see the discussion in section 3.2.4), 
but clearly IT projects pose several difficulties in managing them from a cost / 
benefit perspective.
The main problem is being able to quantify the benefits o f an IT investment. 
Difficulties in such quantifications correlate directly with the evolution in IT 
applications. Whereas IT investments used to be financially justified by determining 
the improvement in efficiency gains (e.g. the time and money saved by automating 
manual labour), the nature of IT investments has dramatically changed over the last 
two decades (Clemons 1991; Ballantine, Galliers et al 1995; Reeken 1997). Farbey, 
Land et a l  (1993) note that today “besides efficiency, IT has the potential to provide 
wide benefits, including: competitive advantage, co-operative advantage,
diversification, marketing and effective management” (ibid, p. 7). Current IT 
investments have become focused on improvements in organisational effectiveness. 
The objective of effectiveness projects is not simply to reduce costs of existing tasks, 
but to do tasks differently to better achieve the desired results (Fitzgerald 1998). The 
justification for these projects must be based on effectiveness criteria such as 
increased functionality, product quality and enhanced competitive advantage. The
17
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strategic benefits of IT investments, such as quality improvement, cost avoidance and 
risks reduction are difficult to assess and inherently hard to quantify. Furthermore, 
the actual organisational benefits of an IT investment depend on the secondary 
effects that occur due to changes that were initiated by the investment. For example, 
the increased number o f customers of an organisation (secondary benefit) due to an 
investment in better quality products (primary benefit) is dependent on the effect that 
the customers acknowledge the quality improvement to be worthwhile. This not only 
results in benefits occurring at some distant point in the future, but also makes it 
harder to link acquired benefits directly to the specific IT investment. Similarly, 
investments in IT infrastructure will only prove profitable if the infrastructure is 
exploited in an effective manner (Renkema 1998; Renkema 2000). Because of the 
difficulty in financially estimating effectiveness criteria and the indirect secondary 
effects, these benefits are said to be intangible.
At first glance costs, as opposed to benefits, seem to pose little problem with respect 
to quantification since they are measurable the moment they occur. However, so- 
called ‘hidden costs’ contribute to the problematic nature o f IT investments (Keen 
1991; Looijen and Vorst 1998). These include background IT management costs, the 
costs of end-users helping each other solve IT related problems and the costs of 
downtime in the case of IT failure (Maanen 2000a). Moreover, (visible) IT costs are 
administered very differently at each individual organisation, making it very difficult 
to obtain a clear view of the actual costs related to IT, For example, often 30% to 
40% of IT expenditures is allocated outside the formal IT budget (Keen 1991; 
Willcocks 1996b). There seems to be no generally accepted accounting norms for 
administrating IT expenses (Davamanirajan, Mukhopadhyay et a l  2002).
Moreover, not only the quantification o f benefits and costs but also their 
identification is a problem fi*equently related to IT investments (Ballantine, Galliers 
et a l 1999). One of the most common deficiencies is not the determination of a poor 
cost / benefit figure, but rather the complete omission of important costs and benefits 
(Page and Hooper 1987). Likewise, unanticipated benefits, which can only be 
assessed retrospectively, can have a greater impact than the anticipated ones (Farbey, 
Lander a/, 1999b).
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Further problems with IT evaluation are related to the difficulties of IT project-risk 
assessment and uncertainty o f investment results. The fact that IT investments have 
organisational impacts which are hard to quantify coupled with the fact that 
evaluation is intrinsically subjective, based on individual value judgements 
(including political considerations), contribute to the ambiguity surrounding IT 
evaluation. As a result, systems do not have clear definitions for ‘success’ and 
‘failure’. In addition, investment objectives might change over time due to evolving 
user requirements (Keen and Scott Morton 1978). These aspects make a viable 
comparison between prior expectations and final outcomes very difficult.
To address these IT evaluation problems, numerous methods and techniques have 
been developed in the past to aid organisations in managing and controlling IT costs 
and benefits (Wolfsen and Lobry 1998). However, in practice few of these methods 
are used (Yan Tam 1992; Bacon 1992; Willcocks 1996a; Ballantine and Stray 1998).
1.1.3 The productivity paradox
The productivity paradox is typically illustrated by a quote from economist Robert 
Solow who wrote (Solow 1987): “You can see the computer age everywhere but in 
the productivity statistics.” Solow’s assertion counters the common assumption that 
computerisation would directly and dramatically improve productivity. The debate 
about if and how IT increases (macro-economic or organisational) productivity is 
typified by the term ‘information paradox’ or ‘productivity paradox’. Economists 
have long argued about the relationship between computerisation and productivity 
growth. Many believed that technological innovation was a major factor in national 
productivity and assumed that investments in information technology would be 
reflected in national statistics when the cumulative capital stock of computer systems 
was large enough. Thus, they would result in improved productivity statistics (Kling 
1999). But from the early seventies onward productivity has shown a much slower 
growth than in previous years in countries with high IT investments. Ironically, this 
was seen as the time when IT was thought to be the most innovative technology that 
would be responsible for ‘technological progress’ and would make just as big a 
contribution to productivity growth in later as in earlier years (Landauer 1995). 
Technological progress made in earlier years includes, for example, inventions like
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the steam engine (1765-1810) and the manufacture of steel, railroads, textiles (1865 
-  1910), electricity generators (1880 -  1925), automobiles (1900-1945), aeroplanes 
and other technological innovations (1935 -  1980).
Many researchers have insisted that IT does increase productivity (e.g. Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt 1998; Dewan and Kraemer 1998), but just as many have demonstrated the 
opposite (notably Strassmann 1985). Numerous reasons for the inability to show 
productivity growth because of the implementation o f IT have been brought to light. 
For example, Brynjolfsson (1993) blames measurement errors, delayed benefits, the 
redistribution o f organisational activities rather than the increase o f organisational 
activities (“IT rearranges the shares of the pie without making it any bigger”) and 
mismanagement due to the lack o f explicit measurements of the value of information 
(e.g. management being overwhelmed rather than helped by more information).
The productivity paradox remains a topic of debate. However, it can be concluded 
that the debate itself gives us reason to believe that current strategies of 
computerisation do not readily produce expected economic and social benefits in a 
vast number of cases and that technology alone, even good technology, is not 
sufficient to create social or economic value (Kling 1999). The debate on the 
productivity paradox stimulates the search for better ways of IT evaluation and our 
understanding of such evaluation itself (Willcocks and Lester 1999c), both in 
research and in practice. It increases the quest for (expost) evaluation to determine in 
retrospect what the contribution of IT has been, but also beforehand (ex ante) 
evaluation, to assess if potential IT investments will be able to deliver benefits.
1.1.4 IT evaluation and its usage
A vast majority o f IT evaluation literature is devoted to the evaluation o f IT 
investments, mainly discussing different methods to address the intangible benefits 
o f the investments using various criteria for evaluation. Wolfsen and Lobry (1998) 
give a good overview of some of the techniques and methods developed for this 
purpose. Considering over 65 methods for IT evaluation, Renkema and Berghout 
(1997b) conclude that the available non-fmancial evaluation methods are hardly 
supported by theory. Furthermore, the methods focus on the evaluation criteria rather 
than the evaluation process by which the evaluation takes place.
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Despite the long list of enhanced methods especially geared to evaluating IT, 
research (Yan Tam 1992, Willcocks 1996a, Ballantine and Stray 1998, Bacon 1992) 
shows that the traditional discounted cash flow appraisal techniques, such as cost 
benefit analysis, payback time and return on investment still dominate IT evaluation. 
These general methods do not account specifically for IT characteristics. Moreover, 
although they are widely used, they are not always trusted (Farbey, Land et al. 1993) 
or considered an important factor in decision-making by the organisations that use 
them (Ballantine and Stray 1998). This seems to suggest that frequently these 
techniques are being used in a more ritualistic manner -  for example, as a means to 
gain project approval -  rather than contributing directly to the evaluation purposes.
Hochstrasser (1994) concludes from his research that only 16 percent o f companies 
use rigorous methods to evaluate and prioritise their IT investments. Kumar (1990) 
shows in his research that only 30 percent of the organisations perform a post­
implementation evaluation on a majority (75 percent or more) of their information 
systems.
Despite the huge variety o f evaluation methods especially constructed for a large 
number o f goals, uses and organisational contexts, their actual use falls short of what 
one would expect. It is unlikely that this lack is to blame on evaluation methods not 
addressing the right characteristics (e.g. technical or economic criteria) for IT 
investments. Still, many new evaluation methods are being developed to improve 
certain characteristics, displaying minor revisions o f already developed -  but unused 
-  methods. Such developments still are justified by a reaction to conventional 
investment appraisal methods since “these [traditional] methods simply do not work 
in today’s sophisticated technology-led environments” (Irani and Love 2001). Such 
arguments however seem to ignore the abundance o f more advanced evaluation 
methods already available.
More radically, the failure to employ IT evaluation methods as seen in practice can 
perhaps be explained by the failure o f the methods to consider necessary sociological 
elements of evaluation, such as taking into account the value-pluralism of 
stakeholders on the subject of evaluation (Guba and Lincoln 1989). Clearly, such an
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interpretive perspective offers a major contribution to traditional evaluation 
practices. However, findings from Serafeimidis and Smithson (1995a) support the 
hypothesis that the adoption of a method is not automatically solved by applying a 
different type of IT evaluation methodology. They found in their introduction of an 
interpretive IT evaluation methodology at an insurance organisation in the UK that 
the method only achieved a limited level of success and in the end it fell into disuse 
(Serafeimidis and Smithson 2000).
1.2 R e se a r c h  b a c k g r o u n d  a n d  r e se a r c h  q u e st io n
1.2.1 Background of the research
To summarise the above, we notice that organisations attempting to employ IT 
evaluation methods do so to improve IT cost / benefit management, a topic high on 
the agenda of business managers and executives. There are many studies and 
suggestions about what constitutes a successful approach to IT evaluation, but 
research shows that in practice few of these approaches are used. The majority of 
evaluations is performed using capital investment appraisal techniques, such as cost- 
benefit analysis, payback and return on investment. There are many arguments 
against using (exclusively) these techniques for IT evaluation, primarily because only 
financial aspects of IT are considered which form just a small portion of the real 
impact of IT investments.
Organisations are aware of these shortcomings in their evaluation of IT, and they 
demonstrate a major interest in this topic, as discussed in section 1.1.1. However, 
despite the existence of various approaches to address such shortcomings, recent 
studies have shown that in general little has been done by organisations to adopt such 
approaches. Studies performed in 1997 (Ballantine and Stray 1998) show the same 
results as studies performed in 1992 (Bacon 1992, Yan Tam 1992): organisations still 
mainly use (simplistic) financial techniques for IT evaluation. Ballantine and Stray 
(1998) surmise that this trend of using financial techniques for IT evaluation is likely 
to continue, contrary to their inappropriateness to the task of IT evaluation. They 
contend that “more research needs to be undertaken, to ascertain what barriers, if 
any, discourage [more sophisticated techniques’] use, so as to avoid potentially 
useful techniques being dismissed as inappropriate” (ibid, p. 13).
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The noticed interest from organisations in better IT cost / benefit management 
(reinforced by the great attendance by managers to IT cost / benefit seminars and the 
abundance of publications on evaluating IT investments in both business journals and 
academic publications -  see section l . I . l )  stands in contrast with the lack o f use of 
evaluation methods that address the shortcomings in their management of IT costs 
and benefits. It can therefore be hypothesised that the introduction o f advanced IT 
evaluation methods does not automatically happen simply by their existence.
1.2.2 Research purpose and question
The purpose o f this research is to develop an understanding o f the employment 
process of IT evaluation methods in organisations. It is hypothesised that 
organisational (social and political) changes have to take place for IT evaluation 
practices to be employed. The aim of the research is not (in the first place) to 
understand the characteristics of a ‘successful’ IT cost / benefit management, an area 
o f research which already has received considerable attention, but to understand how 
the process of employment of IT evaluation methods occurs. Though we do not deny 
the importance of developing IT evaluation methods that better support IT cost / 
benefit improvement, there is still a considerable gap between having sophisticated 
IT evaluation methods and actually employing them. It is argued that this gap needs 
to be bridged if difficulties in IT cost / benefit management are to be addressed.
Powell (1999) asserts that there are investment evaluation techniques which have 
been successfully employed in other fields of application (such as in engineering, 
various social projects and research and development). He argues that IT investments 
should be evaluated in a similar rigorous manner, but “getting organisations to apply 
and stick with techniques, rather than their existence, may be the more critical issue” 
(ibid, p. 163). To understand how organisations ‘apply and stick’ with such 
techniques is the central aim of this research. It can be viewed as building on the 
topic o f changes introduced by an IT evaluation practice, and to deepen the 
understanding of its employment. Thus, the topic is organisational change and 
understanding the dynamics involved in employing IT evaluation methods.
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The research question is: “Why do organisations generally seem to be unsuccessful 
in employing IT evaluation methods that help them in clarifying costs and benefits of 
IT, even when they express the need for more insight into the costs and benefits of 
IT?”
Some words on the clarification regarding the use o f “costs and benefits”, 
“unsuccessful” and “employing” in the research question. Firstly, costs and benefits 
do not necessarily have to denote quantifiable financial terms, but can also 
incorporate (negative and positive) qualitative aspects. Secondly, the difference 
between success and failure can be classified by intent or result (based on Nagel 
1990). In terms o f intent, the employment process is successful if it achieves its 
intended goals and a failure if it does not. In terms o f result, the employment is 
successful if its resulting benefits minus its costs are maximised or at least positive, 
regardless o f whether the benefits or costs were intended. Both intent and result can 
be determined quantitatively by measurement or qualitatively by assessing the 
desirability of the results.
Note however that this understanding of the success or failure of an employment 
process is very much dependent on the individual that assesses the success o f the 
employment. Different people will have different interpretations regarding the 
success or failure of a certain case, an opinion which also may differ over time 
(Wilson and Howcroft 2002). Kanellis, Lycett et a l (1998) argue that there can be 
no single account of success, but only different perceptions influenced by context. 
The importance of their proposed interpretive approach to assess the success of an 
information system, they argue, is not in the final result but in the process itself, 
which allows intelligent consideration as to why aspects of an outcome (in their case: 
the information system, in our case: the employed evaluation method) may or may 
not be perceived as a success. This process induces awareness to change and might 
stimulate corrective action. Moreover, in most cases the employment of evaluation 
methods will only be partial ‘successes’ or ‘failures’ (Mitev 2000). When 
considering the success or failure of employing evaluation methods, we distinguish 
between failure to employ (in the sense o f the method not being employed) and 
failure to deliver the expected effects of the method (unsatisfactory effects of the
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method). In this thesis, we will address both meanings and see that both are very 
much interlinked.
Thirdly, notice that we use the term ‘employment’ rather than (arguably the more 
obvious) term ‘adoption’. The reason for this is that adoption has strong connotations 
associated with the diffusion and adoption theory by Rogers (1995). Although this 
theory is part o f our research, we would like to refrain from connecting ourselves 
beforehand too strongly to this theory, since we will also employ actor-network 
theory, which has a different vocabulary. In this thesis, employment means the 
‘initial uptake and continuous use’ of an IT evaluation method by an organisation.
1 3  S t r u c t u r e  OF THE THESIS
This thesis is organised into 8 chapters. Chapter 2 explores our research 
methodology. It discusses a number o f research paradigms and theoretical streams 
influential in IS research. Adhering to a constructivist position, the thesis describes 
an interpretive approach to this research and details the selection of a case study.
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the literature on evaluation, in particular IT 
evaluation and findings regarding its employment. Moreover, it highlights important 
views on the phenomenon o f organisations. This gives a broad perspective on the 
topics of concern for this study.
Building on the previous chapters. Chapter 4 is devoted to describing the theoretical 
frameworks that guide the analysis of the research. Two distinct theoretical 
approaches that help to understand the employment process of IT evaluation methods 
are discussed: diffusion theory and actor-network theory. Their contributions and 
limitations are presented.
Chapter 5 contains the empirical data central to this research. It starts by showing the 
organisational context o f the case. This is followed by a description of the case 
organisation. The heart of the chapter is devoted to describing the events regarding 
the employment of an IT evaluation method at the selected organisation.
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The findings from the case study are analysed in Chapter 6. Firstly, the case is 
analysed by using the difïusion theory, which though insightful cannot fully explain 
some of the elements in the case study in the case study. An actor-network theory 
discussion is then presented, giving a better understanding o f the events at the case 
study.
Chapter 7 addresses specifically the research question and its inherent paradox. 
Building on the case study from Chapter 5 and the analysis of Chapter 6, it relates the 
findings to a new understanding of evaluation and its employment process.
Lastly, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. After giving an overview of the complete 
research process, the contributions o f the research are presented. A discussion of its 
limitations and implications for further research conclude the thesis.
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology and Case Selection
2.1 In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter discusses the choice of research methodology. All research is based on 
some underlying assumptions or beliefs about what constitutes ‘valid’ research, what 
the ‘underlying nature of phenomena’ are and which research methods are 
appropriate (i.e. generate valid evidence). In order to conduct (or evaluate) research, 
it is important to be aware o f these often hidden and implicit assumptions. 
Researchers therefore should be explicit about the philosophical assumptions 
underlying their research (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). This chapter presents a 
number of dominant research paradigms in IS research and subsequently explains the 
philosophical assumptions which are adhered to throughout this thesis. These 
paradigms will reappear throughout this thesis, showing themselves to be influential 
in both the field of research (e.g. visible in Chapters 3 en 4) and in daily life (e.g. 
visible in the case study described in Chapter 5 and analysed in Chapter 6).
Acknowledging the social character o f the research and the phenomenon under 
study, this chapter further elaborates on various beliefs about the social versus the 
technical. Based on the philosophical foundations, we believe an interpretive 
approach is appropriate for our research and a case study strategy appropriate as 
research method. We describe how we conduct our research and how we have 
selected our case study. Finally, we discuss the background of the researcher, 
hopefully giving the reader more insight into the way this research has been 
conducted and ultimately lead to the results presented here.
2.2 R e se a r c h  pa r a d ig m s  a n d  t h e o r e t ic a l  a ppr o a c h e s
2.2.1 In troduction
In this section we discuss three sets o f assumptions: the conventional, constructivist 
and critical paradigms. We start out by contrasting the first two. The selection of
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these particular paradigms is based on their contrasting views and their influence on 
different streams of research, especially IS research.
We use the conventional, constructivist and critical paradigms only to the extent that 
it allows us to position our research. Specifically, the first two paradigms are a means 
o f contrasting two diverging research approaches while the last, the critical 
paradigm, is more adjacent to a constructivist paradigm but holds some perspectives 
that are beneficial to this thesis.
2.2.2 Philosophical assumptions
Philosophers ask themselves the following three types of questions when trying to 
understand how we come to know what we know (Cuba and Lincoln 1989, p. 83):
1. The ontological question: What is there that can be known? What is the nature of 
reality? What is truth?
2. The epistemological question: What is the relationship between the knower and 
the known (or the knowable)? What kind of knowledge can be obtained and what 
are the limits o f knowledge?
3. The methodological question: What are the ways of finding out knowledge? How 
can we go about finding out things?
Ontology is concerned with the beliefs about physical and social reality, existence or 
being. Ontological beliefs have to do with the essence o f  phenomena under 
investigation, beliefs about human rationality and beliefs about social relations 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). Are the empirical world and its phenomena assumed 
to be objective and therefore independent o f humans, or inherently subjective and 
hence existing only through the actions o f humans in creating and recreating it? What 
intentions are ascribed to the humans studied? For example, in the discipline of 
economics humans are believed to act out of utility-maximising under limited access 
to information. How do people socially interact in organisations, groups and society? 
Social interactions may be viewed as inherently stable or orderly, or by contrast, 
primarily dynamic and conflictive.
Epistemology is concerned with the beliefs about the origin, nature and limits of 
human knowledge. Which criteria need to be met to construct or evaluate
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knowledge? Common epistemological stances are a positivist world view, an 
interpretive perspective and a critical view. A positivist research perspective, which 
regards scientific knowledge as consisting of regularities, causal laws and 
explanations of an objective world (Ivari 1991), is dominant in Western science and 
in life in general, including in information systems research (Lyytinen and Klein 
1985; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). Generally speaking, research is classified as 
positivist if  there is evidence o f formal propositions, quantifiable measures of 
variables, hypothesis testing and the drawing o f inferences about a phenomenon from 
a representative sample to a stated population (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). 
Positivistic research has been critiqued to be inadequate and inappropriate in 
explaining the human, group, organisational and societal matters which surround 
information systems (Lee and Liebenau 1997; Susman and Evered 1978). Moreover, 
the search for universal laws is viewed to disregard historical and contextual 
conditions as potentially triggering events or influencing human action.
Interpretive and critical perspectives emphasise human interpretation and 
understanding as constituents in scientific knowledge (Ivari 1991). Knowledge is 
thus not obtained by employing natural and causal laws but through social discourse. 
These perspectives accuse the positivist world view of ignoring the fact that people 
think and act, and that people are active makers o f their physical and social reality 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). Whereas in positivist social science, ‘prejudice’ or 
pre-judgement is seen as a source of bias and therefore a hindrance to true 
knowledge, interpretive and critical perspectives argue that knowledge and human 
interests are interwoven, and the researcher, being human, cannot be claimed value- 
free or unbiased (Klein and Meyers 1999). A critical view, considered from an 
interpretive view, stresses the importance of being aware of how common 
understandings and interpretations are taken for granted. It promotes having a 
conscious awareness about what interests assumptions that are taken for granted 
serve. Ultimately, its goal is an emancipatory one, to release people from intellectual 
and social domination (Lyytinen and Klein 1985). This entails, for example, 
critically testing the validity and soundness o f arguments in the creation of 
knowledge (Lyytinen and Klein 1985).
29
Ch a p t e r  2
Methodology is concerned with the research methods, approaches and techniques 
appropriate for gathering valid empirical evidence. It deals with the systems, rules 
and conduct o f inquiry (Cuba and Lincoln 1989). Research approaches commonly 
used in information systems research include laboratory experiments, field 
experiments, surveys various types o f case studies, action research and simulations 
(Galliers 1991a).
There is no one choice with regard to these ontological, epistemological and 
methodological issues. The set of choices people make is the basic belief system or 
paradigm which is defined as “the most fundamental set of assumptions adopted by a 
professional community which allow them to share similar perceptions and engage in 
commonly practices” (Hirschheim and Klein 1989, p. 1201). By being explicit about 
the underlying assumptions of an employed paradigm, the researcher can become 
more aware of the assumptions and beliefs he or she brings to bear in his research. 
Each paradigm, while it helps to generate understanding, still has its own strengths 
and weaknesses. Applying different paradigms can also bring new and creative 
solutions and insights (Hirschheim and Klein 1989; Robey 1996; Benbasat and 
Weber 1996). Three diverging paradigms commonly adhered to in IS research are: 
the positivistic (or conventional), constructivist (or interpretive) and critical 
paradigm. These will be discussed below.
2.2.3 The conventional and constructivist paradigm
Cuba and Lincoln (1989) argue that for many centuries the conventional (or 
positivistic, scientific^) paradigm has been the one to prevail. In contrast, there is the 
less widely accepted constructivist (or interpretive^) paradigm. Both are contrasted
 ^Other paradigms compatible with the conventional paradigm include the scientific and positivistic 
paradigms. In addition, links with respect to its objectivist nature can be made to the rationalist, 
functionalist, instrumentalist, structuralist and realist paradigms (Burrell and Morgan 1979). They all 
presume that positivistic assumptions are appropriate for sociology (Giddens 1979), though they differ 
in other respects (e.g. a researcher in the positivistic paradigm can epistemologically be seen to 
intervene in experiments, rather than be a completely exterior observer. However these paradigms 
share the notation that a researcher is more or less detached from the phenomenon under study, and 
has the ability to look from a (symbolic) distance what is going on - e.g. after the researcher has 
intervened. Functionalism holds the particular view that social phenomena can be explained by 
showing their function in the constitution and maintenance of social order (Scherer 2003). etc.).
Other paradigms compatible with the constructivist paradigm include the interpretive and 
hermeneutic paradigms (Cuba and Lincoln 1989, p. 39). Links to other paradigms with respect to the 
subjectivist nature of this paradigm include the postmodern, nominalist, neohumanism, social 
constructivist, social shaping and critical paradigms (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Knights and Murray 
1994). Though these paradigms share a common (non-realist) ontology, they differ in other respects
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by the three types of questions (ontological, epistemological and methodological) in 
Table 2.1. Notice that when the ontological posture is assumed, constraints are 
placed on the way in which epistemological questions can be answered^. For 
example, under the ontological assumption that an objective world exists, it is 
appropriate that the researcher assumes an objective distance from the phenomenon 
under study (i.e. with no or only very limited and controlled interaction), as to limit 
biases and prejudices. By contrast, under the assumption that reality consists of a 
series of mental constructions, the researcher is required to interact with the 
phenomenon and its context. So too, the answers to the methodological questions are 
dependent on both the ontological and epistemological assumptions. Some research 
approaches are more appropriate for certain assumptions than others (e.g. Galliers 
1991a makes the distinction between scientific and interpretivist research 
approaches).
(e.g. an interpretive researcher is not always methodologically interested in coming to a joint 
construction of the case, but can also settle for multiple constructions from various perspectives. 
Moreover, there may be stronger and weaker versions of constructivism, for example, with regard to 
the multiplicity of reality. Interpretivism may acknowledge that a phenomenon may have different 
interpretations, whereas strong constructivism is inclined to argue that all phenomena have as many 
interpretations as there are interpreters -  each having his/her own construction. Postmodernism 
stresses the concept of local truths defined by language games, rejecting any strive for unity and 
consensus, etc.). To acknowledge differences in similar paradigms (e.g. stronger and weaker versions 
of the same paradigm) falls within the constructivist’s belief of dissimilarities in social constructs -  
paradigms are after all also social constructs. Thus, paradigms are not fixed, stable bodies of 
knowledge that can be drawn on unquestionably by researchers, since the (shared) construct 
frequently is revised -  as can be seen historically, for example, by the positivistic paradigm that was 
shaped by different schools of researchers (Giddens 1979, p. 257) and, for instance, demonstrated by 
the different schools of functionalism (Scherer 2003). For a more in-depth and interesting discussion 
of differences between various paradigms, see Scherer 2003.
 ^ Thus, when Walsham states that “interpretivism is [...] an epistemological position, concerned with 
approaches to the understanding of reality and asserting that all such knowledge is necessarily a social 
construction and thus subjective” (Walsham 1993, p. 5), it can equally be argued that interpretivism 
holds an ontological position (compatible to a relativist ontology). Ontologically it assumes that the 
social world is not ‘given’, but is produced and reproduced by humans through their action and 
interaction (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991).
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CONVENTIONAL CONSTRUCTIVIST
Ontology A realist ontology asserts that there 
exists a single reality that is 
independent o f any observer’s interest 
in it and which operates according to 
immutable natural laws, many of 
which take cause-effect form. Truth is 
defined as that set of statements that 
is isomorphic to reality.
A relativist ontology asserts that there 
exist multiple socially constructed 
realities ungovemed by laws, causal or 
otherwise. “Truth” is defined as the best 
informed (amount and quality of 
information) and most sophisticated 
(power with which the information is 
understood and used) construction on 
which there is consensus (although there 
may be several constructions extant that 
simultaneously meet that criterion).
Epistemology A dualist objectivist epistemology 
asserts that it is possible (indeed, 
mandatory) for an observer to 
exteriorise the phenomenon studied, 
remaining detached and distant from 
it (a state often called “subject-object 
dualism”) and excluding any value 
consideration from influencing it.
A monistic subjectivist epistemology 
asserts that an inquirer and the inquired- 
into are interlocked in such a way that the 
findings of an investigation are the literal 
creation of the inquiry process. Note that 
this posture effectively destroys the 
classical ontologi cal -epi stemological 
distinction.
Methodology An interventionist methodology strips 
context o f its contaminating 
(confounding) influences (variables) 
so that the inquiry can converge on 
truth and explain nature as it really is 
and really works, leading to the 
capability to predict and to control.
A hermeneutic methodology involves a 
continuing dialectic o f iteration, analysis, 
critique, reiteration, reanalysis and so on, 
leading to the emergence of a joint 
(among all the inquirers and respondents, 
or among etic and emic views^ 
construction o f a case.
The contrasting conventional and constructivist belief systems, copiedTable 2.1
from Guba and Lincoln (1989, p. 84, original emphasis)
The assumptions of both paradigms relate to different beliefs about the relationship 
between knowledge and the empirical world (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). That is, 
what researchers believe they are able to accomplish with their research work.
The ontological assumption characteristic of the conventional belief system is that 
there is a reality, in which things go on determined by certain laws, the root belief of 
which is called determinism. The existence of such driving laws leads the prime 
directive of research (or science) in this belief, namely to predict and to control 
(Guba and Lincoln 1989). Control requires phenomena be made to act in desired 
ways. For researchers and scientists adhering to the conventional paradigm, research 
is about discovering causal laws; general laws and antecedent conditions that cause a 
phenomenon to occur. Its basis for explanation is founded on a deductive-
Etic research implies that the researcher adopts a more exogenic approach to the field, avoiding close 
involvement with participants and trying to stay clear of presenting all but objective assessments of 
the situation. An emic research holds a more endogenic perspective and stresses the reality as 
understood by the participants within (Prasad 1997).
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nomological model (Scherer 2003), where deduction from universal laws brings 
certainty about the occurrence of a phenomenon. Realising that not all explanations 
o f empirical events make use o f deterministic laws, the conventional paradigm also 
makes use o f statistical laws (inductive and deductive-statistical models of 
explanation). Prediction can be accomplished by relying on statistical-correlational 
bases, where the probability o f antecedents or likeliness of the application of general 
laws to a phenomenon are taken into account.
By contrast, the constructivist belief is that there are multiple constructions of reality 
and its phenomena, devised by individuals as they attempt to make sense of their 
experiences. Entities in the world do not inherently have or give meaning on their 
own, but their meaning is ascribed by processes o f interpretation. Social realities are 
not given as “hard facts”, but rather have to be constructed and interpreted by the 
members of a social community (Scherer 2003). Such constructions usually are 
shared. This does not make them more real, but simply more commonly assented to 
(Guba and Lincoln 1989) that is, more commonly accepted. Shared meanings are 
thus a form of intersubjectivity rather than objectivity (Walsham 1993). These 
constructions might include some law-like attributions, but these are not natural laws 
that have been ‘discovered’. Rather, it just might be useful for a variety o f purposes 
to think sometimes in law-like terms. For example, it may be convenient to imagine 
that one can cause the lights to go on by flipping the switch, but that is not equivalent 
to arguing “that ‘the cause of the light going on is the switch being flipped’, as 
though that statement asserted something fundamental about nature. If there is no 
objective reality then there are no natural laws, and cause-effect attributions are 
simply that -  mental imputations“ (Guba and Lincoln 1989, p. 86). Rather than 
stating (conventionally) that every observed action (effect) has a cause and every 
cause has an effect, the constructivist assumption is that any observed action is the 
resolution of a large number of mutual, simultaneous shapers, each o f which is 
constantly shaping and being shaped by all other shapers. There are no simple linear 
cause and effects. The purpose of research in this constructivist belief is aimed at 
producing (local) understanding (Klein and Meyers 1999) and making sense of the 
phenomenon under study. This entails the understanding of the studied phenomenon 
in its context, and the process whereby the phenomenon influences and is influenced 
by its context (Walsham 1993). Interpretive studies have the intent to understand the
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deeper structure of a phenomenon, which it is believed can then be used to inform 
other settings (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). They are not intended to ‘falsify’ 
theories, but to develop theories as ‘sensitising devices’ to view the world in a certain 
way (Klein and Meyers 1999).
2.2.4 The critical paradigm
In comparing and contrasting paradigms, Burrell and Morgan (1979) note that not 
only can paradigms be classified along a ‘objectivist-subjectivist’ dimension, as was 
done above, but also by an ‘order-conflict’ dimension^. The ‘order’ or unitary view 
emphasises a social world characterised by unity, order, stability, integration, 
consensus and functional coordination. Social groups and organisations are viewed 
as being united under an umbrella of common goals and striving toward their 
achievement (Morgan 1986). It regards conflict as a rare and transient phenomenon, 
which can be removed through appropriate (managerial) action. By contrast, the 
‘conflict’ or pluralist view stresses change, conflict, disintegration and coercion. The 
pluralist view emphasises the diversity of individual and group interests. Formal 
goals are just of passing interest to the social group and to organisations. It regards 
conflict as inherent and enduring and stresses the potentially positive or functional 
aspects of it.
The conventional paradigm is located on the unitary side o f this spectrum. A 
paradigm that is typically located on the pluralist side is the critical paradigm. 
Ontologically speaking, it is compatible with the constructivist paradigm in that it 
adheres to the same premise that social reality is historically and socially constituted 
in human action and interaction. However, social reality is also understood to possess 
some global structural properties which tend to dominate human experience 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). Proponents of the critical paradigm assume that 
people can consciously act to change their social and economic conditions, but does 
however also recognise that human ability to improve their conditions is constrained
’ Other researchers that have provided similar frameworks for classifying these paradigms also use the 
‘order-conflict’ dimension. For example, Knights and Murray (1994) use this dimension, while on 
another dimension contrast the global and the local level o f research. The global focuses on the 
systemic and structural factors (whether for example changes come from technological innovation or 
class and gender interests) and the local on the complexities and specificities of given cases.
34
Ch a p t e r  2
by various forms o f social, cultural and political domination as well as natural laws 
and resource limitations (Klein and Meyers 1999).
Moreover, the critical paradigm stresses the pluralist view in terms of social relations 
which are seen to be inherently conflicting. Whereas the constructivist view deals 
with questions about the subjective meanings actors are creating and adheres to a 
status quo o f the social order, the critical view makes an attempt to uncover and deal 
with social conflicts and the distribution of power (Scherer 2003). The contradictions 
inherent in existing social forms lead to inequalities and conflicts, from which new 
social forms emerge (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). An important objective of 
critical research is “to create awareness and understanding of the various forms of 
social domination, so that people can act to eliminate them” (ibid, p. 19). By 
promoting emancipation, the critical paradigm purports that people can enhance the 
opportunities for realising human potential (Alvesson and Willmott 1992a).
Epistemologically, critical researchers argue that interpretation o f the social world is 
needed, but not sufficient. In addition, the material conditions o f domination need to 
be understood and critiqued. This leads methodologically to interpretive research 
methods that go beyond the self-understanding o f participants and include critical 
analyses by means of particular theoretical frameworks. There are, however, no 
commonly agreed upon and accepted theories or explanations in this respect yet 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). In fact, empirical analytical methods normally 
associated with the conventional paradigm can be considered completely legitimate 
both in the study of natural and mathematical science as in the social sciences 
(Lyytinen and Klein 1985). The point is always to be critical about the methods 
employed and the suitability to the goals. The critical paradigm, on the other hand, 
tries to break open the exclusive validity of traditional scientific methods in order to 
include the hermeneutic methods as well. No matter which methods are chosen, the 
researcher should always be aware o f their limitations and the validity as it relates to 
the research goals.
2.2.5 Theoretical approaches: the social and the technical
By acknowledging that the topic of our research has both social as well as technical 
aspects, we believe it is crucial to discuss the relationship (and dichotomy) between
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the social and the technical in order to pinpoint our research approach. Different 
positions lead to different theoretical strands, a common occurrence in IS research. In 
this section we will discuss some of these relationships to better establish our 
research methodology.
Seen as two extreme forms, there are theories favouring technological determinism 
on the one hand and theories favouring social determinism on the other. In the former 
view, information systems are regarded primarily as technical systems with social 
consequences. Problems regarding IT are technically complex and can be solved by 
using sophisticated technical solutions (tools, methods, models and principles). In the 
latter view, information systems are believed to be social systems that are technically 
implemented. They serve as the agent for significant social interactions, which 
implies their connection to human communication through the medium of language 
(Hirschheim, Klein et a l  1995). IT thus is seen by its nature to be a social 
construction, since its existence depends on social institutions like language, the 
legitimacy and control of power, social influences and other norms of behaviour. In 
fact, it can be claimed from this perspective that all technological solutions are social 
solutions. Moreover, the design and management problems of IS are regarded as 
dealing primarily with social complexity and only secondarily with technological 
complexity. Yet, the mainstream literature continues to deal with information 
systems as a one-dimensional technological issue (ibid, p. 2).
This perspective on information systems brings to bear certain assumptions about 
what is social and what is technical. Different beliefs or theories on this include 
technological determinism, social shaping and social determinism, socio-technical 
theories and the social construction of technology. Relying on the views of Knights 
and Murray (1994), these theories, their underlying assumptions and the degree to 
which they relate to the above-mentioned paradigms will be discussed below.
Technological determinism
The primary concern of theories about organisational change based on technological 
determinism is to measure the correlation between organisational performance and 
organisational structure with regard to different production technologies. Such 
theories assume that the type of production technology largely determines
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management performance, organisational structure and organisational behaviour, 
more so than (universal) administrative structures, interpersonal behaviour and 
leadership styles. For example, studies based on such theories demonstrate that the 
type of technology used largely determined the levels of conflict (Sayles 1958) and 
feelings of job dissatisfaction (Blauner 1964) in organisations.
Innovation theories based on technological determinism argue that technologies 
develop within paradigms and logic that reside within these technologies. The 
primary drive for technological progress and diffusion is considered technology, 
relatively independent of economic and social conditions (Nelson and Winter 1977). 
Ignoring the latter has been criticised as a major flaw in this aspect of determinism. 
Its tendency to neglect environmental and socio-political contexts has been widely 
criticised. For instance, the ten-fold increase in computer calculation speeds every 
five years is not inherently linked to some technological trajectory or natural law 
(often denoted as Moore’s law, based on the paper by Moore 1965), but rather a self- 
fulfilling prophecy due to computer developers’ beliefs in the necessity for achieving 
competitive advantage (Mackenzie 1990).
Despite criticisms, Knights and Murray (1994) argue that technological determinism 
still has a firm place in research, though often only implicitly. IT is attributed an 
inherent progressive role based on the supposedly innate qualities of the technology. 
For example, IT has been accorded with forces that automatically make enterprises 
more effective, flexible and adaptable; that make them less hierarchical and more 
democratic; that increase their learning capabilities and their productivity as well. 
Technological determinism seems naive in ascribing such an autonomous and 
independent role of “neutral” change agent to IT. As such, it has been criticised for 
ignoring the issues of power and politics in organisational change. Technological 
determinism typically adheres to a conventional paradigm.
Social shaping and social determinism
A reaction to the strong influence o f technological determinism in technology studies 
is the social-shaping model. It stresses the human element within the technology 
itself. Physical objects constituting technology are meaningless outside of human 
activity and the knowledge associated with them. Technology and its development
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are not seen as neutral and are therefore political to some extent. Far from shaping 
society, technology itself is shaped by the interests o f powerful groups (e.g. scientific 
communities) or classes (e.g. capitalism), at least according to the proponents o f the 
social-shaping model. The global context of broader cultural and socio-economic 
practices in society is considered paramount in mobilising support for particular 
technological decisions and strategies. For example. Carpenter and Feroz (2001) 
argue that in the context of American state governments all resistance to generally 
accepted accounting principles will ultimately fail. Not due the merits o f the 
accounting techniques, but because of the potency o f the institutional social pressures 
that result from the well-organised professional accounting in the governmental 
institutional field. On the far end, we find social determinism, which suggest all 
technological change is guided by an omnipotent and unseen hand that serves the 
capitalist or other interests. Technologies are perceived to be reified social relations. 
Through the medium of technological artefacts, domination and exclusion hide 
themselves under the guise of natural and objective forces (Latour 1999b). These 
theories are supported by a critical paradigm (see section 2.2.4).
Social shaping has been criticised for its narrow focus on political and social 
interests. As a result of its restricted scope focusing on social interests, it neglects the 
broader contextual issues that may be more unintended and often contradictory to 
particular interests. Social and technical relations often occur not as the direct 
outcome of the interests o f individuals or groups, but as their unintended 
consequences. Moreover, the explanatory status of focusing on interests can be 
questioned since such interests are not autonomous forces that created themselves, 
but are often already an outcome o f the exercise of power and other interests.
Socio-technical approaches
Taking a somewhat middle position between the theories o f technological and social 
determinism are the theories that seek a different conception o f the relationship 
between these two determinisms. The socio-technical perspective perceives the 
positive effects of technology as depending on both social factors and the technical 
qualities o f the technology itself. Acknowledging the importance o f variations in the 
organisational contexts of IT applications has led, for example, to the advocacy of 
user involvement in systems design.
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Within IS research, a socio-technical approach is an attempt to understand the notion 
of ‘information systems’ not only as technology, but to include the idea of social 
practices as well. In the 1980’s, a socio-technical approach was visible in the practice 
of systems development. It can be seen in the work of Markus and Robey (1988) 
who suggest an interactive approach when discussing the causal structure used in 
explaining IT-related change. Such an interactive approach posits that the way we 
use IT is a function of the interaction between both human choice and technological 
(and contextual) characteristics. Mumford and Hensall (1979) propose a participative 
approach in the design o f information systems. Davis, Bagozzi et a l  (1989) discuss a 
technology-acceptance model to predict how users will respond to computer systems. 
This model aims to help in altering the nature o f the systems and the implementation 
processes to improve user acceptance. Agarwal and Prasad (1998) propose a socio- 
technical approach to systems design to make systems compatible with preferred 
workflows and behaviour patterns.
The socio-technical approaches share a common view of the social issues related to 
technology in that they hold on to a ‘rational’ technical perspective, which is limited 
in understanding the social. In such, these approaches have been called ‘socially 
naive’ (Avgerou 2002, p. 54). Though these approaches acknowledge both a social 
and technical side to information systems, they are treated independently and viewed 
from a similar (realist) paradigm.
Another limitation of the socio-technical approach is its lack of regard for 
organisational politics. It grants technologists the role of a ‘neutral’ change agent in 
organisational change and system development, thereby overlooking the fact that 
there may not be a neutral position in terms of desired goals or a shared notion on 
what constitutes a successful system. It favours a very rational view of technological 
and organisational change in that it neglects the various interpretations o f what 
technology does and whether or not it is beneficial. Politics, unless they can be 
mobilised in favour of managerial goals, are considered disruptive.
More sophisticated forms of socio-technical approaches broaden their scope to 
include context and politics. However, they still demonstrate a limited (technology-
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led) paradigm, compatible with a conventional one. Rather than a “matter o f [...] 
‘needing to understand the organisational context, the stakeholders and the politics 
involved’ (Meyers, Lee et al. 2000), which is ontologically realist, [socio-technical 
approaches should aim to] understand how a phenomenon is collectively constructed 
as real, which is ontologically constructivist“ (Mitev forthcoming).
Social construction of technology
The approach o f the social construction o f technology challenges the boundary 
between the technical and the social. Denying all a priori distinction between what is 
social and what is technical, it argues that the world can be perceived to exist out of 
heterogeneous networks (Law 1992) made up o f human and non-human actors. The 
social construction of technology denies giving a dominant role to either the 
technical (e.g. in technological determinism) or the social (e.g. in social shaping and 
determinism). Instead o f understanding technology as black-box with innate 
qualities, social constructionists seek to understand why particular technologies 
emerge and how they are adapted (Bijker, Hughes et al. 1987). They argue that the 
success or failure of technological innovations is not just a matter of technological 
attributes but dependent on the interpretative action from people in their social 
context. Moreover, technologies continue to be (re)shaped during their use.
Critiquing social shaping and social determinism, Latour (1999b, p. 198, original 
italics) argues: “Society is constructed, but not socially constructed. Humans, for 
million of years, have extended their social relations to other actants with which and 
with whom they have swapped many properties and formed collectives.” He argues 
for more consideration o f the influence of (technical) nonhumans in human action, 
since “humans are no longer by themselves” (ibid, p. 190). Technical artefacts, 
constructed in other times and other places, influence our current actions.
However, “in artefacts and technologies we do not find the efficiency and 
stubbornness o f matteri' (ibid, p. 190, my italics), rather in the delegation to these 
nonhumans it is that “an action, long past, of an actor, long disappeared, is still active 
here, today” (ibid, p. 189). Of course matter has properties of its own (think o f the 
inherent physical properties of concrete in speed bumps, as seen in the example 
below), but that does not “imprint chains of cause and effect onto malleable humans”
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(ibid, p. 190). Rather, “society and matter exchange properties" (ibid, p. 190), but not 
deterministically. Some of the characteristics o f nonhumans become human, and 
some of the characteristics o f humans become nonhuman. Resulting action is not a 
property of either the technical or the social, but rather o f their association -  a 
‘property’ o f the associated entities (in an actor network -  which will be discussed 
further in section 4.3).
Latour gives the example of two conflicting expressions; “Guns kill people” versus 
“Guns do not kill people, but people kill people”. He argues it is neither the sole 
properties o f the gun, nor inherent bad qualities in the personalities of people that 
account for the action o f killing; rather it is the association o f the gun and the person 
which together (in a composite actor gun-person) are equally responsible for such 
action. Another example shows that social actions or intentions can be delegated to 
technical artefacts. Speed bumps slow down the speed o f cars: concrete has been 
delegated a program o f  action, that of policemen*. The speed bump translates the 
driver’s goal from ‘slow down so as not to endanger pedestrians’ to ‘slow down and 
protect my car’s suspension’. The action of slowing down the car no longer requires 
a policeman to be present. Similarly, such delegated actions (from long ago and 
disappeared actors) can be argued to be present in all non-humans around us. Latour 
states: “I live in the midst of technical delegates; 1 am folded into nonhumans” (ibid, 
p. 189).
Thus, the ontological belief is that reality is neither technologically determined nor 
socially constructed (i.e. a shared construction formed by social groups), but a 
collective o f  humans and nonhumans', a heterogeneous network of human and non­
human actors.
2.2.6 Conclusion on paradigms and theoretical approaches
In our discussion, we have highlighted three paradigms influential in academic 
research, namely, the conventional, the constructivist and the critical paradigms. We 
acknowledge that such models have an impact on the way research is conducted and 
the results it finally yields. It is therefore important to be explicit about which models 
are central to this thesis.
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In briefly discussing the different paradigms and theories about what is social and 
technical and by contrasting them and displaying them as extremes we have gained a 
means to position our research and its underlying assumptions. We assume that this 
provides sufficient information to aid in understanding the background of this 
research, given that we do not intend to apply mechanically one specific paradigm or 
ignore completely the notions of other paradigms.
Though we do not regard the conventional paradigm illegitimate for research, we do 
contend that it is not appropriate to our goal o f developing an understanding of the 
(social) dynamics involved in the employment of evaluation methods. In this sense, 
we agree with Scherer (2003) that a researcher should not just follow one of the 
different modes of explanation (be it conventional, constructivist, or other) which 
might provide different but equally valuable insights, but rather should deliberately 
pick a paradigm that coincides with his or her research interest; one that is more 
appropriate to the research goals. For this reason, a constructivist interpretive 
approach that allows interpretation, analysis and understanding o f the phenomenon 
of IT evaluation employment is adhered to in this research. The analysis part of our 
research does touch upon ideas related to the critical paradigm, specifically when we 
uncover taken-fbr-granted assumptions related to IT evaluation and its methods. 
However, it is not our aim to explore in-depth where these assumptions stem fi'om or 
what interests they may serve, but merely to raise awareness that such commonsense 
assumptions do exist and may be critiqued. We do, however, adhere to notions o f a 
pluralist view, acknowledging differences in the interests of social actors and 
possible conflicts.
With respect to the social versus the technical debate, we acknowledge that both are 
influential in the use and employment o f IT evaluation methods. Adhering to neither 
one of the extremes of determinism, we adopt a more central position. As we shall 
see in Chapter 4, we employ the diffusion theory on the one hand, which can be 
regarded a socio-technical approach^, and the actor-network theory on the other
* In French, speed bumps are actually called ‘sleeping policemen’.
’ In its origin, the diffusion theory can be regarded as a theory applying a technologically 
deterministic stance, focusing primarily on the technical qualities of an innovation. In later versions, 
this theory encompasses more social aspects from an instrumental point of view.
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hand, to which the social construction o f  technology is central. As will become clear 
in the subsequent chapters, our preference will go to the latter, which is more 
compatible to the constructivist paradigm that is central to this thesis.
This section has laid the foundations o f our research and leads us to an approach that 
is considered ^propriate for research: the interpretive research approach and the 
case study as a research method.
13  R e s e a r c h  a p p r o a c h , m e t h o d  a n d  c a s e  s e l e c t i o n
2.3.1 Introduction
Building on the foundations of the previous section, this section describes what an 
interpretive research approach means to IS research. Furthermore, it elaborates on the 
case study research as the research method we choose to provide valid data for our 
analysis. Details are provided about which case is selected for study and how data are 
gathered and analysed.
2.3.2 Interpretive research in information systems
Recent IS research is inclined more and more towards interpretive research 
(Walsham 1993). It is based on the constructivist paradigm that social theory should 
not be based solely on empirical observations stemming from general laws, but to 
understand the social, one should understand the reasons for the action o f an actor. 
Interpretive research is considered more holistic (as opposed to reductionistic) by 
acknowledging that there can be multiple interpretations o f the same phenomenon. 
Interpretive studies reject the possibility of an ‘objective’ account o f events, opting 
instead for a relativistic understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Orlikowski 
and Baroudi 1991). To understand and be able to theorise about a phenomenon, the 
interpretive research needs to get ‘inside’ the phenomenon; not observe it from a 
distance. Valid knowledge is gained through an understanding o f the different 
interpretations and meanings people ascribe to their actions.
Though generalisation in a law-like cause-effect manner is not considered 
appropriate, interpretative research can be used to inform other situations or 
construct theories. Thus, Walsham argues that interpretive research can be
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generalised in four ways: either by the development of concepts (which can become 
part of a theory), generation of theory, drawing specific implications in a particular 
domain o f action or contributing to the richness o f insight (Walsham 1995).
Within the IS discipline, a number of interpretive approaches have been employed in 
IS research such as phenomenology (Boland 1985), soft systems methodology 
(Checkland 1981) and ethnography (Orlikowski 1989; Prasad 1997).
Though the interpretive approach has been criticised for lacking rigour, precision and 
credibility, these criticisms have not taken into account that interpretive research is 
based on a constructivist paradigm and erroneously judge interpretive research on the 
criteria o f conventional paradigm. Such criticisms include interpretive research as 
being unable statistically to generalise, to falsify hypotheses and to exclude biases 
from the researcher. From a constructivist paradigm these are not considered valid 
critiques. A response to them is given in the discussion of the case study approach in 
the next section.
Relevant critiques come fi’om Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991, p. 18), who show four 
strands of criticisms with regard to interpretive research. First of all, interpretive 
research does not examine the (often external) conditions that give rise to certain 
meanings and interpretations. Secondly, it fails to explain unintended consequences 
of action (Giddens 1979), since they cannot be understood by referring to the 
intentions o f humans concerned. Thirdly, it does not address the structural conflicts 
within society. In other words, the interpretive perspective cannot account for 
situations where actors’ accounts of action and intentions are inconsistent with their 
actual behaviour. Individuals are not always in a position to give a full account of 
their actions or intentions. More often, all they can offer are anecdotes o f what they 
did and the reasons for their actions (Giddens 1984). And lastly, interpretive research 
does not explain how a particular social order historically came to be what it is and 
how it is likely to vary over time.
These criticisms are (partly) addressed by employing an interpretive approach that 
stems from the social construction of technology, namely the actor-network theory. 
This approach, and its own criticisms, is discussed in Chapter 4.
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2.3.3 Case study strategy
A number of alternative approaches to IS research include laboratory experiments, 
field experiments, surveys, case studies, phenomenological studies, longitudinal 
studies and action research (Galliers 1985). According to Walsham (1993) case 
studies are perhaps the most appropriate strategy for conducting empirical research 
from an interpretive stance. It has been an accepted method for research in 
information systems for some time (Benbasat, Goldstein et a l 1987). Case studies 
are defined as an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary issue or event 
within its real-life context, especially where the boundary between such issues or 
events and its context is not clearly defined, and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used (Yin 1989). The case study allows for ‘thick description’, which 
gives the researcher access to the subtleties o f changing and multiple interpretations 
(Walsham 1995) which otherwise would have been lost. The aim of case-study 
research is not to say that the account given is what ‘really happened’, rather it is to 
make an informed interpretation and analysis o f the events available (Geertz 1973).
Many of the criticisms raised against the case-study strategy relate to the fact that 
because it is specific to only a small number o f cases, it is very hard to generalise 
(statistically) to a wider range o f situations. However, as Yin (1989) argues, case 
studies are useful for analytical generalisations, where the researcher’s aim is to 
generalise a particular set of results to some broader theoretical propositions. 
Walsham (1993) argues that from an interpretive stance, the validity o f the results is 
derived from the plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning in its analysis. 
From that perspective, validity does not come from a large number o f cases, but the 
choice o f a singular case study can as easily be justified (Lee 1989). In fact, given 
limited time and resources, the interpretive approach gives more weight to an in- 
depth case study with a thick description, rather than multiple case studies, which are 
less detailed. Moreover, to do multiple case studies they should be analytically 
justified (e.g. to show a remarkable resemblance or a distinction between the cases), 
rather than statistically (e.g. do multiple case studies to demonstrate that results can 
be generalised statistically). Our situation clearly calls for a singular case study.
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In addition, the case-study strategy has been criticised for failing to meet the 
(conventional) criteria for rigorous and scientific adequacy, that being: construct 
validity (and objectivity), internal validity, external validity and reliability (Yin 1989, 
p. 41):
• construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied, including an objective and neutral, free from bias, free from 
researcher prejudice;
• internal validity: establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from 
spurious relationships;
• external validity: establishing the domain to which a study’s findings can be 
generalised;
• reliability: demonstrating that the operations o f a study can be repeated with 
the same results.
These criteria are debated by Guba and Lincoln (1989) who claim that they may be 
perfectly reasonable and appropriate within the framework of logical positivism 
because they are grounded in the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the 
conventional (positivistic) paradigm. However, within a constructivist (interpretive) 
paradigm, these criteria are not meaningful and should be, according to Guba and 
Lincoln , replaced by confirmability, credibility, transferability and dependability. 
These can be described as follows:
• confirmability (instead of construct validity): establishing documentation in 
which the root of data can be tracked down to its sources and the logic used 
in the study is both explicit and implicit in the narrative of the case study;
• credibility (instead of internal validity): establishing a match between the 
constructed realities of respondents and those realities as represented by the 
researcher and attributed to the various respondents;
• transferability (instead of external validity): establishing the possibility (by 
thick description) of checking the degree of similarity between sending and 
receiving contexts;
• dependability (instead of reliability): establishing an audit, in which the 
research process is traceable and documented.
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These criteria influence the selection o f the case, the data gathering process and the 
analysis of the case, as discussed below.
2.3.4 Case selection
The research was conducted at one of the largest insurance companies in the 
Netherlands, which will be referred to by the a n o n y m ‘International Insurance 
Company (IIC)’. It is part o f a group of financial organisations consisting o f a variety 
o f banks and insurers, in this thesis referred to as the Financial Group United (FGU). 
IIC was selected because of its experiences and on-going efforts to employ an IT 
evaluation method. It has been involved in the employment process related to the IT 
evaluation method since 1996 and this continued during 2001, the period in which 
we conducted fieldwork. Actually being present while the dynamics still were going 
on proved to be beneficial, since the respondents could tell their stories vividly -  
their accounts had not yet been tarnished too much by the ravages o f time. Moreover, 
documents and other sources of information (e.g. intranet sources) were ready-at- 
hand. On the downside, it is possible to argue that respondents were less detached 
from the phenomenon and (still) had personal agendas that could lead to tainted and 
partial views. However, this is considered endemic to interpretive research and thus 
does not pose any more problems than other interpretive researches face.
The case is particularly interesting due to the comprehensiveness of the IT evaluation 
method this organisation employed, which is not merely a financial accounting 
technique, but a methodology specifically constructed for the evaluation of IT 
investment proposals. Such cases are not widespread, as is discussed in section 1.1.4. 
Its uniqueness is strengthened when we consider the on-going effort: this was not a 
one-shot attempt, but a genuine effort to employ the evaluation method. The method, 
as we shall see in the case description in Chapter 5, has had a real impact on the
An anonym is chosen to preserve the identity of the organisation itself. The primary reason for this 
was that the process, which was considered to be politically charged, was still very much on-going. 
Even more so, it was likely to continue for some time. Publications were regarded as potentially 
disrupting to this process. Moreover, past experiences with research having publicly spread 
confidential material has made the organisation reluctant to be fully cooperative in this. Since having 
an anonym was not considered to be a constraint for gaining the understanding this research 
envisioned, both at the start of the case study and in hindsight after the analysis of the research, this 
was considered to be acceptable.
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organisation. The case therefore offers a source o f insight into the dynamics, richness 
and complexity of the employment process to be studied.
Lastly, the insurance industry is considered information-rich and one o f the most 
progressive sectors in their use o f information technology. It is argued that much can 
be learned from organisations with relatively long experience with IT and IT 
investment decisions, making the research interesting for informing other cases of IT 
evaluation method employment.
2.3.5 Data gathering and analysis
Initial contact with IIC was made using the help of a consultancy company. Several 
other possible case studies had been discarded for lacking in detail and dynamics 
when compared to the one selected. To gain access to IIC several presentations and 
discussions about the researcher were given.
Empirical evidence was gathered using multiple methods o f data collection. The 
main source of data was interviews that were carried out on site, typically lasting for 
about 2 hours. They were conducted between April and September 2001. 
Respondents were selected on the basis of their involvement in the design, 
implementation, use or evaluation of the evaluation method. All fifteen interviews 
were tape recorded, and extensive research notes were taken. The respondents were 
provided with an initial overview of questions, but interviews were not required to 
follow strict guidelines; they were more open and less structured. This flexibility 
gave the opportunity to zoom in and out when necessary. In addition, some informal 
(non-taped) discussions both with IIC as well as FGU employees took place during 
the fieldwork. A large number o f other sources include public and confidential 
reports given to me by the respondents, the intranet o f IIC and its Internet site. The 
reports included public reports, consultancy reports, press reports, technical 
documentation and annual reports. This allowed for triangulation (Jick 1979).
A heuristic approach was taken to determine the total number of interviews. Though 
it was easy to acquire more IIC respondents for the research, when no new insights 
were gained by interviewing and the gathered data was believed to be sufficient for a 
thorough analysis, we decided to stop adding respondents. The respondents were
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chosen on the basis of involvement and use of the evaluation method and its 
employment process. Consequently, the respondents worked in functional areas such 
as finance, strategy, system development, program management and several 
managers of various business units were also included.
All formal interviews were transcribed and analysed qualitatively. Analysis centred 
on the events of construction o f the evaluation method and the two applications of 
the evaluation method. Typical issues identified were: the reasons and prior 
conditions for the IT evaluation method to appear; the notion of rationality o f the 
evaluation method; the processes of justification, scoring, prioritising and decision­
making; the quality of evaluation results; politics in IT evaluation; the messiness of 
the prioritisation rounds and the appropriation and changing of the method. These 
and related issues were analysed by two strands of theories: the diffusion theory and 
the actor-network theory. They reappear in Chapter 5 and 6.
2 .3 .6  C onclusion
In conclusion, the research approach and method around which this thesis is built are 
the interpretive research and the case study. They match the constructivist paradigm 
and are considered to provide appropriate data in order to give a better understanding 
o f the phenomenon of IT evaluation method employment. The case study provided a 
valuable source of data on the process of IT evaluation method employment.
2.4  B a c k g r o u n d  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h e r
By employing a constructivist paradigm to this research, the background o f the 
researcher is deemed relevant so that explicit and implicit ideas associated with the 
researcher may find their origins.
The researcher has an academic background in Applied Informatics from the 
University of Delft in the Netherlands, where a Master of Science title was attained 
in 1999. This technical university can be seen to promote a paradigm related to the 
socio-technical approach. The impact o f that paradigm is clearly visible in the 
Master’s thesis, which was on the topic of the life cycle IT evaluation at financial
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institutions, and in different publications by the researcher (e.g. Nijland 2000; 
Berghout and Nijland 2002).
The researcher was employed as a management consultant during the duration o f his 
PhD research. As a consultant, the researcher was not only involved in numerous 
projects related to the costs and benefits of IT in organisations, but also in projects 
relating to the insurance sector. During these projects, in-depth knowledge was 
acquired about practical problems in IT evaluation and its employment process, 
common business processes in insurance organisations and IT developments relevant 
to the insurance industry. Familiarity with both the topic o f IT evaluation as well as 
the insurance sector proved to be helpfiil during data gathering. Moreover, the 
researcher’s background as a consultant helped to relate to respondent’s issues, 
which supported the interviews in data gathering.
The academic environment of the London School o f Economics has also been 
influential. As Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) argue, “research methods and 
assumptions are not learned and appropriated in a vacuum. They are heavily 
influenced by the doctoral program attended, the agendas o f powerful and respected 
mentors, the hiring, promotion, and tenure criteria of employing institutions, the 
funding policies o f agencies, the rules o f access negotiated with research sites, and 
the publishing guidelines of academic journals” (ibid, p. 24). Obviously, studying 
Information Systems at the London School of Economics (LSE) and Political 
Science, which promotes interpretive research, has influenced the choice o f research 
methods and assumptions -  much like social developments effect acceptable 
approaches to information systems research in general (Klein and Hirschheim 1987). 
Research at the LSE involved the shift in paradigm from the researcher’s technical 
background to an interpretive perspective, something which can be regarded as quite 
radical. The change in research assumptions by the reseacher, influenced by the 
doctoral program, is not considered a constraint. On the contrary, in hindsight this 
can be seen to have opened up completely new perspectives and provided the 
researcher with new insights. This applies not only to the research at hand, but also to 
how organisations, society and academic research are perceived and to the problem 
o f understanding what constitutes reality. And that, apart from the research ambition
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to contribute to the field o f IT evaluation research, has been one of the most 
important reasons for undertaking this research.
2.5 C o n c l u sio n
In sum, this research can be seen to be located at the constructivist end of the 
paradigm spectrum. Both social and technical issues are considered to influence the 
phenomenon under study. The interpretive approach to conduct research is regarded 
as appropriate and the case-study strategy has been chosen since it fits the 
philosophical assumptions underlying this research. These choices are compatible 
with the goals laid down in this research. A single case study has been selected 
because it offers a unique opportunity to study the complexities of the employment 
o f an IT evaluation method in detail.
In the next chapter we continue our theoretical exploration by discussing the 
literature on the topics considered relevant to our research. Both this chapter and the 
next demonstrate with which background knowledge and beliefs we enter our 
research.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
3.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this chapter, we review the relevant literature to establish a theoretical background 
to understand the employment o f IT evaluation concepts in organisations. We 
thereby heed the warning o f Weick (1984) that everybody has theories, but often 
they are specific and implicit. They impede understanding and act as blind spots 
since “believing is often seeing” (ibid, p .113). People see what they expect to see and 
do not learn to see what they have overlooked. We will discuss the literature relevant 
to our research and hope to make the current theories and their assumptions more 
explicit and broader in order to widen our perspective in understanding and “enlarge 
the set of events to look for” (ibid, p. 129) in our research. Whereas Chapter 2 
focuses on the underlying beliefs, this chapter focuses directly on the topics relevant 
to our research.
The research purpose is concerned with “understanding the employment of 
evaluation methods in organisations" (see section 1.2.2). This phrasing shows three 
relevant parts: evaluation methods, their employment and organisations. Each part 
will be examined in more detail in the following sections. We will start by examining 
evaluation and its methods. We will review the literature on evaluation in general 
and IT evaluation in particular. We will continue with a discussion about the 
literature on the employment of evaluation processes, evaluation results and 
evaluation methods and will end by discussing a selection of organisational 
literature. From the literature on organisations, it will become apparent that a 
particular view on organisations can shape the understanding of how they behave 
with respect to the use and employment of evaluation concepts.
3.2 E v a l u a t i o n  METHODS
3.2.1 Introduction
In this section we discuss the meaning o f evaluation. What do we mean by 
evaluation? In particular the evaluation of IT is addressed and why it seems 
especially difficult. In addition, we discuss IT evaluation methods. Finally, two
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recent shifts in underlying perspectives (related to issues discussed in Chapter 2) on 
IT evaluation are presented: the interpretive and critical perspective.
3.2.2 Understanding evaluation
To understand IT evaluation, it seems reasonable to first try to understand exactly 
what evaluation means. However, constructing a definition of evaluation is difficult. 
A first observation of the word evaluation shows that it can denote both a process 
(e.g. the activity of evaluating) and a result (e.g. the findings or result o f an 
evaluation). This distinction is important since evaluation processes can have a 
significant impact quite separate from the actual findings of an evaluation (Willcocks 
1996b). For example, evaluation processes can be usefiil in helping people clarify 
what they are doing, in establishing priorities, focusing resources and activities on 
specific outcomes and identifying areas of weakness even before data are collected 
(Patton 1987).
A common aspect in many understandings and definitions of evaluation is the 
assessment o f value or worth (Legge 1984; Willcocks 1996a). Legge argues: “We all 
evaluate, that is assess, against implicit or explicit criteria, the value or worth of 
individuals, objects, situations and outcomes, informally and often unconsciously 
every day of our lives. The reasons we do this are a source of considerable 
controversy, but it appears that we require a rationale for the choices that are 
supposed to shape our actions” (Legge 1984, p. 3). As such, evaluation might even 
be claimed to be a ‘natural human desire’ (Hirschheim and Smithson 1988). Beside 
this informal evaluation, formal evaluation seeks to contribute by providing decision­
makers, directly or indirectly, with an objective and reliable information base to 
facilitate decision-making (Legge 1984, p. 5).
In ex ante situations, evaluation often is related to the assumption o f scarce 
organisational resources (e.g. financial budget or IT personnel), which demands that 
proposed investments be evaluated and resources allocated in the direction believed 
to be most fruitful (Legge 1984; Parker, Benson et al. 1988; Berghout 1997). In 
these situations, many researchers therefore link evaluation to organisational 
processes such as organisational decision-making or policy making (Palumbo 1987). 
By contrast, in ex post situations, evaluations are related to measuring how well
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something meets a particular expectation, objective or need (Hirschheim and 
Smithson 1988). In general, researchers agree that an important tlmction of 
evaluation is to provide information for decision-making (Weiss 1972). The 
assumption is that evaluation provides feedback about the products and processes of 
a change (i.e. a project or investment proposal), which reduces uncertainty for the 
decision-maker, and enables him or her to adopt a more controlling, proactive and 
less ad hoc reactive position (Legge 1984).
Another complexity in understanding evaluation is its development through time. 
Cuba and Lincoln (1989) discuss three changed meanings that have been assigned to 
evaluation in the area of education policy and practice in the United States for the 
past hundred years. These three generations of evaluation are a generation of 
measurement where different variables were measured using developed 
measurement instruments for students; a generation of description, where variations 
from a stated objective (such as programs and strategies) were described', a 
generation of judgment, where evaluators as objective outsiders were to judge their 
findings against certain defined standards and intrinsic or contextual values. Each 
subsequent generation represented a step forward, both in the range o f substance as 
well as in its level of sophistication, Cuba and Lincoln themselves propose another 
fourth generation of evaluation meaning in which the negotiation of different claims, 
concerns and issues from various stakeholders is central.
Understanding evaluation related to its functions and purposes is intricate as well. 
The IT evaluation literature shows that evaluation can serve many various objectives 
(e.g. Kumar 1990; Farbey, Land et a l  1993; Ballantine and Stray 1998; Powell 
1999):
1. To justify investments;
2. To enable organisations to decide between competing projects (which claim 
the same resources);
3. To enable decisions concerning expansion, improvement or the postponement 
of projects;
4. To gain information for project planning;
5. To act as a control mechanism over expenditure, benefits and the 
development and implementation o f projects;
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6. To act as a learning device enabling improved appraisal and systems 
development to take place in the future;
7. To evaluate and train personnel responsible for systems development and 
implementation;
8. To ensure that systems continue to perform well;
9. To enable decisions concerning the adaptation, modification or dismissal o f 
information systems;
10. To allocate (and distribute) costs and benefits to appropriate organisational 
departments or business units.
In these different objectives, a certain life cycle concerning IT investments and 
projects is discernable. A life cycle approach has been promoted by researchers, 
stressing the importance of evaluation and actively managing the realisation o f IT 
benefits throughout the life cycle (e.g. ‘benefits management’ from Ward, Taylor et 
al. 1996). In IS development and implementation there are various stages o f the 
system’s development in its life cycle where evaluation practices may take place 
(Willcocks 1996a; Swinkels 1997): the proposal / feasibility stage, the development 
stage, the post-implementation stage and the stage of routine operation. It is argued 
that evaluation practices take place during the whole life cycle, though they might 
vary in formality (Hirschheim and Smithson 1999) and extent to which they are 
implemented.
During the proposal/feasibility stage, ex ante evaluations are performed to assess a 
project proposal for its financial and non-financial acceptability. The term ‘appraisal’ 
may be used for this kind o f evaluation (Ballantine and Stray 1998).
During development, IT projects are constantly being monitored and financially 
controlled. Specific cost-estimation models, such as COCOMO, function-point 
analysis and Putnam’s SLIM (see Tate and Vemer 1991 for an overview) have been 
developed to refine development cost estimates.
At implementation, assessments take place to see if the project is delivered according 
to the agreements made before development (e.g. on time, with the agreed quality
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and functionality, within budget, etc.). Project management approaches (e.g. 
PRINCE2) have been developed to assist in this.
Post-implementation evaluation concerns ex post evaluations of the completion of 
the project and comparing the realised outcomes to the expected outcomes (e.g. 
examining overspends, expected benefits, etc.). Or, in the case of radical changes in 
the environment (Farbey, Land et al. 1999b), compare outcomes to the best 
achievements possible in the new circumstances (e.g. unanticipated benefits and 
adjusted costs and benefit expectations). One o f the better known models to assess 
the success of an information system is that o f DeLone and McLean which considers 
system quality, information quality, the user, user satisfaction, individual impact and 
organisational impact as attributes of the success of a system (DeLone and McLean 
1992). Different variations on this model have been proposed (e.g. Garrity and 
Sanders 1998; Ballantine, Bonner et a l 1998).
Finally, during routine operation, the everyday evaluation o f operational information 
systems is concerned with the ‘smooth’ running o f the systems (e.g. performance 
measures, operational time, conformity with service level agreements, etc.).
Most o f the specific IT evaluation literature focuses on either or both ex ante and ex 
post evaluation, covering only the proposal/feasibility and post-implementation 
stage. The literature on evaluation during development and routine operation is 
mainly located within the area of IT project management and quality management. A 
notable exception is the work o f Klompé (2003) who specifically addresses the 
management and evaluation of benefits and burdens of operational IT.
Another view on evaluation is its classification as being either summative or 
formative. Summative evaluation emphasises the performance and attainment of 
objectives, judging if (closed) projects achieved their objectives -  mostly for 
purposes of accounting and control (Legge 1984). Formative evaluation is designed 
for illumination and learning (Farbey, Land et al. 1999a) in order to improve on­
going efforts. The majority of the ten evaluation objectives mentioned above can be 
said to be formative, whereas calculations like return on investment (ROI) and net 
present value (NPV) can generally be viewed as summative.
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The list of objectives presented above suggests that evaluation in itself never is an 
isolated goal, but that the results of an evaluation always serve some other goal 
related to managing and controlling the impact of IT on organisational costs and 
benefits. Besides these ‘overt’ goals, evaluation can serve '‘covert' ones as well. 
Covert goals are goals which one or more stakeholders in the evaluation consider 
inappropriate to admit to publicly, mainly because they serve their own interests 
above those o f others (Legge 1984). These include rallying support/opposition for a 
proposal, postponing a decision or evading responsibility. Moreover, evaluation can 
serve various ritual goals which may include a symbolic expression of an image of 
rational and accountable management (Symons and Walsham 1991; Carruthers 
1995), or the fulfilment o f an evaluation only as a requirement for financial funding 
(Legge 1984), a procedural obligation to evaluate (Irani and Fitzgerald 2002) or a 
disengagement device to denote the end of a project (Kumar 1990). Though 
evaluations might serve symbolic or ritual goals, some researchers argue that they are 
not to be abandoned blindly (Symons and Walsham 1991). Walsham (1999) states: 
“Symbolism and ritual in human affairs are very important, not least in business 
organisations, and ritualistic evaluation exercises should not therefore be condemned 
out o f hand” (ibid, p. 368). Through this symbolism and ritual, a sense of security 
and reassurance is gained (Knights and Morgan 1991). However, due to the use of 
methods in a covert or ritualistic manner, an important assumption held by many 
researchers arguing for the use o f evaluation methods proves to be false. Namely, the 
assumption that performing an evaluation automatically translates into improved 
management o f IT costs and benefits (as would the list of ‘overt’ goals suggest).
Acknowledging the existence of a multitude of different goals, including covert and 
ritual goals, we see that evaluation may serve multiple purposes simultaneously. 
These purposes may be very dependent on the perspective of the stakeholder. For 
example, those responsible for carrying out the evaluation may have very different 
purposes than those utilising the results of the evaluation in decision-making or those 
affected by the results o f the evaluation. In the processes of evaluating, people may 
wish to ‘play it safe’. They may also be inclined to provide partial information, 
thereby conceivably preventing a project fi-om living up to its full potential or leading 
to the rejection o f the evaluator findings (Legge 1984). This can be related to the
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different organisational roles responsible for IT. Griffiths (1994) argues that being 
unclear or implicit about the separate responsibilities on decision-making in IT, 
providing IT, using IT and the evaluation o f IT may cause unwelcome effects in 
managing IT, possibly leading to a too dominant role for either IT management or 
business management.
In conclusion, evaluation is a complex phenomenon with its multiple meanings and 
functions. Evaluation can be a process and a result; formal and informal; ex ante and 
ex post, summative and formative. Moreover, it can serve a variety of functions, 
including overt, covert and ritual functions. The notion o f value-pluralism and 
differing purposes by different stakeholders make evaluation an inherently social and 
political phenomenon. To understand evaluation means finding a way to cope with 
all these different elements. Matters become even more complex when we consider 
the topic of evaluation, in our case information technology and systems.
3.2.3 Evolution of evaluation practices
By focusing on evaluation in IT and IS, we can trace an evolution of evaluation 
through time. This evolution is linked to the changing role o f IT in organisations 
which in turn is linked to the value attributed to IT. The evolution can be depicted in 
a ‘stages of growth’ model (Nolan 1979) which assumes a process-based ^proach to 
gaining understanding about how an organisation evolves with information 
technology (Galliers and Sutherland 1991) and its evaluation (Reeken 1997 - see 
Table 3.1; Farbey, Land et a l 1995).
The first applications of computers were in automation. The primary goal of these 
investments was to attain efficiency benefits by substituting manual labour by 
computer processors. These applications were followed by an informatisation type of 
investments in the form of management and transaction information systems which 
made new activities possible. No longer did mere substitution of existing work take 
place, but new objectives could be attained more effectively. Related benefits were in 
terms of attaining better, faster or more results.
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Informatisation was followed by alignment in which systems were developed to 
support the whole business rather than partial functions or individual departments. 
These types of IT investment allowed for improved business competition. More 
advanced IT investments were geared towards transformation. To benefit more from 
IT, organisations’ strategies were tuned to make better use o f IT applications. 
Organisations were transformed and organisational work processes redesigned with 
the aim to provide customers with better quality and services. IT can thus be said to 
provide new ways of thinking, working, organising and managing.
Whereas automation, informatisation, alignment and transformation were focused on 
improving business processes by using IT, the anticipation type of IT investment is 
aimed at providing the organisation with flexibility. By discarding rigid IT 
components and infrastructures, these investments in flexibility were aimed at 
benefiting the swiftness by which an organisation could cope with market changes. 
Finally, the venturing IT investments allowed organisations to develop new products 
and enter new markets, thus creating new business opportunities.
Types of IT 
investment
Automation Informatisation Alignment Transformation Anticipation Venturing
Result
Characteristics
Automatic
data
processing
New activities: 
transaction & 
management 
information 
systems
Strategic
information
systems
Redesign of 
business 
processes and 
networks
Pro-active
infi'astructure
New
product/market
combinations
(PMC)
Intention Substitution Improvement Strategic fit Restructuring Flexibility Marketing
Benefits Efficiency
(cheaper)
Effectiveness 
(faster, better, 
more)
Competitive
response
Competitive
advantage
Customer
satisfaction
(Quality)
Reaction
capacity
PMC
profitability
Uncertainties Technical
uncertainty
Specification
uncertainty
Organisational
uncertainty
Organisational
uncertainty
Strategic IS 
architectural 
uncertainty
Strategic IS 
architectural 
uncertainty
IS
infi-astructural
uncertainty
Business
uncertainty
Table 3.1 Typology of IT investments and their characteristics (Reeken 1997)
Through time, the use of IT has evolved dramatically and with it the nature o f its 
investments. Through the years, IT has offered an increase in potential benefits, but 
also an increase in uncertainty and risks pertaining to outcomes as well as an increase 
in the difficulty of communicating and demonstrating relevant benefits (Farbey, Land 
et al. 1995). Though the framework is not intended to limit individual IT investments
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or impose a strict timeline, it does sensitise us to the fact that IT evaluations have 
constantly experienced changes in the object under evaluation. Today, all o f these 
types o f IT investments, including combinations of them, are the concern o f IT 
evaluation. IT evaluation methods should take into account all their various 
characteristics; or as some propose, depending on the application o f IT, appropriate 
evaluation techniques should be chosen (Farbey, Land et al. 1992).
3.2.4 The uniqueness of IT evaluation
Why is the topic of information technology evaluation relevant separate from other 
(organisational) evaluations? Is the evaluation of IT investments dissimilar to the 
assessment of other investments that an organisation may wish to undertake? Why 
should IT be approached with its own set of evaluation methods?
One could argue that IT investments are different because IT is different (Powell
1999). This perspective might be attributed historically to early researchers that have 
technical rather than economic or managerial backgrounds. When later business- 
related researchers entered the field of research, the myth that IT was actually 
different had already been established. Some however argue that IT investments are 
genuinely different, in that their costs and benefits are hard to quantify. Arguments 
that favour this position stress the large portion o f intangible elements, the 
uncertainty and risks of IS projects, the greater impact on a larger number of 
elements of the business, the immaturity of the IT industry, the unproven technology 
of IT applications and the shorter life cycle than non-IT investments (Ballantine, 
Galliers cr a/. 1995).
Serafeimidis and Smithson (1995a) argue from their case study that “while IT 
resources ought to be treated no differently from other capital resources, all too often 
in practice they were different. Much depended on what kind of IT was being 
considered, what kind of benefits were expected and, no less significantly, what kind 
o f IT is even available.” (ibid, p. 225).
However, evaluation of education, hospitals, healthcare, research & development and 
governmental programmes might be considered even more complex than IT
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evaluation (Cuba and Lincoln 1989; Powell 1999; Nowak 1991; Mayne, 
Bemelmans-Videc et a l 1992). The field of engineering can be seen to be confronted 
with similar intangibles, high costs and a high degree o f innovativeness (e.g. in the 
construction o f new factories) as in the field o f IT, but despite those complexities, 
engineering uses evaluation methods (Powell 1999)'\ Moreover, problems inherent 
in many types of investment consideration are often similar; all capital investments 
can be seen to have the following facets (Ballantine, Galliers et a l  1995): a project 
type (i.e. related to a particular area of the business); size of investment (i.e. 
generally measured in terms of the amount o f resources allocated to it); a level of 
return and distribution over time; a source o f funding (internal or external); a 
relationship to a particular organisational function or sub-budget; a risk level; an 
impact (e.g. strategic, operational); a method of appraisal and subsequent evaluation; 
alternatives which compete for funding; timing in terms o f estimated project life; and 
a proposer (largely related to functional areas). So, what is so special about IT that it 
requires specific evaluation methods?
One possible answer to this question maybe found in the innovative and new 
applications of IT. Powell contends that in the contemporary network-based area for 
IT evaluation practices it may not be “business as usual” (Powell 1999). Discussing 
three cases, he demonstrates that investments related to network-based systems, 
Internet and new types o f (virtual) businesses require an IT-specific understanding of 
risks, cost structures, benefits and timescales. Still, did the IT investments in 
previous decades then not require such an evaluation? Maybe a more satisfying 
answer lays in the oddity of the object under evaluation, in this case information.
IT evaluation is all about assessing, or (e)valuating, the value of information 
technology. Some of the problems with evaluating IT are thus said to arise due to the 
differences between information and physical goods. It is commonly asserted that 
information has certain general characteristics which make it very difficult to assess 
its value (e.g. Van Alstyne 1999; Berghout 1993). Information from this perspective 
is a non-physical thing which is easy to duplicate, transport and manipulate at low 
costs. It can also be said to have an abstract nature in the way information can
” The only difference Powell asserts with IT is that engineering through the years has acquired a large 
databank of historical information on relevant costs and benefits.
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represent collection o f ideas. In other words, the same information can be 
represented at different levels of abstraction (e.g. condensed by a formula). 
Furthermore, when information is sold or given away (through duplication), the 
seller retains the same information. It can be sold again. Moreover, the value of 
information drops quickly after the information has been made public. This attribute 
of information is also accountable for the buyer’s inspection paradox: potential 
buyers o f information cannot assess the information without acquiring it during the 
assessment process of assessment. In addition, the value of information is not 
additive: additional copies of the same information are not necessarily worth more to 
the possessor than the first copy. Finally, the value o f information is dependent on its 
use. It has no intrinsic value, but depends on its context to generate its value. Thus, 
its value can only be measured in its use.
Though such a view on information seems appealing, a different perspective is 
offered by Boland (1987; 1991). He argues that information is not some (non­
physical) thing, object, or structured data that can be transported fi'ee of 
interpretation. Instead, he argues that the essence of information is 'in-formation'': 
the inward forming o f a person due to an encounter with data. It involves a change in 
the knowledge, beliefs, values or behaviour of that person. Therefore, information 
only exists embodied in human beings and is found in the lived experience of human 
condition. Through situated hermeneutic interpretation, information becomes 
meaningful. “Information is not a resource to be stockpiled as one more factor of 
production. It is meaning can only be achieved through dialogue in the human 
community. Information is not a commodity but a skilled human accomplishment" 
(Boland 1987, p. 377). From this perspective, information is far fi-om easily 
duplicated, transported or manipulated. This not only goes beyond the notion that the 
value of information depends upon how it is used by its user, as argued above; it also 
challenges the view that the value of information can be measured objectively. The 
value of information can only be discussed meaningfully in casu and can only be 
interpreted (socially), not measured. This relates to the notion of value described by 
Legge (1984) who states the following propositions about value (ibid, p. 149):
1. Values derive from and are embedded in communities of people who share 
experience and attributed meanings;
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2. Values are ideas about what ‘should be’ to produce the kinds o f consequences 
an individual or group desires;
3. An entity, such as a change programme or IT investment, has value if those 
attributing value to it believe it has produced desirable consequences.
Thus, the argument is that due to the value o f information being a social 
construction, the evaluation of IT investments is a complex phenomenon. Though 
other (non-IT) investments may be equally (or even more) complex, specific 
attention to the valuing and evaluating o f IT is (also) justified.
3.2.5 IT evaluation methods
The development sketched in the preceding section is reflected in the methods and 
tools that have been developed through time to support the evaluation of IT 
expenditures and investments. Rather than merely performing a cost analysis, 
managers nowadays are required to make an investment appraisal. This means a shift 
tfom cost management to return or benefits management. Cost management tools 
have been exchanged for methods from accounting, such as net present value (NPV), 
return on investment (ROI), internal rate of return (IRR) and payback period (Earl 
1989). Whereas cost management tools only focus on controlling costs, these 
methods encapsulate typical investment characteristics, taking into account both 
financial costs and benefits, acknowledging the future impact o f the investment and 
considering the influence o f time on financial value (discounted cash flow) as well as 
the possibility of comparing different investments quantitatively. With this shift, IT 
investments were acknowledged as strategic investments.
However, these accounting or discounted cash flow (DCF) methods have been 
widely criticised on a number o f points (e.g. Earl 1989; Willcocks 1994; Farbey, 
Land et al. 1999a). One major point of critique is their disregard for non-financial 
and intangible costs and benefits (Parker, Benson et al. 1988). In assessing financial 
figures only, they disregard benefits common to certain IT investments, such as 
quality improvement o f products, better customer support and improved decision­
making. Also, indirect and hidden costs are overlooked (Keen 1991; Irani and 
Fitzgerald 2002). Further criticisms include their disregard for project risks.
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Typically, an investment is concerned with future expectations and uncertainties. 
Neglecting these uncertainties poses a risk to the investor. In addition, the methods 
do not inherently show the risks of not performing an investment - i,e, the risks 
associated with doing nothing (Powell 1999), Many IT investments are justified not 
because they have financial benefits, but because, quite simply, it is necessary to 
comply with them. Good examples are governmental regulations, or the need to cope 
with external developments (e,g, the millennium bug at the end of the ‘90s or the 
investments required to comply with the introduction o f the euro currency in 2000), 
Moreover, the methods favour cost reduction and short-term returns and disfavour 
innovative organisational changes and strategic opportunities (Walsham 1999), 
Discounted cash flow techniques used in the calculations o f accounting figures value 
short-term benefits higher than benefits that are long-term. The methods have also 
been blamed for turning decision-making into a “numbers game” (Bacon 1992), 
rather than help support decision-making based on a real understanding o f a project. 
Moreover, it is argued that their reduction to economic terms is too one-dimensional 
for complex IT investments since they disregard human and social consequences 
(Land 2000; Hirschheim and Smithson 1988), Their focus of evaluation is narrow, 
concentrating on the technical system in itself, rather than the intervention as a 
whole, of which the (new) system is just a part (Walsham 1999), Finally, these 
traditional methods are aimed at project level while other levels, for example the IT 
portfolio (considering the relationship to other projects), are neglected. The links 
between this investment and other investments or developments are not an inherent 
part of these methods (Farbey, Land et a l 1999a),
Focusing on the deficiencies in traditional approaches to the value of IT, Parker, 
Benson et al, (1988) in their influential book titled “Information Economics” 
critique the traditional tools in cost-benefit analysis since they cannot easily be 
applied to their six identified classes o f value specific to IT investments: (I) return 
on investment defines the financial effects from IT; (2) strategic match is the value 
derived from supporting an existing business unit strategy; (3) competitive advantage 
is the value derived from creating a new business strategy, new product or new 
approach to overcoming a competitive force or hurdle; (4) management information 
is the value derived from information support on organisational processes critical to 
the success o f the organisation; (5) competitive response reflects the value derived
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from IT projects intended to catch up with the competition; (6) strategic IS 
architecture is the value derived from investments in IT that enabled other projects 
to occur. Thus, Parker, Benson et al. redefine value o f information to incorporate 
these six elements.
Parker, Benson et a l do not discard the traditional financial techniques, but propose 
additional techniques to account for both the values mentioned above and project 
risks that might influence costs and benefits. To assess both the financial and non- 
financial (intangible) impact of projects, they propose a multi-criteria approach. This 
approach is one of many multi-criteria methods that have been developed through 
the years to cope with the deficiencies o f the traditional financial methods (Renkema 
and Berghout 1997b). The multi-criteria methods share a common usage: they (1) 
establish a set of criteria; (2) appoint relative weights to the different criteria; (3) 
score all investment proposals on the criteria; and (4) calculate final scores for each 
proposal by multiplying all given scores by the relative weights and adding them 
together. According to these methods, the proposals that end up with the highest 
score are the ones with the highest value.
Which criteria are used in IT methods to decide IT investments are significant for a 
number of reasons (Bacon 1992). First of all, they significantly impact the 
effectiveness with which IT investments are made. The criteria specify which 
projects are the ‘right’ projects to be selected, and which projects will not be carried 
out. From this viewpoint, if a ‘wrong’ set of criteria is selected, a wrong (less 
effective) set of projects will be the outcome of evaluation. Secondly, they contribute 
to the finance and management accounting function o f the organisation by optimising 
the return on investment through involvement in the cost / benefits analysis that may 
precede an IT capital investment decision. Thirdly, they are responsible for 
presenting the right ‘balance’ between quantitative and qualitative effects. 
Quantitative measures are usually necessary to understand the financial details 
involved in the investment and provide the possibility to track, evaluate and screen 
the investment once it is being carried out. Qualitative measures generally 
demonstrate the effects of the intangible costs and benefits. Critiquing the objectivity 
o f criteria, Legge (1984) argues that the selection of criteria will depend on the 
desirable consequences the investments should have. What count as ‘desirable’ and
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which projects are ‘right’ will depend on the developers of the evaluation criteria (or 
their sponsors); their overt and covert functions o f the evaluation will undoubtedly 
shape the method, possibly to the detriment o f other functions and consequences 
desired by others. Such a critical view on evaluation is further elaborated on below in 
section 3.2.7. Despite the supposed significance of these criteria, Huerta and Sanchez 
(1999) show that often such criteria are a mismatch to the actual goals of IT projects. 
Many times only financial criteria are evaluated, whereas organisational IT strategy 
is not focused on (merely) obtaining financial goals. In addition, they note that this 
does not always lead to results that the related organisations find unsatisfactory. It 
can thus be concluded that the influence of evaluation criteria on the outcomes of IT 
investments is not always significant to success, but may be dependent on how strict 
they guide the decision-making process and the implementation o f the resulting IT 
investments.
Elements typically assessed by IT evaluation methods are (e.g. Berghout 1997) 
benefits such as developing new products, entering into new markets and improving 
the relation with existing customers. In addition, benefits are seen in a more flexible 
production, improved functionality o f the information function regarding the 
provision of internal information, improved external information provision, 
improved quality of the information function and further extension of knowledge of 
the information function. We also see savings in labour costs, assets, capital and in 
improved working conditions. On the cost side, the negative effects o f these elements 
are considered. In addition, some methods take risks into account by using scenario 
techniques (e.g. best and worst case), ranged estimates (e.g. minimal and maximum 
value) or probability calculations (e.g. option theory), just to name a few. Other 
elements typically assessed are based on an evaluation approach, called the Balanced 
Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1992). It stresses a balanced approach, not focussing 
solemnly on financial aspects, but also on internal business aspects Ç^What must we 
excel at?”), innovation and learning {“Can we continue to improve and create 
value? ”) and the customer (“/7ow do customers see us? ”). This approach can also be 
seen influential in the case study (see section 5.4).
A great number of IT evaluation methods have been designed over the last few 
decades (see Renkema and Berghout 1997b and Wolfsen and Lobry 1998 for an
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overview), created both by academics as well as practitioners. These include more 
advanced financial methods (e.g. methods based on option theory), multi-criteria 
methods, ratio methods (e.g. return on management - Strassmann 1985) and portfolio 
methods (e.g. the IT portfolio method by Renkema and Berghout 1997a). The list of 
evaluation methods designed is continually growing. Recent additions to the list 
include methods for IT evaluations in general (e.g. Hogbin and Thomas 1987; 
Berghout 1997; Gunasekaran, Love et al. 2001; Irani and Love 2002) or specifically 
tailored for certain industries or IT applications (e.g. Hoogeweegen, Streng et a l  
1998; Shang and Seddon 2002; Murhpy and Simon 2002).
Although addressing some of the limitations associated with the discount cash flow 
methods, a few additional critiques have recently been added to many of these newly 
developed methods. One criticism is that in general, multi-criteria approaches are 
intended for ex ante investment evaluation only. They are used to appraise 
investment proposals. However, evaluation should also be performed ex post. The 
reasons for this are to ensure that planned benefits are in fact being delivered, to 
identify unforeseen or unexpected benefits or costs and to acquire experience for 
future proposals and projects (Farbey, Land et a l  1993). To include ex post 
evaluation and other evaluation phases (see section 3.2.1), several researchers have 
extended the scope to the life cycle of the investment (Farbey, Land et al 1993; 
Willcocks 1996b; Swinkels 1997; Ward and Griffiths 1996) and propose a broader 
life cycle approach to IT investments.
A more fundamental critique stems from the fact that most of these methods could be 
classified as being derived from a conventional paradigm. When it comes to 
evaluation, they display a tendency toward a measurement o f reality. Though reality 
may be perceived differently by different people, in the end their assumption is that 
reality is singular and independent. Problems in perceptions of ‘true’ reality are 
related to difficulties in assessing all consequences of a proposal (e.g. too costly, too 
time consuming or too hard to obtain). A lack of quality of information (e.g. its 
unavailability, unreliability and imprecision) and various cognitive ‘limitations’ (e.g. 
bounded rationality, information overload, cognitive dissonance, group think, risk 
aversive behaviour, preferences for simple and easy collectable data, an inclination to 
favour first impressions and other psychological constraints -  De Vries 1993; Mares
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1991; see also section 3.4.5) are elements that also influence an individual’s 
perception o f reality. Considering a multi-criteria IT evaluation method Berghout 
(1997) talks about an ‘increase in subjectivity’ when subsequently assessed 
consequences of an investment are connected to corresponding evaluation aspects, 
and when these consequences are scored and finally an overall score is given by 
multiplying the weights of aspects to the scores of consequences. The final score 
seems to be highly subjective and far fi’om the ‘real’ consequences. Another 
illustration is the methodology of Applied Information Economics promoted by 
Hubbard Ross Associates -  Ross 1999). It states that every real phenomenon can be 
measured; if it cannot be measured it is not real. Precisely this argumentation has 
been critiqued by Weick (1984, p. 129), calling it illogic. He argues that omitting 
attributes in a forecast or estimate that are obviously relevant to the result, since they 
could not be objectively measured, is to value them zero. Though one might respond 
that all attributes (including intangibles) may be measured, this goes beyond the 
acknowledgement that inherently different people will hold different interpretations 
o f the same attributes; in fact they will have different social constructions of the 
same phenomena. Therefore, such a response can be seen to be too connected to a 
unitary rather than a pluralist view (see section 2.2.4).
In sum, conventional ontological standpoints are lodged in discount cash flow 
methods, but in the newer sophisticated methods as well, specifically multi-criteria 
methods. For this reason, these methods have been criticised for their limited 
consideration o f human, social and political aspects (Hirschheim and Smithson 1988; 
Walsham 1999; Farbey, Land et a l 1999a) and their lack o f consideration of the 
organisational context (Serafeimidis 1997). Moreover, they are criticised for their 
limited perspective on the evaluation process that underemphasises the involvement 
and commitment of stakeholders (Symons and Walsham 1991). These criticisms lead 
researchers to propose an interpretive evaluation q/'/T  as a way o f gaining a deeper 
understanding of the different interpretations of various stakeholder groups in an 
organisation in an evaluation exercise. Thus, the purpose for an interpretive 
evaluation is to deepen understanding and to generate motivation and commitment 
(Walsham 1999).
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3.2.6 Interpretive view on IT evaluation
In taking an interpretive stance, which recognises information systems to be more 
social systems than technical systems (see section 2.2.5), it can be concluded that 
most IT evaluations concentrate on the technical rather than on the human and social 
aspects o f the systems (Hirschheim and Smithson 1988). By contrast, interpretive 
researchers claim organisations are complex social and political entities that defy a 
purely objective technical analysis. Because information systems are part of 
organisations, they cannot be viewed in isolation, but should also be considered as 
social systems. Interpretive researchers deny the ontological belief that information 
systems are fundamentally technical systems. Many examples in the literature show 
the success or failure o f an information system to be determined by ‘people 
problems’ and not by technical aspects (Lyytinen 1987; Symons and Walsham 
1991). The socio-organisational impacts are frequently the most wide-ranging. Thus, 
these researchers argue a comprehensive information system’s evaluation must be 
significantly broader in scope than methodologies such as cost / benefit analysis, 
value analysis and decision analysis. IT evaluation should take into account both the 
technical and social aspects o f a system. In order to incorporate these more 
problematic social aspects into the evaluation, a deeper understanding of the nature 
and the process of evaluation is required. Hirschheim and Smithson (1988) therefore 
propose an interpretive IS perspective to understand IT evaluation. They criticise the 
most current evaluation methods as treating individuals as though they are 
deterministic to the extent that they respond to events in predictable and determinate 
ways. And although this approach may be appropriate for studying a subject that 
does not possess a free will, interpretivists argue that information systems are 
fundamentally human and social entities and therefore require a different approach.
In sum, information systems are perceived to be social systems and an analysis 
which treats them as distinct from their infrastructure and context will lose 
correspondingly in richness of understanding. Historical, social and political issues 
may be of equal or greater importance than the technical and economic dimensions -  
for example, visible in the covert functions of evaluation (see section 3.2.1).
Discussing the three historical generations of evaluation (discussed in section 3.2.1), 
Cuba and Lincoln (1989) operating from an interpretive stance have noticed three
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major flaws in each of the generations. These are the tendency o f the evaluation to 
favour the manager who commissioned the evaluation, a failure to accommodate the 
multiple values in evaluation and an over adherence to the scientific paradigm of 
inquiry based on the conventional philosophical assumptions. To tackle these 
deficiencies, Guba and Lincoln propose a fourth generation in which the different 
claims, concerns and issues from various stakeholders about the subject under 
evaluation are central. This fourth generation is linked to a constructivist perspective 
which also can be termed as an interpretive approach (Walsham 1993) from which 
the key dynamic is negotiation. The approach they call responsive evaluation seeks 
to reach consensus among stakeholders on all various claims, concerns and issues. It 
acknowledges the fact that different people may hold different values and ideas on a 
certain phenomenon and therefore evaluate it differently; the approach therefore 
accommodates value-pluralism. A perspective on evaluation as negotiation process 
has also already been recognised earlier (Land 1976).
Adopting such a stance means quite a radical move away from the conventional 
evaluation practices since it substitutes relativity for (alleged) certainty, since there is 
no objective truth on which inquires can converge; empowerment for control, since 
multiple (possibly conflicting) interests and values are taken into account; and local 
understanding for generalised explanation, since it denies the assumption that 
(social) reality is based on well-established cause-effect relationships. But, Guba and 
Lincoln argue this radical move is necessary if we accept the basic premises of the 
constructivist paradigm in favour of the conventional paradigm; that is to accept 
that no generic or universal solutions can be devised for social problems through 
denial o f generalisation and simple, linear cause-and-effect relationships. Responsive 
constructivist evaluation instead argues that the constructivist paradigm can help to 
find and support solutions for situated, local problems.
“[A]ll these fears -  about the loss of absolutes on which to pin our hopes, about 
intolerable ambiguity, about the loss o f experimental and political control, about our
It can even be argued that Guba and Lincoln (1989) adhere more to the critical paradigm in the way 
they try to emancipate evaluators from their entrapment within the conventional paradigm. However, 
their proposed responsive evaluation is based on negotiation to come to a shared understanding of the 
évaluant, and thus leading to consensus, which is a different view from what a critical paradigm might 
advocate in viewing evaluation as political instrument (possible as an instrument o f domination).
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inability to find widely useful solutions to our pressing problems -  are themselves 
only constructions in which their constructors are trapped because of their rigid 
adherence to assumptions that have patently outlived their utility and their 
credibility. It is precisely because of our preoccupation with finding universal 
solutions that we fail to see how to devise solutions with local meaning and utility. It 
is precisely because of our preoccupation with control that we fail to empower the 
very people whom we are putatively trying to serve” (Guba and Lincoln 1989, p.47).
As can be seen fi"om Table 3.2 the shift to a constructivist paradigm also means a 
radical break from the conventional beliefs on evaluation (also see section 2.2.3).
Theorem on CONVENTIONAL CONSTRUCTIVIST
Nature of 
evaluation
Evaluation is a form of scientific inquiry 
and hence has all the attributes of that 
genre.
Evaluation is a form of constructivist inquiry 
and hence has all the attributes of that genre.
Values and 
evaluation
Evaluation produces data untainted by 
values. Values are intrusive to the 
evaluation process and distort scientific 
data by, for example, biasing them.
Evaluation produces reconstructions in which 
“facts” and “values” are inextricably linked. 
Valuing is an intrinsic part of the evaluation 
process, providing the basis for attributed 
meaning.
Accountability Accountability can always be assigned 
because it is determinable via the relevant 
cause-effect chain.
Accountability is a characteristic of a 
conglomerate of mutual and simultaneous 
shapers, no one of which or one subset of 
which can be uniquely singled out for praise 
or blame.
Objectivity of 
evaluation findings
Evaluators can find a place to stand that 
will support the objective pursuit of 
evaluation activities.
Evaluators are subjective partners with 
stakeholders in the literal creation of 
evaluation data.
Function of 
evaluators
Evaluators are the communication 
channels through which literally true data 
are passed to the audience of evaluation 
reports.
Evaluators orchestrate a negotiation process 
that aims to culminate in consensus on better- 
informed and more sophisticated 
constructions.
Legitimacy of 
evaluation findings
Scientific evaluation data have special 
legitimacy and special status that confer 
on them priority over all other 
considerations.
Constructivist evaluation data have neither 
special status nor legitimacy; they represent 
simply another construction to be taken into 
account in the move toward consensus.
Table 3.2 Contrasting theorems fi'om conventional and constructivist belief systems 
specific to evaluation, based on Guba and Lincoln (1989, p. 109- 111).
An interpretive approach to IT evaluation is supported further by Serafeimidis 
(1997), who emplo)^ the concepts of content, context and process o f the evaluation 
(Pettigrew 1990; Farbey, Land et al. 1993; Symons 1994). Thus the scope of 
conventional evaluation methods is broadened to go beyond just the content o f the 
evaluation and to include also the context in which the evaluation takes place (e.g.
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external environmental and internal organisational factors) and the process by which 
the evaluation is performed. Interpretive researchers thus claim that an interpretive 
approach to evaluation would be more appropriate than the narrow traditional 
evaluations, if the aim of the evaluation is to generate real understanding o f the costs 
and benefits o f a computer-based system and its human and organisational 
consequences (Walsham 1999).
So both from a practical point of view (e.g. hard to quantify intangibles, the 
favouring of quick-retum projects, the lack of consideration for typical 
characteristics of IT projects, etc.) as well as from an ontological point o f view 
(information systems are primarily social systems, not technical systems which can 
be evaluated in an unbiased, value-free and objective way), objections are raised 
against applying traditional methods to evaluate IT. A critical theoretical perspective 
adds still another critique.
3.2.7 Critical view on IT evaluation
Lyytinen and Klein (1985) propose applying the critical theory (based on the critical 
paradigm) of Jurgen Habermas to information systems instead of the natural 
scientific research theories which have dominated IS research. They stress the 
importance of the social characteristics of information systems, the recognition o f IS 
development as social act, the emancipation o f individuals and interest groups, the 
participation o f all stakeholders in IS development decisions and processes and the 
need for achieving consensus in the goals of IS development through extensive 
communication. Critical theorists argue that people cannot fulfil their potential owing 
to constraints imposed on them by prevailing systems of economic, political, and 
cultural authority, constructed both socially and by material conditions (Orlikowski 
and Baroudi 1991; Ngwenyama 1991). Where interpretivism seeks understanding of 
the phenomenon through description, critical studies consider inequalities and power 
relations within organisations. They propagate emancipation o f all individual 
stakeholders from prevailing systems. In the case o f IT evaluation this can, for 
example, mean that all stakeholders are given a genuine chance to express their 
arguments and views on the phenomenon under evaluation and that all o f these be 
regarded as equal partners. A joint understanding with a consensus between all 
stakeholders concerned with the phenomenon is the ultimate goal.
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Critical theory, in addition to the critique of an interpretive view, adds a critique 
concerning the inability of the methods to capture an independent reality. Instead, 
they create taken-for-granted images of the world. Critical theory argues that there is 
no such thing as an independent economic reality, but evaluation and accounting 
methods and practices are creating that reality (Power and Laughlin 1992). In their 
simplification and representation of the world, they create an image o f the world 
which to decision-makers can become reality. Moreover, critical theory argues that 
evaluators are not value-free or neutral, but exist in the broader social context of the 
organisation. An evaluation is the reflection o f the evaluator’s beliefs and 
assumptions. It presents his or her point o f view, values and criteria in a specific way 
of capturing and describing reality. Furthermore, the evaluator is limited by his / her 
mental inability to capture and understand the rich and complex context o f the 
situations and so is forced to simplify reality in models. Evaluation is therefore a 
partial and subjective view of the reality o f a situation as seen by the evaluator at a 
specific point of time.
Since information from evaluations is used for decision-making purposes, critical 
theory adds that it can become an instrument for organisational politics. Moreover, it 
argues that evaluation practices and methods can obscure the actual personal 
objectives pursued by decision-makers behind a rationalised myth and the overt 
organisational goals (Knights and Murray 1994). Ritualistic use o f discounted cash 
flow methods can, by supporting powerfiil interests, become a device to suppress the 
less powerful in organisational terms (Walsham 1999). It is however questionable, as 
Carruthers (1995) demonstrates, who is suppressing whom through the rationalised 
myth. For instance, is it the financial specialists who by their (institutionalised) 
background adhere more to the methods, and let such methods influence their 
worldview and actions? Or by contrast, is it the non-specialists who are fooled, and 
the financial experts who through their experience appreciate the malleable, 
ambiguous and political nature o f the methods? Maybe both groups are by the formal 
rational method decoupled from actual organisational practice and are only 
maintaining appearances to the outside by symbolically reproducing rationality 
(Meyer and Rowan 1991; Carruthers 1995) or maintaining their own sense of 
security (Knights and Morgan 1991).
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McCabe, Knights et a l  (1998) discuss from a critical perspective a case study where 
the concept of Total Quality Management (TQM) is introduced in an organisation. 
TQM is introduced by management to unite the organisation and secure employee 
commitment. However, their main argument is that TQM can be used to transform 
social relations. But it does so based on existing social relations. Consequently, while 
addressing some problems, TQM reconstitutes organisational inequalities and 
existing power relations. In doing so it (re)creates many of the problems it is 
intended to resolve. TQM is usually depicted as a moral and politically neutral set of 
techniques to manage an organisation more effectively by improving the quality of 
its products and services. The researchers however argue that TQM does not remove 
organisational politics. As it resolves older tensions, it in fact creates new political 
anxiety and stress. TQM promises empowerment, but instead gives a rationale for 
cost-cutting and labour-saving, thus resulting in employment insecurity.
In the case study o f a medium-sized UK, Bank McCabe, Knights et a l  (1998) show 
that TQM is to blame for anxiety in job security because TQM goes hand in hand 
with restructuring (and lay-offs). This results in tensions in the organisation, creating 
an atmosphere where people (as understood from a critical political point of view) try 
to survive and start blaming each other for inefficiencies. The case shows that TQM 
only works in this company for the people who do not have to be afraid of 
unemployment. The people who are in a more uncertain position try to make it more 
secure by only doing the work that is demanded of them, and trying not to accept 
extra responsibilities from the people who are in the better position.
A similar analysis of the concept of Activity-Based Management (ABM) has been 
given by Armstrong (2002), which aims to treat staff activities in routine functions 
for particular cost-objects, usually products. The framework encourages the 
stripping-out of all staff work which cannot be accommodated within its defined 
activities or the language o f accountability imposed by ABM. This holds the threat of 
limiting or downplaying non-routine initiatives aimed at competitive advantage, such 
as human resource management or marketing. Moreover, due to its cost-cutting 
focus, ABM can have negative consequences with regard to employment security.
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We argue that similar reasoning can be applied to the introduction of improved IT 
cost/benefit management through the employment of a new IT evaluation method. 
The introduction of a new IT evaluation method changes employees’ roles, 
responsibilities and commitments and thereby disrupts the “secure identities and 
positions they have created for themselves” (Knights and Murray 1994). It can also 
be seen as an indirect threat to employment security, since improved cost 
management can result in reductions o f staff. Pfeffer (1981) argues that changing 
monitoring and evaluation instruments in organisations can lead to changes in 
existing power distributions leading to political unrest.
One could think that the politics practiced, owing to employment insecurity by the 
employees in the TQM case, are undesirable and should somehow be eliminated. 
This assumption is a very common one in managerial literature. For example. Boar 
(2001) argues that “by far, the most difficult barrier to overcome is organisational 
politics. [...] Politics is a hard reality for the strategic change agent. [...] Better to 
protect and defend ‘what is’ rather than be at the mercy o f the change agent, or 
should we say the ‘annihilator.’ [...] To overcome politics and the inertia to action it 
causes, persuasive arguments that transcend the ability of the factions to resist must 
be developed” (ibid, p. 259 -  261).
But these politics are not unfavourable, so argue the critical researchers (McCabe, 
Knights et a l 1998), but a rational and central activity “and beneficial for 
organisations: it is through political manipulation and manoeuvring that individuals 
are able to secure their sense o f self and identity. In doing so individuals may derive 
meaning from their work that could otherwise be absent. Critically, such expressions 
o f self may serve to curb more violent forms of resistance should management 
attempt to remove them” (ibid, p. 123). The researchers conclude that TQM either 
has to be accepted as a concept that will not deliver its promises and therefore should 
not be employed, or TQM should be extended to take into account the issues of 
power, structure, inequalities and (employment) security as well.
In the field of evaluation, interpretive and critical studies promote deeper 
understanding by the stakeholders of the object under evaluation and do so by 
stimulating discussion among stakeholders (Cuba and Lincoln 1989, Avgerou 1995).
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Critical theory however goes ftirther, acknowledging the existence of political 
inequalities and barriers between stakeholders. Though critical theory does not pose 
a solution to break down these barriers, it does stimulate an explicit and critical 
reflection on these inequalities. Thus, it perceives this recognition o f inequalities to 
be a first step in the right direction of emancipation (Walsham 1993). It should 
however not only uncover that such inequalities, dominant ways of thinking or taken- 
for-granted assumptions exist, but also question what, how and why they have 
become purposive and how and why they are being or are about to be used in a 
particular context (Lodh and Graffikin 1997). It should question the power structures, 
which maintain the status quo and “open the ‘black-box o f  information technology 
and scrutinise the power relations inscribed within it which may repress or constrain” 
(Doolin 1998, p. 307). A critical approach to evaluation should show how particular 
technological outcomes or evaluation methods define and stabilise particular 
representations of organisational reality (Doolin 1998). A critical perspective does 
not offer ‘better’ evaluation methods, but a word of caution concerning the 
worldview presented by any IT evaluation method employed.
3.2.8 Conclusion on evaluation
Patton gives a nice summary o f the arguments on evaluation as presented in this 
section. Based on six different current practices of evaluation that vary in emphasis, 
(evaluation tied to goals; evaluation tied to scientific methods; evaluation as 
comparing alternatives; judgments based on evaluating value; evaluation as 
generating data for decision-making; evaluation as information providing to users), 
he concludes that (Patton 1987, p. 106):
• no single-sentence definition will suffice to capture fully the practice of 
evaluation;
• different definitions serve different purposes;
• there are fundamental political disagreements in practice on the essence and 
boundaries o f evaluation -  different perspectives involve different values;
• people who propound a particular definition often have some ego investment 
in their special perspective;
• outsiders are confused and uncertain about just what evaluation is;
• there is no reason to expect an early end to either the disagreements or the 
confusion.
76
C h a p t e r s
Thus, when talking about evaluation, the actual meaning of the term depends heavily 
on its use, context and interpretation by the people involved. This conclusion is 
important while gathering and analysing the case study results. Due to the many 
aspects that are understood by evaluation, there is no ‘right’ way to define 
evaluation. The definition of evaluation is a human mental construction whose 
correspondence to some ‘reality’ is not and cannot be an issue (Guba and Lincoln 
1989, p. 21). IT evaluation can thus be said to be socially constructed.
Within the field o f IT, the (social construction of) evaluation has evolved from a shift 
in focus fi-om costs to investment; from financial methods to more comprehensive 
methods that capture intangible aspects as well; from project appraisal to full life 
cycle management; from evaluation concepts that were focused on the technical and 
economical evaluation results, towards evaluation concepts that also focused on the 
social aspects; and moreover regard the evaluation process, the evaluation context 
and political implications to be important.
This is reflected in the development of evaluation methods. Based on contemporary 
insights, a comprehensive evaluation method should address a rich content 
(tangibles, intangibles, risks), the notion of life cycle evaluation (e.g. manage costs 
and benefits throughout the various stages o f IT investments), contingency 
considerations (e.g. apply a broad spectrum of criteria to capture the wide range of 
costs and benefits of different types of IT investments) and contextual considerations 
(e.g. broaden the scope beyond the investment itself and recognise that it influences 
organisational roles, responsibilities and decision-making) (Farbey, Land et al. 1993; 
Serafeimidis and Smithson 1999). Furthermore, it should be supported by tools and 
techniques and identify relevant stakeholders who should be involved in the 
evaluation process.
77
Ch a p t e r s
3 3  T h e  e m pl o y m e n t  o f  IT  e v a l u a t io n
3.3.1 Introduction
In this section, we will approach the employment of IT evaluation from three 
different angles: experiences with IT evaluation processes, experiences with IT 
evaluation results and experiences with IT evaluation methods. One common aspect 
shared by all three angles is that evaluations do not happen very often. We discuss 
the different reasons researchers have found for this phenomenon. Then, in the next 
section, we will discuss the different theories on organisations and organisational 
change in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of the processes involved in 
employing evaluation methods in organisations.
3.3.2 Experiences with evaluation processes
Although “everybody does cost / benefit analysis on projects, most of them are 
fictional” (Farbey, Land et al. 1993, p. 154). This citation illustrates a common 
experience with evaluation processes. Powell (1999) notes a number of motives for 
organisations not to evaluate. Among them are:
• firms not having clear objectives and thus lacking a yardstick against which 
to evaluate;
• projects being labelled strategic or must-do, which therefore may not be 
deemed necessary to review;
• IT projects often not being critically viewed if they in fact are necessary 
because “the forces for computerizations are such that the alternative of doing 
nothing is not often considered” (ibid, p. 173);
• costs not dominating, for example in financial industries, where the costs are 
small compared to the financial operations the system might support, or in 
government, where budgets and subsidies form ‘easy money’ which does not 
need evaluation;
• difficulties in evaluation due to changing requirements; having an aversion to 
too much cost control because it might have a negative impact on overall 
performance;
• difficulties in getting all stakeholders (e.g. top management) involved in the 
evaluation process and thereby degrading the value of an evaluation.
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Overall, experiences show that formal evaluations (as a process) do not happen very 
often. This can be seen to be true for all different types of evaluations throughout the 
life cycle (see section 3.2.1). At the proposal /  feasibility stage, many researchers 
report on managers making decisions based on instinct, gut feeling, ‘irrationality’ 
and ‘act-of-faith’ rather than employing a formal evaluation (Farbey, Land et a l  
1993; Farbey, Land et a l 1999a; Remenyi, Money et a l 1993 ).
At the development stage, there is an abundance of literature pointing to the poor 
evaluation of projects that make projects run out of time and budget (e.g. Genuchten, 
Heemstra et a l  1991). In fact, IT projects are notorious for costing twice as much 
and taking twice as long as initial estimations often show (e.g. Siskens, Heemstra et 
a l 1989). Research shows that the use of methodologies for system development, 
which could assist in monitoring and evaluation, are uncommon and show mixed 
results at the organisations that do use them (Kautz and McMaster 1994; Chatzoglou 
1997; Beynon-Davies and Williams 2003).
Lack o f evaluation at the post-implementation stage seems not to have changed much 
over the last few decades despite many researchers pointing to the benefits of it. 
Research from 20 years ago until very recently describes the same situations: 
managers generally do not make ex post evaluations (Farbey, Land et a l  1999a; 
Remenyi, Money et a l 1993; Berghout and Nijland 2002). Although many managers 
acknowledge the advantages for ex post evaluation, common excuses for not carrying 
them out include (Remenyi, Money et a l 1993; Farbey, Land et a l 1993; Nijland
2000):
• “if the investment appraisal during the proposal / feasibility stage was 
conducted correctly, the results should be automatically delivered -  ex-post 
evaluation then is a waste of time”;
• “the complex results of IT projects cannot be disentangled from other 
business activities or general noise in the environment”;
• “to act as an auditor or policeman is inappropriate in the organisation and will 
produce negative feelings among the staff towards IT”;
• “the costs for evaluation and measurement are too high in relation to the 
expected results received”;
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• “nothing can be learned by evaluation. If the investment already is made, 
nothing can be done about it. New investments have their own characteristics 
and difficulties”;
•  “people responsible for the justification have already left”;
•  “it is too early or too late for evaluation -  the benefits did not appear yet, or 
already have been negated by other developments”.
Researchers acknowledge these difficulties: ex ante and ex post evaluation are in fact 
not ‘two sides of the same coin’ in so far that a coherent evaluation plan before 
development would enable evaluation after development (as was argued in Farbey, 
Land et a l 1993), but rather ex post evaluation should take into account the 
environmental changes of the investment (Farbey, Land et a l 1999b). Investments 
do not occur in a stable world. The right question is then “Are we achieving the best 
we can with this system in the current circumstances?” rather than “Are we achieving 
what we set out to do with this system and to what degree?” (Farbey, Land et a l 
1999b, p. 247).
Finally, formal evaluations on the benefits and burdens o f operational IT at the stage 
o f routine operation are also uncommon (Klompé 2003). Business mangers and 
executives commonly intuitively know that operational IT returns value. However, 
what additional benefits can be gained from operational IT is not commonly assessed 
(Ward and Peppard 2002).
If, however, organisations do perform an evaluation, fi’equently the results o f the 
evaluation are not used, as we will discuss in the next section. Here there is 
interdependence between the results and the process o f evaluation, since the limited 
use o f the results of evaluations diminish the motivation to carry out future 
evaluations.
3.3.3 The use of evaluation results
There is strong evidence that evaluation results in many cases are not used by 
administrators and managers (Patton 1978; Legge 1984). This is especially the case if 
findings are contrary to the existing beliefs of the decision-makers. Legge talks about 
“the crisis of utilisation” (Legge 1984, p.6). She argues that the crisis reflects a
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deeper-rooted problem -  the question o f what fiinctions an evaluation design can and 
should fulfil. She assumes that if managers and administrators are to use evaluation 
findings, these findings must fulfil whatever function they require of the evaluation. 
Findings are not utilised, she argues, since they are frequently addressed to people 
who are not directly involved in the subject o f the research, or to people who have 
political reasons to accept a certain outcome only. Guba and Lincoln (1989) add that 
the receivers o f the evaluation results sometimes lack the power or resources to act in 
a meaningful way. Other reasons include managerial turnover (people who initiated 
the evaluation research have left the organisation before it is presented), evaluators 
who are producing results that are too academic in that they do not answer the 
questions in which decision-makers were really interested, or which come too late or 
are trivial and only provide information that those involved knew anyway, at least 
instinctively (Legge 1984).
Covert reasons include that evaluators may only seek approval of their work from 
professional colleagues, or seek only results that satisfy their own research interests. 
On the other hand, the managers involved may not have wanted the evaluation to 
take place at all, fearing that the evaluation may expose a failure or increase 
accountability. These reasons frequently denote the findings of evaluations as 
‘irrelevant’. Moreover, another major contribution strengthening the crisis of 
utilisation is that different people involved in the evaluation will require different 
overt and covert functions o f the evaluation -  most likely conflicting ones. Each of 
the functions requires different information to be gathered. Only by providing this 
information does the chance of the evaluation results being used improve.
To understand the crises o f utilisation further, Legge suggests looking at the 
definition of utilisation. She argues that the crisis of utilisation in many cases stems 
from a '^'’disillusionment about the utilization of evaluation research, rather than its 
actual utilisation" (ibid, p. 199, original italics). The common evaluation 
researcher’s commitment to positivistic research designs leads them to define 
utilisation in terms of ‘dramatic impact’, rather than ‘gradual influence‘. Legge 
concludes that “if utilisation is defined as having gradual impact, rather than 
dramatic impact on decision-making, utilisation does take place. Evaluator’s 
concerns that their research findings were not utilised, at least for overt informational
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purposes, can be seen to have arisen from their unrealistic expectations about the 
nature of much decision-making and o f the potential impact o f research findings in 
that process” (ibid, p. 198). To test if ‘utilisation occurred’ in case one accepts the 
impact to be gradually influential, is a hypothesis that neither can be proved nor 
falsified. It relies on respondent’s opinions and attributions of how the evaluation 
influences their own and other’s intellectual thought processes.
In a similar way, Bannister and Remenyi (1999) argue that evaluation results are 
only one of the many inputs in the process of evaluating IT. The evaluation process 
actually entails “the absorption of a range o f input information including data, 
evaluation techniques, personal experience, personal knowledge, corporate or 
departmental politics, personal desires and intuition”. Thus the impact of the 
evaluation results, be it dramatic, gradual or none whatsoever, very much depends on 
the hermeneutic process by which individual decision-makers filter and distillate the 
different sources o f (often complex) data, information and knowledge.
With respect to the crisis of utilisation, Legge thus argues convincingly that a 
positivistic (conventional) stance cannot be upheld (Legge 1984). If one holds to it, 
seeing the number o f evaluations not used (in an ‘overt sense’) would have to 
convince positivistic evaluators that what they are doing is not worth while. On the 
other hand, if they redefine utilisation as having a gradual influence in the minds and 
thinking o f people, rather than dramatically shaping decisions, they would have the 
problem of ‘falsification’. Knowing if evaluations have been utilised could not be 
verified or measured, but could only be appropriated by interpretation. That situation 
is incompatible with the positivistic paradigm.
The influence o f evaluations can be facilitated by getting “the appropriate 
information to the appropriate people in an appropriate form and at an appropriate 
time” (Legge 1984, p. 198), which in itself might be self-evident, but how to 
implement this is not. Important aspects in implementation include the identification 
o f relevant decision-makers and users of the evaluation, the usefulness o f 
information (with regards to the relevancy, adequacy and persuasiveness), effective 
communication o f findings and the so-called ‘personal factor’ (Patton 1978). This 
factor denotes the enthusiasm of both the potential users as well as the evaluators o f
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the evaluation and the part they take in conceptualising and designing the evaluation 
study as well as their interest in the focus of the evaluation (Legge 1984, p. 181 - 
198).
3.3.4 Influences and difficulties in employing IT evaluation methods
Apart from the reasons why formal evaluation is not often employed (see section 
3.3.2), research in IT evaluation shows that evaluation methods are not employed 
widely for IT evaluation (see section 1.1.4). Given the fact that evaluation is 
considered important and that evaluation methods are employed in other fields, are 
recognised as useful (Powell 1999) and can bring within reach a large number of 
benefits (see section 3.2.1), why is that organisations seem to have trouble employing 
IT evaluation methods? Though not previously researched, several studies hint at 
possibilities as to why this employment is so difficult.
With regard to the evaluation method, various studies indicate how a method should 
be constructed or what characteristics it should have to be considered for 
employment by an organisation. One o f the most common reactions to organisations 
finding it difficult to evaluate is to blame the contents of the method. It could be 
argued then that by ‘improving’ the method it will be employed more easily. For 
example, Clermont states that a traditional methodical approach to IT cost- 
justification have two characteristics in common: the first characteristic is that they 
are financially oriented, using financial techniques such as return on investment or 
net present value to evaluate investments, and the second characteristic is that all of 
them ‘only work in theory’ (Clermont 2002).
Suggestions for improvements in the contents, covered in the previous section (see 
section 3.2.5), include adding more criteria (e.g. measure risk in addition to costs 
and benefits; measure intangibles also), defining better what is meant by certain 
definitions (e.g. have a new definition o f how the value of information can be 
measured), extending the scope of the method (e.g. to include life cycle evaluation) 
and shaping the method to certain contexts or types of information systems (e.g. use 
different criteria for different types of organisations or information systems).
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Rather than constructing the ‘ultimate best’ evaluation method, some researchers 
argue that one singular method cannot comprise the range of applications covered by 
IT. Therefore, they suggest selecting the appropriate method depending on the 
particular type of IT application considered (Farbey, Land et a l 1992; Farbey, Land 
et a l  1995). However, this approach seems to be fraught with further difficulties in 
terms of employing IT evaluation.
By contrast, Serafeimidis and Smithson (1995a) from a case study o f introducing an 
evaluation method in a UK insurance organisation make some suggestions for 
considering not only the content but also the context and process of the evaluation. 
An important argument they add is that the evaluation method should fit with the 
culture o f the organisation. The evaluation process “should take on board the 
fundamental values of the organisation” (ibid, p. 224) to prevent it being dismissed 
as ‘counter-cultural’. In other words, the criteria used to demonstrate or measure the 
value of the investments should reflect the values of the organisation. For example, 
organisations in which innovation is considered important will have different criteria 
than organisations that regard optimising costs and benefits of paramount 
importance. Therefore it seems necessary to understand ‘who’ or ‘what’ is the source 
o f the values represented in the evaluation method. The method, they argue, should 
strive to have criteria on which key stakeholders hold (some) consensus. Moreover, 
if an organisation is used to using very formal financial methods for project 
justification, it cannot be expected to employ suddenly a much richer and more 
sophisticated method (e.g. one that includes intangibles, risks, etc.), without 
undertaking the process of organisational change involved (Serafeimidis and 
Smithson 1995a, p. 226).
Similarly, organisations that are used to measuring will appreciate different methods 
than organisations that are used to discussing. According to Serafeimidis and 
Smithson when the method fits with the way things are currently being done, it has a 
better chance o f being used . One of the reasons for the lack of success in their case 
study is the difficulty o f shifting paradigms (Serafeimidis and Smithson 2000). A 
turnaround from traditional accounting techniques to the holistic evaluation paradigm 
(i.e. including intangibles and risks) represents a significant change in the underlying 
concepts and values. The advanced evaluation approach is faced by the existing
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culture, based on the previous (formal-rational) paradigm. The argument for the poor 
acceptance of the evaluation method can thus be viewed from an institutional point 
o f view, arguing that cultural inertia may be constraining this acceptance (Orlikowski 
and Barley 2001). Although the new method might be beneficial, the social and 
cultural traditions of using traditional accounting techniques have to change before 
the new method is accepted.
Thus Serafeimidis and Smithson (2000) identify the size, or more precisely the 
strength of the institutional practices, of an organisation to be an important obstacle 
in changing evaluation practices. Due to the large size of the organisation and its 
formal and bureaucratic culture, changes are unlikely to attract support easily. 
Applying the notion of structuration theory (Giddens 1979 -  see section 3.4.3), they 
argue that majority of the organisation in their case study continued with their 
existing practices, thereby reinforcing the existing structures of values and beliefs 
(the traditional paradigm), which in turn supported the existing practices. The need 
for a change was not universally felt in the organisation. Most managers and staff 
saw no reasons to change, arguing “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” (ibid, p. 102).
To continue, Serafeimidis and Smithson (2000) identify a change in the roles of 
stakeholders involved in the evaluation when a shift in evaluation methods occurs. 
For example, accountants may feel their traditional position being undermined, while 
system developers and business managers do not welcome the increased 
responsibility and accountability involved in the new form of evaluation. Thus, the 
change in evaluation approach may upset a delicate long-established political 
balance. The dominance of existing accounting practices preventing organisational 
change has also been presented in other cases (e.g. Larringa-Gonzalez and 
Bebbingon 2001). Changes in responsibilities, tasks and roles concerned with 
evaluation may strengthen the insecurity of those involved and thereby invoke 
resistance or lead to conflict. Case studies show that additional ‘political’ means to 
support investment proposals are employed by business sponsors when methods are 
being used to divide resources and prioritise them (Serafeimidis and Smithson 
1995a). Apparently, in employing the method, changes in the way resources are 
divided and the business sponsors’ ability to influence that should be taken into
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account. Simply, the argument is that the method should fit the organisational 
politics.
Regarding the social acceptance o f the method, some researchers stress the 
importance of evaluation methods not being too complex in use (e.g. Irani and Love
2001). Simple tools, such as tick-1 ists (Serafeimidis and Smithson 1995a), are 
preferred over complex calculations or detailed inquiries. This reduces the efforts 
and time required by the users of the method and increases the chances of the method 
being employed.
Related to this is the consideration that the terms used in the method should be clear 
to all users and have a common definition. Serafeimidis and Smithson (1995a) found 
that in the process of evaluation method employment confusion about the 
interpretation of terms used in questionnaires, checklists and spreadsheet models 
arose when they were not clearly defined. People interpreted them in different ways. 
Though people will always have their own interpretations (Boland 1985), clear 
definitions of terms will prevent too widely diverging interpretations. In fact, “the 
weak support and training o f the users to use the tools” was claimed to be the most 
important reason for the limited success in employment of the evaluation method 
(Serafeimidis 1997, p. 143).
However, there is also another reason that is considered primary to its limited 
success. Serafeimidis and Smithson (1995a) argue that in their case study a lack of 
support from corporate level and senior management accounts for a limited success 
o f the evaluation methodology. The failure to obtain the agreement of the finance 
director in the organisation led to the effect that the evaluation method was 
disregarded by the finance division and consequently also by the marketing division. 
This ultimately led to the evaluation method being discarded.
Moreover, an evaluation method that has the appearance of being too IT focused can 
lead potential users to be biased against it and fail to view it as the decision-making 
tool it was designed to be (Serafeimidis and Smithson 1995a, p.229). It thus stands 
the chance of being pushed aside (Land 2000). For better acceptance, these 
researchers argue that the evaluation method should be perceived to be worthwhile
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by the business managers rather than IT managers. Undertaking the employment as a 
business initiative rather than an IT initiative contributes to that. In addition, 
Serafeimidis and Smithson (1995a) in the design of an evaluation method promote a 
considerable programme of persuasion and confidence-building to convince all 
relevant stakeholders o f the necessity to include risks, intangibles and strategic 
outcomes in the evaluation method.
In conclusion, Serafeimidis and Smithson (1995a) provide a number of 
recommendations in the management o f changes introduced by the employment of 
an IT appraisal method. First of all, identify the expected impacts of the change 
introduced and propose remedial actions for anticipated problems and conflicts. This 
should include an investigation of the political and social dimension of the change. 
Secondly, ensure the support and commitment of management. Serafeimidis and 
Smithson (2000) argue that perhaps if senior management had provided more 
support to facilitate the needed shift in paradigm and its underlying beliefs and 
values, a more successful outcome could have been obtained. Related to this support 
is the recommendation to have a ‘champion’ that is committed to the employment o f 
the method. Similarly, Farbey, Land et al. (1999b) point to the critical role of the 
project manager involved in introducing appraisal and evaluation processes. Thirdly, 
investigate how well the method is supported by existing organisational and IT 
infi-astructures. Shaping the evaluation method so that it fits previous organisational 
practices in the areas of project management, IT development methodologies, 
financial appraisal and capital investment appraisal can alleviate problems that 
originate from an inability to integrate the new approaches with the existing ones 
(Serafeimidis and Smithson 2000).
Other researchers have noted additional influences in the employment o f evaluation 
methods. Ballantine, Galliers et al. (1995) argue that the degree o f  consideration fo r  
the process o f  appraisal and evaluation is important for the employment of a method. 
Organisations with little consideration for this process are not likely to use an 
accounting model (such as NPV, payback or ROI) or use only a standardised one, 
whereas organisations with in-depth considerations o f this process will adhere to 
methods that account for specific IT characteristics. Moreover, the organisation must 
have the resources to evaluate, as well as the desire to commit to them. Ballantine,
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Galliers et al. further argue that organisations that see themselves as followers of 
particular trends in technology are not inclined to employ sophisticated evaluation 
methods. They rely on leading organisations (e.g. early adopters - Rogers 1995) to 
evaluate new technologies and will only invest in ‘proven technologies’.
Focusing on the context, Farbey, Land et al (1999a) argue that in the climate o f 
recession, severe cost cutting and potential job losses, formative evaluation is not 
usually employed. On the other hand, Ballantine and Stray (1998) assert that in the 
need for cost containment resulting from recession, companies are more likely to 
appraise projects. This seeming contradiction can be explained by the notion that 
formative ex post evaluations are unlikely in recessions, but thoroughly analysed ex 
ante evaluations are required. In fact, ex post evaluations can be seen to be 
suppositious, irrespective of the economic climate (Van Eekeren and Nijland 2003), 
whereas ex ante evaluations seem to be promoted by scarcity of resources, be it 
financial (in economic lesser times) or IT capacity (in economic better times). Still, 
external factors such as the national economic situation, national and local 
government policy, markets and market demands, competition, supplier availability 
and expertise and other environmental pressures can be argued to influence the 
employment o f the evaluation method (Serafeimidis and Smithson 1995a).
More generally speaking, apart from IT evaluation specific attributes, a large number 
o f aspects stemming from both organisational research and common sense logic can 
be seen to influence the degree to which an evaluation method is successfully 
employed by an organisation. Studies on the employment of information systems, 
system development methodologies, management techniques and account techniques 
offer a plethora of suggestions concerning the elements which influence the potential 
for success (e.g. Smith, Cohen et a l  1989; Wilson 1991; Kautz and McMaster 1994; 
Miller 1997; Premkumar, Ramamurthy et a l 1997; Plouffe, Hulland et a l  2001; 
Aladwani 2002; Ballantine, Bonner et a l  1998; Gosselin 1997). As such, the reasons 
for evaluation employment to be so problematic can be argued to be related to:
• the method (e.g. its content, the object of evaluation, the criteria in use, 
employed timeframe, people involved in its construction, supporting tools, 
outputs it provides, compatibility with organisational and technical 
infrastructure, ease-of-use, etc.);
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• the organisation (e.g. culture, structure, management procedures, decision­
making procedures, organisational procedures, other financial, budgeting and 
accounting methods, business strategy, IT strategy, etc.);
• the people involved (e.g. management support, characteristics o f the 
stakeholders, the project team members involved in the implementation 
project, a project-champion, etc.);
• the process and project of implementation (e.g. project management, project 
planning, order o f actions, available resources, etc.);
• the external environment (e.g. pressures, opportunities, organisational 
priorities with respect to other issues, impulse or reason to change, 
institutional context, etc.) and
• the gap between current and future situation (e.g. a gradual and incremental 
change versus a radical change).
This list undoubtedly can be expanded and viewed from different analytical levels 
(fi-om micro to macro levels; fi-om individual to organisational, to societal levels). 
However, that is not the aim of this research. Neither is the aim to test which reasons 
are influential and which not. Most likely, all of the reasons mentioned, plus a great 
number not yet identified, will affect the employment. The degree to which they are 
relevant is highly situational and contextual.
Suggestions for a more interpretive approach to IT evaluation methods have included 
recommendations to go beyond the contents o f the method and incorporate the 
context and process o f the evaluation (see section 3.2.6) and include some of the 
notions discussed in this section. However, such academic literature on enhanced 
organisational evaluation practice has so far not been influential (Willcocks 1996a). 
In a few cases, more comprehensive evaluation methodologies have been tried. The 
results however showed that these methods also fell into disuse (Serafeimidis and 
Smithson 1995a).
In sum, evaluation methods, other than the traditional financial ones, are uncommon 
in organisations. Moreover, somehow none of the suggestions presented in this 
chapter, as far as they have been tried, seem to have led to improved employment of 
IT evaluation methods. The object of our research then is to deepen our
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understanding of the employment of IT evaluation methods in organisations and 
thereby offer new explanations o f the problems related to this process.
3.3.5 Conclusion on employment
The literature on the employment o f evaluation does not show an encouraging 
picture. Evaluation processes are hardly being employed, evaluation results are 
disregarded and evaluation methods are not used. Despite all o f the suggestions in 
the literature on different ways to improve employment of evaluation methods, there 
is no evidence that they are being employed in a successful way. However, some 
arguments were presented as to how these results can be understood. Notably, the 
work of Legge (1984) contended that maybe our understanding o f employment is 
too black and white. Expecting but not finding the radical impacts, we are blinded to 
see the gradual but nonetheless influential impact evaluation has in organisations. 
Maybe we are too quick in classifying evaluation employment attempts as ‘failures’ 
or ‘successes’ (see section 1.2.2).
We contend that our understanding of the process o f IT evaluation method 
employment is currently simply too narrow to answer the question why it seems to 
be leading so often to results that were not contemplated. By an in-depth case study 
we hope to shed light on this issue.
3.4 O r g a n isa t io n s
3.4.1 Introduction
To understand the adoption of IT evaluation concepts in organisations, we should 
have a clear idea about what organisations are and how they behave. In our daily 
lives as researchers, students, managers, workers or consumers, and all our other 
circumstances of our social life, we realise that we are a part of an organised world. 
We experience organisations as systems of implicit and explicit rules which are 
oriented toward an (often unexpressed) purpose (Scherer 2003). These rules 
communicate behavioural expectations fi*om organisational members as well as to 
non-members. They contribute to the coordination o f activities for a variety of 
objectives, which an individual often cannot achieve on his or her own. Especially in
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economic terms, the objective of production and distribution o f products or services 
can be achieved only by a division of labour where people depend on organisation(s) 
for coordination o f their operations and actions. Such coordination is not an easy 
task, neither is it an automatic achievement. Organisation theory offers many 
different, sometimes conflicting, views how the phenomenon ‘organisation’ can be 
considered. One common assertion is that organisations are highly complex entities, 
dealing with a great number o f relevant issues with regard to their creation, 
existence, functionality and transformation. Moreover, these issues can be viewed 
from different perspectives and from different paradigms as described in section 2.2.
To improve our understanding of IT evaluation in organisations, in this section we 
explore different conceptualisations of organisations. By acknowledging differences 
in what organisations are and how they behave (for example in organisational 
decision-making), we aim to avoid a constricted view of the phenomenon under 
study. Discussing current insights and issues in organisational theory, we broaden 
our understanding of the process o f evaluation employment that takes place in an 
organisational environment.
Clearly the literature on organisations and understanding what they are, what their 
behaviour is, how they function and what they are made of is abundant and too broad 
to discuss in detail in this thesis. To understand how organisations behave, a 
selection of relevant literature on organisational behaviour and organisational change 
is discussed. The scope o f this section is set by two dualities that seem most relevant 
and have been the topic of many organisational debates. It concerns the debate 
between agency and structure and the debate between planned and emergent change. 
Furthermore, we zoom in on organisational decision-making, since IT evaluation is 
so closely linked to that, and discuss the literature on rational versus irrational 
behaviour o f organisations (and managers). To learn more about what organisations 
are, a short discussion of organisational metaphors is presented.
3.4.2 Images of organisation
To understand how organisations handle IT evaluation concepts, it is important to 
have an understanding how organisations ‘work’, how they behave and react to new
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concepts. One view is that organisations can be ‘many things at once’. A renowned 
work on theoretical views of organisations comes from Morgan (1986) who 
describes organisational metaphors as a means to think about organisations. 
Organisations are complex phenomena that can be understood in many different 
ways. Metaphors enable us to see and think about them from different perspectives. 
“The use o f metaphors implies a way o f  thinking and a way o f  seeing that pervade 
how we understand the world generally” (ibid, original italics, p. 4). Metaphors, by 
making implicit and explicit assertions between two phenomena, produce insight in 
distinctive but partial ways. On the one hand, it can help to understand one element 
o f experience in terms of another, but on the other hand, the comparison between the 
experiences is limited and incomplete. There is even the danger that the way of 
seeing created through a metaphor becomes a way of not seeing, specifically when 
the limitations of the metaphor are not recognised.
Applying the ideas of metaphors to organisations, Morgan considers eight 
metaphorical images of organisations as machines, organisms, brains, cultures, 
political systems, psychic prisons, flux and transformation and instruments of 
domination. These images have been related to IS research by Walsham (1991).
The metaphors can be applied theoretically to the research question. Each metaphor 
creates a distinct perspective on the research and related questions and also shapes 
the possible understanding. For example, seeing organisations as machines, IT 
evaluation concepts are viewed as tools to better control and manage IS costs and 
benefits. The understanding of IT evaluation employment then is framed by the 
notion that IT evaluation concepts will be employed if they increase the efficiency of 
the organisation and provide better measurement of the real costs and benefits of IS.
By contrast, applying the organism metaphor to the research question yields the view 
o f IT evaluation concepts as means to better align the organisation with its 
environment. The employment o f new evaluation methods can thus be understood as 
a response to its environment. For example, the notion of institutionalism (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991), which can be said to fit with this metaphor, describes the 
phenomenon of ‘copying mechanisms’ from other organisations. Such mechanisms 
could explain why certain organisations make an attempt to employ new evaluation
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methods, namely as a mimic process of other organisations that already have 
employed such methods.
Yet another view on organisations, that o f the political metaphor, entices the 
perspective of organisations as political systems. IT evaluation concepts can then be 
perceived as means to uncover hidden agendas or to create win-win situations for all 
stakeholders involved. Table 3.3 shows (simplified) descriptions of the metaphors of 
Morgan and some different insights they offer in understanding IT evaluation 
methods and their employment.
Similarly, other ways of understanding can be constructed from other metaphors that 
are not limited to the eight listed by Morgan. Clearly, each perspective gives quite a 
different understanding of what happens at organisations when a new IT evaluation 
method is introduced.
Metaphor Machines Organisms Brains Cultures
Meaning Organisations 
operate as machines: 
different parts form a 
whole, and operate 
in a seasoned, 
efficient, reliable and 
predictable way.
Organisations are 
living systems, 
existing in a wider 
environment on 
which they depend 
for the satisfaction 
of their “needs”.
Organisations are 
synonymous to their 
information systems. 
They create the 
possibility of 
organising without 
having an organisation 
in physical terms.
Organisations are 
socially constructed 
realities that are as 
much in the minds of 
their members as they 
are in concrete 
structures, rules and 
relations.
Tends to view IT  
evaluation 
method a s ....
... a tool to 
rationalise decision­
making and increase 
the efficiency of the 
organisation.
... an opportunity to 
better align the 
organisation with its 
environment.
... a learning device, to 
bring to perfection 
future IT investments 
and prevent repeating 
mistakes in the future.
... a socially 
constructed, shared 
view on the value of 
IT investments.
Tends to view the 
employment o f an 
IT evaluation 
method (the 
organisational 
change) a s....
... ‘slotting’ the 
method into the 
organisational 
machine.
... shaping the 
method to make it 
compatible to the 
characteristics of the 
organisation.
... introducing a new 
knowledge system, 
and by means of 
feedback, adjusting it 
until it provides all the 
desired information.
... accepting the 
method by the 
organisational 
members, due to its fit 
with their values, 
beliefs, norms and 
social practices.
(Table continues on next page)
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Metaphor Political systems Psychic prisons Flux and 
transformation
Instruments of 
domination
Meaning Organisations are 
loose networks of 
people with 
divergent interests, 
concerned with 
issues such as 
authority, power and 
superior-subordinate 
relations.
Organisations are 
ultimately created 
and sustained by 
conscious and 
unconscious 
processes, where 
people can become 
imprisoned by the 
images, ideas and 
thoughts shaped by 
these processes.
Organisations are part 
of their environments 
and their environments 
are part of the 
organisations. Change 
is an emergent rather 
than controlled 
phenomenon. Key 
organising rules tend 
to hold organisation- 
environment relations 
in a particular 
configuration.
Organisations should 
be viewed from an 
ethical and moral 
perspective, since 
they may be 
intrinsically 
dominating and used 
by individuals and 
groups to impose their 
will upon others.
Tends to view IT  
evaluation 
method a s ....
... way to uncover 
hidden agendas and 
conform conflicting 
interests in win-win 
situations. It serves 
the interests of all 
parties.
...a tool that 
increases 
‘rationality’ and 
thereby threatens to 
downplay the 
importance of the 
‘irrational’, such as 
intuition and 
feeling.
... one of many 
contributors to the 
emergent changes in 
the organisation.
... a narrow perception 
of reality,
institutionalising the 
dominance of a 
financial perspective, 
possibly to the 
detriment of other 
(social) perspectives.
Tends to view the 
employment o f an 
IT evaluation 
method (the 
organisational 
change) a s ....
... a battle, where the 
method increases the 
power of some over 
others.
... changing (for 
better or for worse) 
the sense of comfort 
and security of 
organisational 
members, for 
example in 
decision-making or 
in accountability.
... the undermining of 
the status-quo, which 
will only succeed if 
the organisational 
context is (made) 
sufficiently receptive 
to the method.
... imposing a 
domination 
instrument on (some) 
organisational 
members, who 
thereby can be 
controlled’ and made 
accountable.
Table 3.3 Understanding IT evaluation methods and their employment, based on (a 
minimalistic version of) Morgan’s organisational metaphors (Morgan 1986; 
Walsham 1991).
Each metaphor is valuable because it offers new insights. There is no correct or 
incorrect image of organisation, no all-embracing metaphor, but all are partial, yet 
valuable. By selecting specific approaches when they appear to be more relevant, we 
gain richer insight (Walsham 1991). A metaphor in itself can never be normative, 
only descriptive. It can help to sensitise us to perspectives otherwise overlooked and 
thereby deepen our understanding o f the phenomenon of IT evaluation method 
employment.
In our research the metaphors o f Morgan have been used as initial starting point to 
think about organisations and the way they might be understood when considering 
the topic of IT evaluation. The different insights can be seen to have influenced the 
entire research, ranging from the construction of the research question, the selection
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of appropriate theories for understanding (see Chapter 3) and the analysis of our case 
study.
3.4.3 Organisational behaviour: agency versus structure
In order to understand organisational behaviour related to employing an IT 
evaluation concept, social theories provide two distinct streams: theories that place 
their emphasis at the level o f human agents and human action, and alternative 
theories which focus on the structure o f social systems (Walsham 1993).
Schools of thought that have been preoccupied with action regard social life as an 
active accomplishment o f purposive, knowledgeable actors. Action or agency 
concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the 
individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently. 
Whatever happened would not have happened if that individual had not intervened 
(Giddens 1984). Action depends upon the capability o f the individual to ‘make a 
difference’ to a pre-existing state of affairs or course o f events. Moreover, the actor 
‘could have acted otherwise’ (Giddens 1979).
An interesting action-focused approach is that o f organisational psychologist Karl 
Weick. He describes the process through which humans shape and structure their 
realities as a process of enactment (Weick 1990; Weick 1995). This concept stresses 
the proactive role people unconsciously play in creating their world. Humans take an 
active role in bringing their realities into being through various interpretive schemes, 
even though these realities may then have a habit of imposing themselves as ‘the way 
things are’. Organisations in that sense are in essence socially constructed realities 
that are as much in the minds of their members as they are in concrete structures, 
rules and relations (Morgan 1986). Regarding organisational behaviour as an 
enactment process suggests that the behaviour does not arise merely from 
organisations compulsively conforming to environmental pressures, but in fact 
organisations are active in creating and defining some of their own environments. 
Coordinated action in this view is made possible when organisational members agree 
on a number of meanings that are flexible enough to allow for local accommodation 
(Weick 1993).
95
Ch a p t e r s
By contrast, structuralism assigns a priority to structure over action. Structure can be 
understood as referring to a ‘pattern’ of social relationships. The conduct o f actors in 
society is dominated by the influence o f the ‘totality’ which has characteristics 
separate from its individual members (Giddens 1979). A prevailing structure-focused 
approach is that of institutional theorists. They argue that organisational actions are 
the direct effects of these ideas, values and beliefs that have their origin in the 
institutional environment of the organisations (Greenwood and Hinnings 1996). 
Therefore, organisations are compelled, out of necessity, to conform to these 
environmental prescriptions in order to survive (Bada 2000). A particular resulting 
process is that of homogenisation, where an organisation resembles other 
organisations that face the same set of environmental conditions. This process of 
isomorphic change is driven by three mechanisms labelled as coercive^ mimetic and 
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Coercive isomorphism is 
concerned with pressures and forces outside an organisations (e.g. government 
regulations, supplier organisations, etc.) upon which it may be dependent. Mimetic 
isomorphism is concerned with organisations doing what other organisations are 
doing (e.g. fads and fashions) in situations where they are uncertain about what to do. 
For example, the study of Beatty, Shim et a l (2001) shows that organisations that 
are followers in adopting corporate websites place less emphasis on perceived related 
benefits than early adopters do. Normative isomorphism is concerned with the way 
members o f a certain profession are trained similarly and therefore are influenced in 
the way they behave and obtain knowledge. However, newer forms of 
institutionalism recognise that institutions are not always imposed on an organisation 
by its external environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Frequently, organisations 
play an active role in constructing and shaping rationalised myths (Carruthers 1995) 
or organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller 1997), often characterised as 
buzzwords, thereby having a more active role in legitimatising their actions.
The agency/structure debate is resolved by Giddens into a duality of structure, 
whereby agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, 
but represent a duality whereby structure is drawn on in human actions but, in so 
doing, social structures are produced and reproduced (Giddens 1979; Walsham 
1993). Structure is both enabling and constraining; structural properties o f social
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systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those 
systems. Though the process of action is a production of something new, at the same 
time, all action exists in continuity with the past which supplies the means of its 
initiation. Simultaneously, through their regular action and interaction human agents 
are defining patterns of practices that in the recursive actions become standardised 
organisation practices, which Giddens defines as the ‘structural or institutionalised 
properties’. In other words, interactions and choice are both enabled and restricted by 
habits, procedures and other embodiments o f structure. Interaction and choice have 
over time created, changed and reinforced these structural arrangements. The 
resultant is a dynamic environment where people act on the basis o f their stocks of 
knowledge (interpretive scheme), the available resources and opportunities (facility) 
and acceptable behaviour (norms). However, in addition, their actions are also 
affected by unacknowledged*^ conditions and by intended and unintended 
consequences of action of other human and non-human agents. Thus, social action 
not only reproduces existing social structure but also produces new structure 
(Walsham 1993).
Giddens’ structuration theory has been applied to IS research by Orlikowski (1992), 
demonstrating the duality of technology. She argues that technology is both a product 
and a medium of human action. It is at the same time an outcome of human design 
and implementation, but it also facilitates or limits future human courses. Moreover, 
institutional properties influence how humans interact with technology, for example, 
through design standards, professional norms and state-of-the-art materials and 
knowledge. Likewise, technology strengthens certain institutional properties by 
reinforcing organisational structures of signification, domination and legitimation. 
Another application is that of Barley (1986) who describes the introduction of 
computer tomography (CT) scanners into two different hospitals.
3.4.4 Organisational change as emergent and improvisationai versus planned 
change
Turning to organisational change as a form of organisational behaviour, Giddens 
notes that “change, or its potentiality, is inherent in all moments o f social
Which Giddens describes as unconscious motives operating ‘outside’ the range o f the self- 
understanding of the agent. (Giddens 1979, p. 59).
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reproduction” (Giddens 1979, p. 114). Every change is a social system logically 
implicates the totality and thus implies structural modification. Weick notes that 
organisational change is a continuous activity with diverse and varied origins, 
multiple actors with multiple interpretations and actions which combine to make up 
the change process (Weick 1993; Daft and Weick 1984). Regarding change more as 
improvisation ‘as we go along’ than as a planned and intended action, he concludes 
that control over change is never complete and unintended consequences are 
commonplace. As a response to these consequences, people revise their sense of 
what is happening and what can be accomplished. These revised interpretations, 
rather than initial decisions, guide action and the outcome of change (Weick 1993). 
Mintzberg and Westley (2001) build on this notion of Weick when they argue 
managers should include ‘seeing first’ and ‘doing first’ approaches to decision­
making next to the traditional rational model o f ‘thinking first’. They argue that 
decisions and actions can equally be driven by ideas and imagination (‘art’), 
experiments and experience (‘craft’) as it can by planning or facts (‘science’). 
Ciborra argues for supporting ‘smart and competent’ improvisation to enable 
everyday micro-practices in order to improve change outcomes or IT 
implementations (Ciborra 1999). Rather than looking for more sophisticated 
techniques or more structured systems, the flexibility and effectiveness of 
improvisation in ‘taking things as they come’ (ibid, p. 141) should be appreciated.
Similarly, Orlikowski notes that “change may not always be as planned, inevitable, 
or discontinuous as we imagine. Rather, it is often realised through the ongoing 
variations which emerge frequently, even imperceptibly, in the slippages and 
improvisations of everyday activity. Those variations that are repeated, shared, 
amplified, and sustained can, over time, produce perceptible and striking 
organisational changes” (Orlikowski 1996, p. 89). Classifying change, she 
categorised three types of change: anticipated, emergent, and opportunity-based 
change. Anticipated changes can be seen as changes that are planned ahead o f time 
and occur as intended; emergent changes are changes that arise spontaneously out of 
local innovation and which are not originally anticipated or intended; opportunity- 
based changes are changes that are not anticipated ahead of time but are introduced 
purposefully and intentionally during the change process in response to an 
unexpected opportunity, event or breakdown.
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These notions o f emergent and improvisational change are a radical break with 
traditional perceptions of change. Traditionally, organisational change is perceived as 
predictable, controllable and structured, where the change can be guided using 
blueprint plans. Change in this vision can be engineered. This rational and 
mechanical (e.g. Morgan’s metaphor of the machine) vision o f organisational change 
can still be seen to prevail in Western societies with its roots in widespread 
management theories, such as classical management theory (with its aim to 
‘engineer’ efficient organisations), management of change and scientific 
management by Taylor (Morgan 1986). This rational view too is visible in many 
dominant views on how decision-making in organisations occurs.
Instead, in this thesis we recognise that “change is multifaceted, involving political, 
cultural, incremental, environmental, and structural, as well as rational dimensions. 
Power, chance, opportunism and accident are as influential in shaping outcomes as 
are design, negotiated agreements and master-plans” (Pettigrew 1990, p. 268).
3.4.5 Organisational decision-making
As seen in section 3.2.1, evaluation is closely linked to decision-making. In this 
section we discuss organisational decision-making. Normative research has 
engendered an increasing consensus among researchers about the kind o f decision­
making that should be described as rational (Mares 1991). Typically, rational 
decision-making is associated with terms such as measurable, calculated, based on 
logic and hard data, systematic, objective, factual, reasoned, etc. At the same time, 
empirical research has found ample evidence of decision-making processes that 
appear ‘irrational’ by the normative standards (Brunsson 1985). Irrational elements 
in decision-making are associated with personal preferences, (gut) feelings, 
subjectivity, politics, intuition, entrepreneurship, ambition, instincts, beliefs, etc. 
These apparent irrationalities are not limited to minor decisions: people behave 
similarly when they approach major decisions on strategic issues. It can even be 
argued that the apparent irrationalities are greatest in the case of the weightiest 
decisions (Janis 1972). Moreover, Brunsson refers to Lundberg (1961), who 
observed that investment calculations are made when small marginal investments are 
considered, but not when major strategic investments are being discussed.
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The traditional thinking about decision-making can be classified as rational and 
normative (Mares 1991). The decision process is seen as a rational process, in which 
decision-makers know and oversee all possible alternatives and choose a solution 
that maximises their returns in accordance with their explicit preferences. Moreover, 
traditional research on decision-making was not just descriptive, but insights from 
practice have been translated to normative prescriptions on how to best perform 
decision-making. According to the prescriptions, rationality in decision-making can 
be threatened by a lack in the areas of information, policy and insight into 
organisational processes, a lack of consensus, control and management and the 
improper use of decision-making tools (Koopman 1980).
The traditional model of decision-making has been criticised by many only to be 
applicable to one decision-maker who only has one goal which can be described in 
quantitative terms (Harrison 1981). Moreover, it has been criticised for its 
assumptions that there are a limited number o f known solutions, all o f which are 
known to the decision-maker and that the optimal alternative can be ‘calculated’. 
Simon (1960) argues that decision-makers do not look for the optimal but rather the 
solution that satisfies, and decision-makers only posses bounded rationality in that 
they do not research all alternatives and consequences, but only a few, which allows 
them to avoid new and uncertain alternatives. Due to cognitive dissonance^ people 
close their eyes to information that does not fit into their perceptions of reality. In 
addition, Lindblom (1959) argues that individuals and organisations have conflicting 
rather than unified goals. Reaching a compromise with all involved may be the more 
important issue (Avgerou 1995). Moreover, different stakeholders can attach quite 
different values to objectives even though the objectives themselves may be shared 
(Land 2000). It seems that rationality, when defined as denoting “thought and action 
which are consciously in accord with the rules o f logic and empirical knowledge, 
where objectives are coherent, mutually consistent and achieved by the most 
appropriate means” (Mitchell 1979, p. 154) has little to do with the process of 
decision-making in organisations.
Brunsson argues that many rational decision-making perspectives fail to recognise 
that managers do more than make decisions. Making a decision is merely a step
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towards taking action. The decision is not the end product. “Managers get things 
done -  act and induce others to act” (Brunsson 1985, p. 18). He contends that there 
are two kinds of rationality: decision rationality and action rationality. The decision 
rationality is concerned with the function of choice; to choose the right thing to do. 
The action reality is concerned with the function of action; to get it done. Both 
rationalities serve different purposes which are difficult to pursue simultaneously 
because rational decision-making procedures seem irrational from an action 
perspective (Brunsson 1985, p. 27). If a decision is to initiate intended action, it must 
incorporate elements of expectation, motivation and commitment. Expectation refers 
to the aspect that individuals must find it worth-while to act, which requires them to 
be able to envisage the result; motivation deals with the individual assessment of the 
action to be taken, and whether the person regards it as good or bad; commitment 
relates to the social aspect o f action: people must be able to rely on certain types of 
behaviour (of the team or organisation).
From a decision-rationality perspective, we are prescribed to:
1. evaluate all possible alternative solutions to a problem -  or at least as many 
as possible;
2. consider all relevant consequences of the alternatives proposed, both positive 
and negative;
3. evaluate according to a set of predetermined criteria, preferably in the form of 
objectives;
4. decide for the alternative that comes out most favourably in the preceding 
analysis.
However, from an action-rationality perspective, effective decision processes break 
all of the rules of rational decision-making: few alternatives should be analysed, only 
the positive consequences of the chosen actions should be considered and objectives 
should not be formulated in advance. Considering multiple alternatives and all 
(negative) consequences evokes uncertainty, and uncertainty reduces motivation and 
commitment. If people are uncertain whether or not a proposed action is a good idea, 
they are less willing to perform it or to commit themselves to promoting its success. 
Evaluating against predetermined criteria is undesired from an action perspective, 
because decision-makers are only too likely to formulate inconsistent objectives and
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to find it difficult to assess the alternatives. Finally, automatically deciding for one 
alternative based on a rational analysis may work to make a choice, but when 
decision-making generates action, the choice is not merely the statement of a 
preference for one alternative; it is also an expression of a commitment to carry out 
an action.
Brunsson concludes that if decisions should generate action, then “irrationality” (or 
action rationality) is functional and should not be replaced by more rational decision 
procedures. Action cannot be expected to derive automatically from decisions, or 
choices, or problem-solving activities. Organisational action, understood as the result 
o f coordinated individual actions to act within certain limits, is accomplished by 
several organisation members in collaboration. “Organisational action is at one and 
the same time the raion d ’etre o f the organisation. The ability to achieve 
organisational action is not established now and forever simply because an 
organisation is created; the active maintenance o f the organisation is also vital. In a 
way, the organisation has to be recreated before each new organisational action is 
undertaken: organising is an ever-recurring activity of organisations” (Brunsson 
1985, p. 7).
Morgan (1986) argues that the notion of rationality is always interest based and 
political; it changes according to the perspective from which it is viewed. The 
question to ask is: rational to whom? Whose goals are being pursued? What interests 
are being served? He argues that “organisational goals may be rational for some 
people’s interests, but not for others” (ibid, p. 209). In fact, an organisation embraces 
many rationalities. Moreover, managers often use the idea o f rationality as a resource 
for pursuing political agendas -  “justifying actions that suit their personal aspirations 
in terms that appear rational from an organisational standpoint” (ibid, p. 209).
On making decisions and in making choices, Elster (1989) discusses two lines of 
thought in the social science of human behaviour associated with Adam Smith and 
Emile Durkheim: the difference between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. 
The former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the latter is 
dictated by social norms. Elster contends: “Rational action is concerned with 
outcomes. Rationality says: If you want to achieve Y, do X. By contrast, I define
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norms by the feature that they are not outcome-oriented. The simplest social norms 
are of the type: Do X, or: Don’t do X. More complex norms say: If you do Y, then do 
X, or: If others do Y, then do X. More complex norms still might say: Do X if it 
would be good if everyone did X. Rationality is essentially conditional and future- 
oriented. Social norms are either unconditional or, if conditional, are not future- 
oriented. For norms to be social, they must be shared by other people and partly 
sustained by their approval and disapproval. “ (Elster 1989, p. 99) He concludes that 
to accept social norms as a motivational mechanism is not to deny the importance of 
rational choice. Actions, he argues, typically are influenced both by rationality and 
by norms. Sometimes the outcome is a compromise between what the norm 
prescribes and what rationality dictates. Notice that these norms may very well be 
unacknowledged, tacit or unconscious (Giddens 1979) to the people who employ 
them (also see section 3.4.3). Giving (rational) accounts for decisions made might 
therefore become problematic.
Studying the role o f intuition in decision-making, Agor (1984) argues that intuition 
plays an important role in strategically important decisions, where uncertainty is high 
and little prior experience or information on the effects exist. Based on this, Mares 
(1991) argues that decisions, for instance, on proposing someone for an appointment 
rely more heavily on intuition and less on analysis, than for example decisions on the 
closure of a business unit. He argues further that intuition and analysis go hand in 
hand, where speculative elements in intuition can be reduced by analyses, and 
rational analyses can be assessed through experiences, commonsense and intuition. 
He shows that at some point the dichotomy between analysis and intuition is lost. 
Quoting a general manager, he argues that “you automatically combine intuition with 
the analyses you receive or make, since intuition is after all a collection of 
knowledge, experience and wisdom” (ibid, p. 62) which you cannot detach from in 
analysis.
In the discussion of the rationality of altruism, Knox (1999) argues that the limited 
view of economic rationality is outcome-oriented, focusing more on the ends and 
efficient ways to reach them, than process-oriented, focusing on the means. Whereas 
economic rationality would qualify altruism as irrational, since a monetary 
contribution would be more efficient than to volunteer, he argues that rationality only
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requires the effectiveness of means to a desired end, not the relative efficiency of the 
chosen means compared to other possible means. For example, if one chooses to 
write a paper on a manual typewriter rather than a computer, it would not necessarily 
be qualified irrational. However, if one would attempt to write a paper on the piano 
keyboard, rationality would be violated since the means is categorically ineffective to 
the end. Goals can justijy action rationally, but they do not govern a particular choice 
o f means that can explain action.
In conclusion, the traditional rationality theories seem insufficient to understand 
organisational decision-making. Although one might be inclined after reading all of 
the above to argue that these theories are completely inappropriate, rather than just 
insufficient. However, we argue that in many decision-making processes elements 
(such as data, figures, analyses, etc.) connected to these rational theories are often 
influential in decision-making (Mares 1991). The point we want to stress here is that 
their influence may be partial, and understanding of the decision-making process 
should include the effects of politics, norms, intuition, instinct, gut-feeling and the 
rationality o f action (Bannister and Remenyi 1999). Though with such 
understanding, we can avoid reductionism by heeding a word of caution from 
Morgan: seeing organisations as political systems, “we begin to see politics 
everywhere and look for hidden agendas even when there are none. [..,] Under the 
influence o f a political mode of understanding, everything becomes political” 
(Morgan 1986, p. 212). Our understanding of decision-making should be balanced 
between the ‘rationalities’ and ‘irrationalities’ -  looking from case to case to see how 
they each influence the actual decision-making. Or as Batty (1978) contends 
“intuition and judgement cannot be replaced by the collection o f facts, but there is no 
doubt that the decision-making mechanism is likely to be strengthened materially by 
the systematic collection and analysis o f relevant data” (quoted in Powell 1999).
3.4.6 Conclusion on organisations
In this review on organisations, we briefly discussed different perspectives on 
understanding organisations, organisational change and decision-making. We 
touched upon several contemporary theories that shape current ideas about the 
behaviour o f organisations.
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The above implies that understanding the employment of IT evaluation methods 
requires a special focus when we study organisations. In our analysis, special 
attention should be given to the difference between intended and emergent 
consequences, and explanations of the differences could be found in a link to 
structure. We should take into account the duality of agency and structure; in which 
agency is a continuous flow of conduct governed by intentionality (which is both 
conscious and unconscious) and conditions unacknowledged by the human agent 
(operating ‘outside’ the self-understanding of the agent). That action has intended as 
well as emergent, unintended consequences. The consequences in turn have effects 
on structure which constrains and enables new actions. From this perspective, it does 
not suffice to inquire into people’s intentions when adopting a new evaluation 
concept to compare them to certain outcomes, but instead we should analyse the 
process of evaluation employment. In addition, the improvisations along the way 
require much more attention when we aim to understand the employment of IT 
evaluation concepts fully.
3.5 C o n c l u sio n
Research in IS has displayed a major focus on managerial and technical approaches 
to IT, and in particular to IT evaluation. It holds an oversimplified view on IT 
evaluation on how organisational processes with regard to the employment of IT 
evaluation methods take place and on the ways in which organisations are defined. 
This chapter has been devoted to the complexity o f all these areas which must be 
combined in our research. Current understandings of IT evaluation employment are 
too narrow to provide the understanding required to address our research question 
and related paradox.
Evaluation is a complex and dynamic social construction. IT evaluation methods are 
related to highly complex issues such as the value of IT, uncertainty of investments 
and future results and social processes (inherently political) such as decision-making 
and organisational change. Understanding the employment o f such methods, within 
complex contexts such as organisations, requires a research approach that is not
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limited, but includes ideas related to social, economic, political, cultural and 
historical perspectives. Such an approach must be able to account for 
agency/structures, intended/emergent consequences and rationality/irrationality. It 
should account for both social and technical attributes of the phenomenon of 
evaluation method employment.
Combining insights from the previous chapter on underlying philosophical 
paradigms and the explicit ideas on IT evaluation presented in this chapter, we 
discuss in the next chapter two particular theoretical perspectives that can broaden 
our understanding of the employment o f IT evaluation methods in organisations.
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Chapter 4: Diffusion Theory and Actor-Network Theory as a 
Theoretical Framework for Analysis
4.1 In t r o d u c t io n
Using insights gained from Chapters 2 and 3, the goal of this chapter is to highlight 
some explicit theories that can be helpful in understanding the case study of this 
research. In a way, it is a search to define a language for understanding. The theories 
discussed here will shape the analysis o f the case study and ultimately the 
conclusions drawn from it. Proper theories provide ‘sensitising devices’ to develop 
understanding. “Theory is both a way of seeing and a way of not-seeing” (Walsham 
1993, p. 6). In other words, it helps to highlight certain perspectives, but at the same 
time blinds us to other perspectives. This chapter outlines the theories that dominate 
in the analysis of the research.
We will start by describing the diffusion theory, which is a dominant theory in 
understanding the process o f diffusion and adoption of innovations. Although 
analysis with this theory is very common and gives interesting insights, it will be 
argued that a deeper understanding is gained by using the actor-network theory 
(ANT). We will demonstrate this in Chapter 6 by first analysing our case study using 
the diffusion theory, showing the insights such an analysis gives and then point out 
some interesting questions that it leaves unanswered. We will then turn to ANT to 
address these questions. To facilitate this analysis, this chapter describes both the 
diffusion theory and ANT.
4.2 D if f u s io n  THEORY 
4.2.1 In troduction
Our research question as stated in section 1.2.2 has been derived from the 
mainstream discourse in the IS literature. It demonstrates the idea that evaluation 
methods can be regarded as useful tools which lead to beneficial effects in terms of 
better costs and benefits management o f IT. The paradox that has been highlighted is 
concerned with the question why, given these beneficial effects, these methods are 
not more widespread among organisations that face questions concerning gaining a
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better grip on the economics of IT. Since it is concerned with the spread or 
adoption''* o f the evaluation methods, the diffusion theory is a good candidate for 
analysing these types o f questions. Diffusion is concerned with examining the 
diffusion and adoption of innovations within and among organisations. Being a 
logical starting point for analysis, we will discuss this theory further.
4.2.2 Diffusion theory
Probably the broadest research perspective on diffusion and adoption o f innovation is 
Everett Rogers’ work ‘Diffusion of Innovations’ (Rogers 1995). It is the basis of 
many studies in diffusion and adoption of (technological) innovations. According to 
Rogers, an innovation is “an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption” (ibid, p .11). Since we are interested in 
understanding the adoption o f a new concept (an IT evaluation method) in an 
organisation, it seems justified to see how the theory of Rogers can help. Our aim of 
conducting an analysis using the diffusion / adoption theory (hereafter: diffusion 
theory) from Rogers is to gain an understanding o f the influential elements in the 
adoption of evaluation methods. In our analysis (Chapter 5), we want to demonstrate 
which parts of the evaluation adoption the diffusion theory can help explain with 
respect to the case and which parts it leaves unexplained.
Rogers’ theory on the innovation decision process states that diffusion is a process 
through which an individual (or other decision-making unit) passes, that it occurs 
over time and can be seen as having five distinct stages. The stages in the process are 
known as: knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. 
Potential adopters must become aware of the IT evaluation concept and obtain the 
knowledge o f its existence. Once awareness of it is established, the adopter can at 
any point enter a persuasion stage during which he/she seeks and processes 
information in order to decide whether to adopt the evaluation method. At several 
points in time, the adopter may make a decision not to adopt, to postpone adoption, 
to continue the search for information or to adopt the new innovation. This 
persuasion stage is followed by an implementation stage in which the innovation is
We use ‘adoption’ of evaluation concepts to mean the ‘uptake and continuous use’ of concepts, 
rather than ‘the decision to use’ as proposed by Rogers (1995, p. 21). However, Rogers does not use 
his definition too strictly, since elsewhere he states that “adoption of an innovation is the process of
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put in place. Finally, the adopter re-evaluates or confirms his/her decision to adopt 
the innovation. The result may be either continuance or discontinuance o f the 
evaluation method.
According to Rogers, five particular attributes of an innovation can explain the 
differences between the adoption or non-adoption of an innovation. These are 
relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability. Relative 
advantage is the degree to which potential adopters see an advantage for adopting the 
innovation; compatibility is the degree to which the innovation fits in with potential 
adopters’ current practices and values; complexity is degree of the innovations ease 
of use; trialability is the degree to which potential adopters have the availability of 
“testing” before adopting; and observability is the degree to which potential adopters 
are able to see observable results of an innovation.
These characteristics and the way they are perceived by potential adopters, Rogers 
argues, determine the speed with which an innovation is adopted by potential 
adopters. This rate o f adoption is positively related to perceived relative advantage, 
compatibility, trialability and observability and is negatively related to the perceived 
complexity of the innovation. Other factors that determine the rate o f adoption are 
the type o f innovation-decision-making (be it optional, collective or authority); the 
communication channels (e.g. mass media or interpersonal); the nature of the social 
system (e.g. its norms, degree of network, interconnectedness, etc.); and the extent of 
the change agents’ promotion efforts.
Typical applications of diffusion theory focus on finding adoption-diffusion factors 
that determine the adoption or non-adoption o f a certain type of innovation. These 
factors can be related to a wide range o f aspects of the innovation and its context, 
such as innovation characteristics, organisational characteristics, characteristics of 
the environment and characteristics o f the communication channels. Typically these 
factors are researched through variance research, whereby hypotheses about 
influential factors in adoption-diffusion are statistically tested through (multiple) case 
research. Variance theory-building is concerned with identifying causal links
using an existing idea” (ibid, p. 174, original italics). Thus our meaning attributed to the term 
‘adoption’ seems compatible with his understanding.
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between variables that conform to the view that the precursor (X) is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the outcome (Y). Variance models thus explain the variability 
o f a dependent variable based on its correlation with one or more independent 
variables (Shaw and Jarvenpaa 1997). The next section shows examples of the results 
obtained by using diffusion theory in IS research.
4.2.3 Diffusion theory in information technology research
Diffusion theory is used by many studies in IT research. Prescott and Conger (1995) 
identified 70 IT articles published in IT outlets between 1984 and 1994 that relied on 
this theory. It has been used widely to research the factors promoting or hampering 
the adoption of IT. An extended overview of examples of studies of diffusion theory 
in information sj^tems is presented in the table in the Appendix of this thesis (jfrom 
Pitchman 1992 adapted by Lefebvre and Lefebvre 1996).
Each empirical study sheds light on a particular set of adoption factors in some 
specific contextual environment. Diffusion theorists have put effort in presenting 
exhaustive lists of factors influencing IT adoption and testing in case studies which 
o f these factors are generally influential.
To illustrate here, we present the study of Lefebvre and Lefebvre (1996) who 
identify a range of internal and external factors that may affect the adoption of 
technologies by examining a large number o f diffusion studies. Factors internal to the 
firm that may affect the adoption o f technologies include (Lefebvre and Lefebvre 
1996): the firm’s past experience with technology (operationalised by variables such 
as time since first acquisition, number of technologies or applications adopted, types 
of technologies or applications adopted, current level of assimilation and integration 
o f technologies and percentage by class of personnel familiar with the technologies); 
the firm’s specific characteristics (with variables such as availability of financial 
resources, centralisation, formalisation, technocratisation and size) and the firm’s 
pursued strategy (with variables such as strategic orientation, technological policy, 
technological awareness and technological scanning). External factors are conditions 
that exist in a firm’s external environment and may affect its technology-adoption 
decisions (Lefebvre and Lefebvre 1996). These factors include the industry level, the 
macroeconomic environment and the national policies.
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Diffusion theory has been widely applied but also widely criticised. The next section 
describes the major criticisms on diffusion theory.
4.2.4 Critiques on and limitations of diffusion theory
Diffusion theory can be critiqued for different reasons. Organisational diffusion 
studies typically consider independent variables (e.g. based on elements o f the 
innovation, the organisation and environment or context) as determining the outcome 
of the adoption process. In knowing the variables, they claim that suppliers or users 
of innovations can determine the outcome of an innovation adoption or even 
influence outcomes by manipulating variables in a way that is more favourable (e.g. 
Frambach and Schillewaert 2002). Typically, diffusion theory has a normative 
character. It prescribes factors which should be attended to in order to ensure a more 
successful adoption and diffusion (‘critical success factors’).
Ontologically, diffusion theory, in particular the early applications based on variance 
research, can be seen to be aligned with the conventional paradigm. The failures of 
variance approaches to generate understanding undermined their positivist 
assumption that a theory of innovation would “gradually emerge from the 
accumulation o f more and more data” (Downs and Mohr 1979, p. 380). This 
constitutes its major weakness. Although the diffusion theory in reducing the world 
to a number of factors becomes applicable in practice, it looses out on richness in its 
simplification of the phenomenon under study. It has been argued that social reality 
cannot be reduced to a small set of discrete variables (such as values, beliefs, stories, 
norms and rituals) that can be documented and manipulated in an instrumental way 
(Morgan 1986). Innovation does not have to have distinct and measurable features, 
but complex systems have ‘interpretive flexibility’, having different significance 
depending on context and time (Lyytinen and Damsgaard 2001). Moreover, diffusion 
research has been critiqued to produce endless lists of factors which are 
“inconclusive, inconsistent and characterised by low levels o f explanation” (Wolfe 
1994, p. 405). An explanatory theory based on research aimed at finding such factors 
has been elusive because “virtually every determinant employed has proved to be a 
highly and inexplicably erratic predictor of innovativeness with an impact that varies 
dramatically across studies” (ibid., p. 405). The influence of factors can be shown to
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be very dependent on the time, history, situation and context in which they are 
applied. Institutional arrangements, context and technologic and economic 
constraints reshape the diffusion space in which the innovation is diffused (Lyytinen 
and Damsgaard 2001). Though this is acknowledged by some diffusion theorists 
contending that “knowledge of the extent to which variables affect different stages in 
the adoption process differently is still limited” (Frambach and Schillewaert 2002), 
they still continue to hold on to diffusion theory to discover such factors through 
progressive research. The critique is strengthened by the acknowledgement that the 
formulation o f these ‘factors’ is historically situated, socially constructed and 
corresponds to time-dependent managerial ideas and movements used in specific 
contexts for complex reasons (Mitev forthcoming; Lyytinen and Damsgaard 2001).
An illustration of the limitations o f diffusion theory has been shown in the case of 
business process re-engineering (BPR) (Newell, Swan et a l 2000). With BPR, 
adoption theory would predict a slow diffusion process due to certain characteristics 
o f BPR, such as the fact that it is complex, incompatible with current practise, not 
easily observable and alters organisational practise. However, practise shows a rapid 
and widespread use o f BPR (with various levels of utilisation and success) in 
communities of firms and academics (Newell, Swan et a l 2000). Newell, Swan et a l 
argue that the weakness of the diffusion theory by Rogers can be explained if it is 
recognised that the defining characteristics o f new technologies are not, as assumed 
by traditional models, given and permanent, but rather are perceived and therefore 
influenced by cognitive, social and political processes. The attributes of the complex 
technologies are not fixed and rigid but socially constructed.
Thus it is contended that research based on diffusion theory has produced few 
consistent findings regarding the causes, consequences or management of the 
innovation and adoption process (Wolfe 1994). The ability to make the kinds of 
generalisations and predictions that are typically associated with science and models 
is consistently being undermined by the phenomenon of complexity (Edwards 2000).
Another major critique is the unitary view of diffusion theory. Rogers (1995), for 
example, sees an organisation as “a stable system o f individuals who work together 
to achieve goals through a hierarchy of ranks and a division of labour” (ibid, p. 375).
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Such fiinctionalistic assumptions normally view politics in organisations as 
disruptive. In its social-technical approach, it sees technology as having inherent 
qualities that ‘naturally’ drive its diffusion, and social factors merely as interfering. 
Managers are thus portrayed with neutral tasks, neglecting the inherent, formal, 
hierarchical power differential that exists within organisations (Hislop, Newell et al 
2000, p. 400). However, evidence of conflict and power struggles has become 
impossible to deny, and the view that technology has a central determining force on 
an organisation and its socio-political life has to be questioned (Knights and Murray 
1994, p. 4). The rate o f diffusion is not solely a function o f push.
Despite its acknowledged limitations, diffusion theory is still an important influence 
in IT research. Both in its more traditional form, but also in more progressed forms 
that address some o f the critiques identified in this section. These are discussed in the 
next section.
4.2.5 Progressions in understanding diffusion of innovations
Building on the foundations of diffusion theory, many researchers have through the 
years extended the notions o f diffusion in order to better understand the phenomena 
related to the diffusion o f innovations.
The traditional diffusion theory has been criticised for its lack of consideration 
regarding the (attributes of the) innovation itself (Rogers 1983; Rogers 1995), and in 
response, these attributes were then given consideration. Moreover, rather than 
variance research, process research was advocated to aid in understanding the nature 
o f the innovation-décision process.
Traditional diffusion research has been based on variance research, discerning 
general properties of adopters to which the innovation is introduced. Its purpose was 
to investigate the variables related to innovativeness in a generalised way across 
different innovations. However, variance research does not show any order o f events 
neither does it provide insight into the process of innovation. It merely investigates 
the “variables related to innovativeness” (Rogers 1995, p. 188). Process research, by 
contrast, seeks to study the conceptual stages of the innovation-décision process and 
determine the time-ordered sequence of a set of events to explain the causes and
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effects. It attempts to explain the occurrence of an outcome by identifying the 
sequence of events preceding it (Shaw and Jarvenpaa 1997). In addition to variance 
research, Rogers therefore promotes a process research to explore the nature of the 
decision process involved in the adoption of the innovation and explain the causes 
and sequences o f related events over time.
As was argued in the previous section, variance research fits in the category of 
positivistic research. Process research, though still connected to variance research to 
find influential factors or characteristics, is more open to understand why in a certain 
context specific characteristics seem to influence events in a particular way. 
Although the characteristics o f this process are still often reduced to a limited 
number of generalised ‘variables’, the analysis is much more descriptive and 
qualitative and does not rest on statistical generalisation (Shaw and Jarvenpaa 1997, 
p. 188). Moreover, it acknowledges to a greater extent probabilistic and random 
influences which may cause cause-and-effect paths to deviate from the expected 
route (Shaw and Jarvenpaa 1997). In its analysis, it is more contextually conscious 
and may even be supported by interpretive assumptions. Still, diffusion research was 
focused on finding generalised variables (or particular events) which could determine 
the rate of a particular (fixed) technology. The limitations of this “technology-push” 
approach have been recognised (Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2001). This type of 
research has also been criticised for its simplistic linear cause-and-effect 
explanations which neglects the interplay between them (e.g. Pettigrew 1990). 
Research shows (including this research) that stages overlap, are iterated, surpassed 
and frequently change order (Newell, Swan et al. 2000).
More sophisticated insights were gained when a move was made to look beyond 
perspectives on technology with fixed and permanent attributes. Additional notions 
such as ‘perceived characteristics’ and ‘reinvention’ (Rogers 1995) made diffusion 
theory more sensitive to interpretivistic notions that the adoption of technology was 
not deterministically technologically driven but much more o f a social phenomenon. 
Characteristics of innovations were no longer considered inherent attributes of the 
technology, but were influenced by the perceptions o f potential adopters (Davis 
1989). Notions o f universally applicable best-practice solutions gradually came to a 
fall and were seen to be flawed. Traditional diffusion theory had underestimated the
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role of the adopters in appropriating the innovation. In its simplest form a linear 
“market-need” approach to innovation can be distinguished, but interactive models 
for combining technology-push and market-need approaches have also been 
proposed (Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2001). However, it can be concluded that more 
sophisticated diffusion studies typically view the adoption process as a process that 
involves (human) action in the form of a (rational) decision either to adopt or reject 
the innovation. Adoption is seen as the decision to make full use of an innovation 
(Rogers 1983). Many researchers have convincingly shown that organisational 
changes due to newly introduced concepts in organisations often are emergent and 
unanticipated. The adoption o f these concepts is neither intended nor deliberate (e.g. 
Orlikowski 1996).
Another extension to diffusion theory has been the focus on the communication 
channels and networks by which (potential) adopters learn about innovations. Early 
insights talk about the diffusion networks in which opinion leaders influence the 
opinions of others and in which the interconnectedness between individuals in a 
communication network plays an important role in the spread o f innovations (Rogers 
1995). Later insights develop the notion that adopters are not part of one social 
network, but a variety o f social networks through which ideas are communicated. 
Individuals that are ‘boundary spanning’, that is both active in penetrating 
interorganisational networks as well as connected within the networks within their 
own firm, drive forward new ideas and innovations (Tushman and Scanlan 1981). 
Communication through both oral and written language, as well as formal 
codification (e.g. through numerical representation or representation in information 
systems) can be argued to influence diffusion. Hasselbladth and Kallinikos (2000) 
theorise that three characteristics o f innovations with respect to their codification 
impact their spread across different contexts and their institutionalisation: namely the 
ease with which they can be reproduced (e.g. an algorithm is more easily 
reproducible than a painting), the extent to which they are perishable or durable (e.g. 
writing is more durable than speech) and the degree to which they are immediately 
comprehensible and communicable (e.g. how well they are expressed in terms that 
reflect established significations and meanings). They argue that management 
models with low or modest codification, such as BPR and TQM are relatively easily 
communicable, but more perishable and not easily reproducible, which may account
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for the fact that such models become fashionable, diffuse quickly across various 
organisational contexts, but also fade and change relatively rapidly. By contrast, 
models supported by formal codification have a more stable meaning, since such 
codification they argue creates barriers to alternative interpretations which in turn 
contributes to durability.
However, communication about innovations is not comprehensive and politically 
neutral, but inherently limited and politically shaped. Particular aspects o f the 
innovation can be communicated selectively according to the interests of the 
communicators (or change agents). Notably, the way IT suppliers, vendors and 
consultants selectively communicate about new IT innovations has been highlighted 
as being influential in the adoption of innovations, even enticing adopters to adopt 
technologies that were not appropriate for them (Newell, Swan et a l  2000). 
Expanding the micro-organisational view of previous diffusion theories, Newell, 
Swan et a l (1998) call for an analysis of meso-industry and macro-national level 
contextual factors that influence the adoption of innovations. Such an analysis can 
show how innovations spread, regardless o f their technical merits. In a similar 
fashion, Edwards (2000) argues that the accomplishment o f innovative action 
depends on the dynamic contingencies o f the institutional setting.
Building on these insights, Newell, Swan et a l (2000) present a knowledge-focused 
perspective, arguing that one should not focus on the spread of particular 
technological artefacts related to the innovation (e.g. technological concepts such as 
BPR, JIT, CRM, ERP, and the like), but rather on the spread o f ideas and knowledge 
underpinning a technology. The solutions that present themselves as generic ‘best 
practices’ actually need to be ‘unpacked’ and reconfigured to fit the firm-specific 
context. The innovation processes are presented as a ‘knowledge integration 
problem’: the difficulty of unbundling and integrating commodified knowledge with 
firm-specific knowledge. They argue that understanding the innovation diffusion can 
be extended by exploring the processes of knowledge bundling and unbundling and 
reintegration. The knowledge-focused perspective is used by Beynon-Davies and 
Williams (2003) to provide an interpretation of the low take-up of information 
system development methods and the considerable adaptation o f these methods in the 
cases where they were adopted. From their initial analysis, they argue that these
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methods are packed bundles of knowledge, which are then unpacked with various 
levels of success in different organisations.
Further understanding of diffusion comes from social constructivists who 
demonstrate the influential role of actors beyond the suppliers or targeted adopters 
involved in the innovation. For example, in the promotion of computerisation, there 
is a large contribution from all kinds o f actors, including colleagues, trade 
associations in the computer industry, professional societies, regulatory agencies and 
the media (lacono and Kling 1996). Pinch and Bijker (1987) tell the story of the 
development of the bicycle. Conflicts between different social groups related to the 
bicycle can be seen to shape the bicycle innovations. The innovation is shaped by 
technical conflicts (regarding requirements to meet speed versus safety), conflicting 
solutions to meet requirements (different bicycle designs) and moral conflicts 
(women wearing skirts on bicycles). Social groups, which share the same set of 
meaning attached to the specific artefact, present various solutions for dealing with 
these conflicts and problems. In the interaction of the social groups, the innovation is 
constructed and the diffusion is propelled. Some have termed this approach to 
diffusion ‘emergent’, since the innovation can be seen to be influenced by 
unpredictable and inevitable setbacks and surprises, arising out of the organisational 
and social context (Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2001). In contrast to traditional 
theories of diffusion, building on a general notion of consensus, politics, conflicts 
and competition have entered the contemporary understanding of innovation 
diffusion.
The understanding of diffusion of innovations can be seen to have progressed a long 
these lines. In this thesis, when we analyse our case using diffusion theory, we use 
the diffusion theory as promoted by Rogers (1995), which is more socially informed 
and has a more qualitative nature than diffusion theory that stems from variance 
research. This approach can be labelled socio-technical (see section 2.2.5).
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4.2.6 Conclusion on diffusion theory
Though we have not come across academic publications studying the topic of IT 
evaluation method diffusion, the elements identified originating from different 
studies (including ones that apply or were informed by diffusion theory) in section
3.3.4 can be seen to influence the diffusion of such methods. If we were to employ a 
strict version of diffusion theory, we would start by defining some hypotheses about 
such elements or factors that are likely to influence the adoption of evaluation 
methods. A variance research in difflision-adoption theory would argue that from a 
statistical analysis the most important factors could be uncovered and measured on a 
measurement scale of some sort.
Though we do not aim to determine statistically which factors are in general the most 
influential, as a variance approach to diffusion theory would dictate, all of these 
elements (and more) can influence the employment of an evaluation method within 
any context. However, only by closer analysis are we able to discover which 
elements are influential in a particular context, and why in that particular case, they 
are in fact influential.
By saying that studies based on diffusion theory have such limitations, it is not our 
conclusion that they are not helpful in understanding the adoption of evaluation 
concepts. The factors identified by these and others studies can be very helpful in 
understanding our case. In fact, many identified factors will indeed be very 
influential in a large number of cases. However, we do not subscribe to the ideas that 
a generic framework can be used to understand the complexity of the case, or that it 
can predict or be used to control the outcome of the adoption. Neither will we try to 
validate adoption models or identified adoption factors with the intention of 
constructing such a generic framework. Instead, the factors will be used as 
complementary to the more socially acknowledgeable theories, and their sole 
function is to analyse the case study in this research.
Diffusion theory offers a widely used approach to explore the adoption process of 
innovations, and given its compatibility with our research question it is discussed in 
this work. Although it seems like the natural starting point for our analysis, we know 
that this theory cannot definitively conclude the analysis considering all the various
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ways in which it has been subjected to criticism. The theory will be applied to the 
case in a minimalistic way to demonstrate where the interesting questions lie.
To move beyond a functionalist understanding o f evaluation adoption, we propose 
using the actor-network theory for gaining a deeper understanding. In this theory, 
technological innovation is viewed as an attempt to build and stabilise a diffuse 
system of allies composed of human and non-human entities (Mitev forthcoming, p. 
8). It enables one to circumvent technological determinism in which technical 
projects and innovations proceed naturally unless they are actively stopped, and 
replaces it with the idea that things do not happen unless human and non-human 
actors make them happen.
In the next section we will explore the actor-network theory in more detail.
4 J  A c t o r - n e t w o r k  THEORY
4.3.1 Introduction
Although the diffusion theory, given its focus on understanding diffusion of 
innovations, offers a natural starting point for addressing our research question, we 
explore here the actor-network theory (ANT) as a possible addition to help with a 
further understanding of the case. One of the main motivations for including actor- 
network in our analysis is the fact that it may offer additional insights with regard to 
the dynamics of the employment of evaluation methods in organisations. Diffusion 
theory, including its enhancements, has a strong tendency to make a distinction 
between the technology (the innovation) and the social. In this instance, bringing the 
two theories together is the actual diffusion.
However, we argue that IT evaluation has both technical and social merits at the 
same time (see the ideas presented in Chapter 3), and that therefore it might be 
appropriate to try to overcome the distinction between technical and social for a 
better understanding. We argue that it is neither the inherent properties o f the 
innovation nor some properties of the (social) context (including potential adopters 
and other actors) that drives the innovation, but rather the associations that exist and 
are created between the innovation and its surrounding actors. Actors that are both
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technical and social. ANT presents a view of translation, which in focusing on 
associations rather than properties, is radically different from the ideas proposed by 
the diffusion theory.
In this section we will describe ANT so that we can use it in our analysis of our case 
study. We will highlight some of its uses in IS research and finally discuss its 
critiques.
4.3.2 Actor-network theory
Actor-network theory employs a particular vocabulary, which though in terms may 
appear in other theories (for example, systems theory), however have in ANT a quite 
different meaning. The particular interpretation ANT gives to notions such as 
‘network’, ‘black-box’ and ‘translation’ will therefore be discussed in this section. 
We will briefly outline the actor-network theory by means of addressing a number of 
questions:
• What is ANT?
• What is ANT about? What is the essence o f ANT?
• What is an actor?
• What is a network and what an actor-network?
• What is a translation?
For a more comprehensive explanation of ANT, please refer to the publications 
referred to in this section.
What is ANT?
In short, actor-network theory, or the ‘sociology of translations’ (Gallon 1986a), is 
concerned with studying the construction and transformation o f the heterogeneous 
networks (Law 1992) that are made up of people, organisations, agents, machines 
and many other objects; studying the networks that constitute the world, existing o f 
both humans and non-humans. It explores the ways that the networks of relations are 
composed, how they emerge and come into being, how they are constructed and 
maintained, how they compete with other networks and how they are made more 
durable over time (Tatnall and Gilding 1999). ANT examines how actors enlist other 
actors into their world and how they bestow qualities, desires, visions and 
motivations on these actors (Latour 1996a).
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What is ANT about? What is the essence o f ANT?
The essence o f actor-network theory is a perspective o f the world that shows it to 
comprise heterogeneous networks that form actors. All phenomena are the effect or 
the product of heterogeneous networks (Law 1992). Even persons are made up out of 
a heterogeneous network, as Law describes (1992):
“However, I will press the argument in another way by saying that, analytically, what 
counts as a person is an effect generated by a network of heterogeneous, interacting, 
materials. This is much the same argument as the one that I have already made about 
both scientific knowledge and the social world as a whole. But converted into a claim 
about humans it says that people are who they are because they are a patterned 
network of heterogeneous materials. If you took away my computer, my colleagues, 
my office, my books, my desk, my telephone I wouldn’t be a sociologist writing 
papers, delivering lectures, and producing ‘knowledge’. I’d be something quite other 
- and the same is true for all of us. So the analytical question is this. Is an agent an 
agent primarily because he or she inhabits a body that carries knowledge, skills, 
values, and all the rest? Or is an agent an agent because he or she inhabits a set of 
elements (including, of course, a body) that stretches out into the network of 
materials, somatic and otherwise, that surrounds each body?”
To understand phenomena (such as acts, events and actors) these networks, these 
actors, need to be studied without imposing on them a priori definitions or 
expectations; to avoid a priori distinctions between the technical and the social. Or, 
put in another way, actor-network theory argues avoiding both technological 
determinism and social reductionism (Monteiro 2000). ANT does not accept any 
form o f reductionism (neither technological nor social) that splits up the technical 
from the social and supposes that the one drives the other. It states that there is no 
reason to assume, a priori, that either objects or people in general determine the 
character o f social change or stability (Law 1992). As such, ANT supports 
analytically treating objects and people the same; non-humans and humans together 
form the heterogeneous networks.
We illustrate this thinking with an example. Think about how ordinary life is 
influenced by a wide range of factors, including social and technical, but also
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political and historical factors. For example, when driving a car we are influenced by 
traffic regulations, previous driving experience, and the car’s manoeuvrability 
(Monteiro 2000). To understand the phenomenon o f driving a car, we should 
consider all these influencing factors together. In ANT, the actor-network that makes 
up this event should be analysed. The actor-network is those elements in a context 
that shape action.
To address the need to treat both human and non-human actors fairly and in the same 
way, ANT is based upon three methodological principles (Gallon 1986a): generalised 
agnosticism, generalised symmetry and free association. In general agnosticism, the 
researcher abstains from censoring or judging the actors, whether they are human or 
non-human. In generalised symmetry, researchers are required to use a single 
repertoire when human and non-human, social or natural elements are described. The 
rule is not to change registers when moving from the technical to the social aspects 
o f the problem studied, or to give either of them special explanatory status. In free  
association, the researcher must abandon all previous distinctions between natural 
and social events. There can be no boundary between the two; they might be 
separated later, only as the result of analysis and understood as outcomes or effects, 
but cannot be divided a priori, assuming it is the given order of things (Law 1999).
W hat is an actor?
Actors are those elements in a context that shape action while pursuing their 
interests. An actor is something that acts or to which activity is granted by others. It 
implies no special motivation of human individual actors or o f humans in general. 
An actor can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of an action 
(Latour 1996b).
But as Law argues, actors are also “an effect generated by a network of 
heterogeneous, interacting, materials” (Law 1992). He demonstrates (see above) as 
an example that for a researcher to be a researcher, he has to be aligned with 
surrounding actors such as books, a computer, an office, colleagues, etc. Social 
agents are never located in bodies alone, but rather are patterned networks of 
heterogeneous relations. By punctualisation or black-boxing, actor-networks 
themselves “make up an actor”. Thus each actor is made up out of actors and at the
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same time is part o f an actor. Or, in the vocabulary of actor-network, each actor is 
itself a (simplified) actor-network and is at the same time part o f other actor- 
networks. As Latour (1999a) argues, actor and network designate two faces of the 
same phenomenon -  the social phenomenon called actor-network; that is “a certain 
type o f circulation that travels endlessly without ever encountering either the micro­
level or the macro-level”. Law states that all attributes we normally associate with 
human beings, such as thinking, acting, writing, loving and earning, are generated in 
networks that exist beyond the body. An actor is also always a network (Law 1992).
Since actors are actor-networks in infinity, the researcher must choose how the 
network under research is ‘zoomed in and out’ and which actors are included. “It 
entails that that the ‘actor’ of an analysis is of the ‘size’ that the researcher chooses 
as most convenient relative to the direction o f the analysis” (Monteiro 2000, p. 82). 
However, being seen as an actor and thereby producing a simplification of 
complexity, either by researchers but more importantly by other actors, shows “the 
result of a mobilization process with black-boxing effects. The ordering these 
simplifications produce is neither neutral nor ‘obvious’. They are made obvious or 
natural in order to achieve an effect -  namely, to curb opposition or alternatives” 
(ibid, p. 82). Thus, we see that in choosing the size or shape of an actor the 
researcher is not completely free, but bound by other actors’ practice -  what is 
obvious and natural to them. Thus, actors should have some obviousness and 
naturalness to them.
What is a network and what is an actor-network?
By being aligned with each other, actors form an actor-network. This alignment is 
achieved through the translation of interests and the enrolment o f actors into the 
network. Translating involves showing how an actor’s non-aligned interests may 
become aligned. Alignment is established in inscriptions that give a particular 
precedence in terms o f a viewpoint. Inscriptions refer to the way technical artefacts 
embody patterns of use (Monteiro 2000), or how certain viewpoints, values, opinions 
and rhetoric are converted into devices or materials (such as reports, documents and 
scientific papers - Gallon 1986b), or frozen into codes or computer applications 
(Bowker and Star 1994). Latour uses the term ‘immutable mobile’ to describe such 
network elements that when they are moved around in time and space, they remain
123
C h a p t e r  4
stable and unchanged (Tatnall and Gilding 1999; Latour 1999b). For example, a car 
can be considered an immutable mobile when it displays a relational pattern of 
certain properties (such as infrastructure, oil industry, driving-licences, traffic signs, 
garages, etc.). Such a network can move through time and space without changing 
these properties. It displays properties of irreversibility (Walsham 1997).
To Law (1992) the core of the actor-network approach is “a concern with how actors 
and organisations mobilise, juxtapose and hold together the bits and pieces out of 
which they are composed; how they are sometimes able to prevent those bits and 
pieces from following their own inclinations and making off; and how they manage, 
as a result, to conceal for a time the process o f translation itself and so turn a network 
from a heterogeneous set of bits and pieces each with its own inclinations, into 
something that passes as a punctualised actor.” In this sentence, he talks about ‘for a 
time’ because once a network is formed, it is not formed once and for all. It can 
always become unstable since new actors, the desertion o f existing actors or changes 
in alliances can cause the ‘black-boxes ’ (Gallon 1986b) of networked actors to be 
opened and their contents reconsidered. A black-box is “a way of talking of the 
simplified points that are linked together in an actor-network” (Gallon 1986b), which 
is also a network in its own right. Law (1992) speaks of a ‘punctualised actor’. 
Latour (1987, p. 108-121; Hepso 2001) describes five alternative strategies for 
enrolling others in the punctualisation or creation o f a black-box: to appeal to the 
other’s explicit interests (“I want what you want”); to get the others to follow our 
interests (“You want what I want”); to suggest a short detour (“I will take care of 
your interests, if you follow me”); to reshuffle interests and goals by tactics such as 
inventing new goals and inventing new groups (“We all want this”); by becoming 
indispensable to the others (“You need me to get what you want”).
A network recursively generates and reproduces itself and relies on the active 
maintenance of its simplifications or ‘punctulisation’ for its continued existence. 
Network, contrary to other uses o f the term, does not imply some fixed thing, but a 
dynamic, actively shifting alliance o f actors. A network becomes durable partly due 
to a structure where each point is at the intersection of two networks: “one that it 
simplifies and another that simplifies it” (Gallon 1987, p. 97).
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W hat is a translation?
Just as an actor is hard to scope, so is translation. It is a term used in many different 
ways. Literally the term translation denotes two meanings, both relevant to ANT. In 
the first place, it is a change of position and a (new) interpretation. Latour (1991) 
describes “[t]he innovation is translated or carried from one position to another in the 
sense of a mathematical manipulation; the innovation is also interpreted or 
transposed from one position to another in the linguistic sense of the word 
translation. Translation operates between actors: an actor gives definition to another 
actor, imputes him/her/it/them with interests, projects, desires, strategies, reflexes, 
afterthoughts.” And secondly, according to Gallon (1986b), a translation is “the 
methods by which an actor enrols others. These methods involve: (a) the definition 
of roles, their distribution, and the delineation of a scenario; (b) the strategies in 
which a [future state actor-network] renders itself indispensable to others by creating 
a geography of obligatory passage points; and (c) the displacement imposed upon 
others as they are forced to follow the itinerary that has been imposed” (ibid, p. xvii). 
In the process o f translation. Gallon discerns four ‘moments’: problematisation, 
intéressement, enrolment and mobilisation. During problematisation one actor makes 
an effort to make other actors subscribe to its own conceptions by demonstrating that 
they have the right solutions to, or definitions of, others’ problems. During 
problematisation the actor tries to demonstrate their quality of being indispensable to 
the solution o f the problem (McMaster, Vidgen et al. 1997). The problem is re­
defined (translated) in terms of solutions offered by this actor (Bloomfield and Best 
1992), who then attempts to establish themselves as an ‘obligatory passage point’ 
which must be negotiated as part o f its solution. To pass through the obligatory 
passage point, the other actors must accept a set of specific conventions, rules, 
assumptions and ways of operating laid down by the first actor (Tatnall 2000). 
During intéressement an attempt is made to impose the identities and roles defined in 
the problematisation on the other actors, thereby locking other actors in the roles 
proposed for them. Gradually existing networks are thus replaced by the new 
network (Grint and Woolgar 1997). Enrolment occurs when a stable network of 
alliances is formed and the actors yield to their defined roles and definitions 
(Singleton and Michael 1993). Finally, during mobilisation the proposed solution 
gains wider acceptance -  it has become taken-for-granted and is black-boxed.
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Moreover, translation can be seen as to “re-interpret, represent, or appropriate others’ 
interests to one’s own. In other words, with a translation one and the same interest or 
anticipation may be presented in different ways, thereby mobilizing broader 
support.” Translation is necessary for stability in the network, since actors from the 
outset have a diverse set of interests (Monteiro 2000). Aligning these interests causes 
a network to become stable and durable. In fact, translation can be seen to create new 
relationships between actors to form an actor-network: ‘[t]ranslation is a process in 
which sets o f relations [...] are proposed and brought into being’ (Gallon and Law 
1989). The goal of translation can be seen as to bring together complex entities into 
a single object or idea that can be mobilised and circulated like a branded commodity 
or a taken-for-granted fact (Clarke 2001).
As Monteiro (2000) describes it: “In ANT terms, [information system] design is 
translation: users’ and others’ interests may, according to typical ideal models, be 
translated into specific ‘needs’; the specific needs are further translated into more 
general and unified needs, so that these needs can be translated into one and the same 
solution. When the solution (system) is running, it will be adopted by the users who 
translated the system into the context of their specific work tasks and situations” 
(ibid, p. 77).
4.3.3 ANT in information systems research
ANT has been employed in many different cases to investigate the successes and 
failures o f technological innovations. Some notable examples are mentioned here.
Gallon (1986a) has used it to explain the failure of the domestication of the scallops 
o f St Brieuc Bay and the development of the electric vehicle by the Electricité de 
France (Gallon 1986b). Latour has used actor-network theory to analyse the 
development of a revolutionary public transportation system known as Aramis 
(Latour 1996a) and to discuss the achievements of Louis Pasteur (Latour 1999b). 
Monteiro and Hanseth (1995) studied the role of standards in EDI systems and 
information infrastructure (Hanseth and Braa 1999). Vidgen and McMaster (1996) 
have applied it to the adoption o f a particular car-parking system.
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Silva and Backhouse (1997) used the concepts of ANT to explain the failure to 
institutionalise the London Ambulance Service information system. Mitev (2000) 
has employed ANT to study the problematic introduction o f an American 
computerised reservation system and yield management at French railways. Wagner 
(2003) draws on ANT to study the design and implementation of an ERP system in 
an academic environment.
More and more studies apply ANT in IS research. Overall, ANT is beginning to gain 
firm ground within IS research.
4.3.4 Critiques on and limitations of ANT
ANT has been criticised from different stances. Walsham (1997) criticises ANT and 
its disregard for social structures, its lack o f political analysis and its poor capacity 
for explanations. Furthermore, the role of the researcher as actor in the research has 
been criticised (Clarke 2001), which relates to the dependence between results from 
an ANT study and the viewpoint presented by the researcher. Also, the discussion 
between humans and non-humans, and which explanatory power is given to each, is 
a subject debate. Finally, ANT is criticised for its underestimation of ‘exogenous 
contingencies’. These critiques are discussed below.
Social structures
ANT has been criticised for neglecting macro social structures and focusing only on 
local contingencies. How can the local and the global be related? However, ANT 
argues that macro levels can be investigated with the same methodological tools as 
the micro-level -  “the macro-structure o f society is made o f the same stuff as the 
micro-structure” (Latour 1991, p. 118). ANT allows movement between levels of 
analysis; it actually denies a difference between macro structures and micro 
interactions -  differences between network and actor; they “are two faces o f the same 
phenomenon” (Latour 1999a, p. 19). Walsham (1997) suggests drawing upon the 
structuration theory by Giddens (1984), which links levels of analysis from the 
individual to the global and offers models o f social action and structure at multiple 
levels to overcome this problem. However, Latour (1999a, p. 17, original italics) 
argues “maybe the social possesses the bizarre property of not being made o f agency 
and structure at all, but rather of being a circulating entity.” In other words, the
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social is circulating between actor and network. Moreover, ANT argues for keeping 
the same framework of analysis for tackling both a “macro-actor or a micro-actor” 
(Gallon and Latour 1981) and for making the notion of an actor-network scalable: 
one element o f an actor-network may be expanded into a new complete actor 
network, and vice versa, a whole actor-network may be collapsed into one element of 
another actor-network (Monteiro 2000). Impacts on the micro or respectively the 
macro level can thereby be analysed to show its effect on either o f these levels.
Political analysis
Walsham (1997) criticises the amoral stance of ANT and thus its lack o f insight 
concerning political viewpoints. He argues that additional political and ethical 
theories might be needed to understand case findings. For example, the reason for the 
African continent almost totally being excluded in the Internet cannot be understood 
by simply investigating the network. He suggests that the empirical results from an 
ANT study should also be debated in terms of the moral and political issues. 
Furthermore Mitev (forthcoming) argues that treating the actors as equal is 
problematic: not all actors are equal; some exert a stronger influence than others.
In a similar way, Knights and Murray (1994 ) criticise ANT for the way in which it 
gives little or no attention to the broader powers and inequalities that are both the 
condition and consequence of network formations. Latour replies by a counter 
critique to critical theorists who rely too much on inequalities o f the social: “Critical 
theorists argue that through the medium of artefacts, domination and exclusion hide 
themselves under the guise of natural and objective forces. Critical theory thus 
deploys a tautology -  social relations are nothing but social relations -  to which it 
adds a conspiracy theory: society is hiding behind the fetish of techniques. But 
techniques are not fetishes, they are unpredictable, not means but mediators, means 
and ends at the same time. [...] Critical theory is unable to explain why artefacts enter 
the stream of our relations, why we so incessantly recruit and socialize non-humans. 
It is not to mirror, congeal, crystallize, or hide social relations, but to remake these 
very relations through fresh and unexpected sources of action. Society is not stable 
enough to inscribe itself in anything. On the contrary, most of the features of what 
we mean by social order -  scale, asymmetry, durability, power, hierarchy, and the 
distribution o f roles -  are impossible even to define without recruiting non-humans.
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Yes, society is constructed, but not socially constructed. Humans, for millions of 
years, have extended their social relations to others actants with which, with whom, 
they have swapped many properties, and with which, with whom, they form 
collectives” (Latour 1999b, p. 197, original italics).
In other words, it is true that there are inequalities, but not a priori, dividing the 
social and technological. ANT does not accept any reductionism; neither machines 
nor human relations are determinate in the last instance. It is argued that there is no 
reason to assume, a priori, that either objects or people in general determine the 
character of social change or stability. Indeed, in particular cases, social relations 
may shape machines, or machine relations shape their social counterparts. But this is 
an empirical question and usually matters are more complex (Law 1992). The social 
and the technical might be considered separate when understood as effects or 
outcomes, but not as given in the order of things (Law 1999). Both (through 
inscriptions) can have an impact in the resulting inequalities between actors. The 
same conclusion as before can be drawn: “Moral and political issues should be 
debated from a solid empirical base, and actor-network theory offers a contribution 
to the latter if not directly to the former” (Walsham 1997, p. 475).
Poor capacity for explanations
ANT is argued to be much more a method for describing rather than explaining. 
However, Latour (1999a) argues that ANT never was intended to be “a theory of the 
social or even worse an explanation o f what makes society exert pressure on actors 
[but a] very crude method to learn from the actors without imposing on them an a 
priori definition of their world-building capacities. [...] ANT does not claim to 
explain the actor’s behaviours and reasons, but only to find the procedures which 
render actors able to negotiate their ways through one another’s world-building 
activity” (ibid, p. 20). In other words, it never was intended to explain the behaviour 
o f social actors, but in a much more ethnographic sense a way for researchers to 
study what, how and why actors behave the way they do -  not claiming to explain 
this behaviour by all kinds of exterior forces unknown to the actors themselves. 
‘Explanation’ in this sense, and as it will be used in the analysis part o f this thesis, is 
intended to describe in detail the events and actions that take place and how they 
interact, rather than to find (invisible) causes (e.g. contextual explanations) or linking
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perceived events to generalised social theories (e.g. explaining that actors acted the 
way they did because that is consistent with a particular social theory).
Role of the researcher
Another point o f critique on ANT is the position of the researcher. From the idea of 
generalised symmetry both humans and non-humans are considered a priori equal. 
However, the role of the researcher in labelling actors, defining passage points, 
scoping the actor-network, telling the story and so on is very influential in the results 
an ANT study delivers. The researcher enters the study with his/her own theoretical 
backgrounds, ideas and preconceptions (Clarke 2001). A way to deal with this 
critique is to adopt a more reflexive approach towards the researcher within the 
study. Moreover, Monteiro (2000, p. 76) argues that “employing ANT still requires a 
researcher to make critical judgements about how to delineate the context of study 
from the backdrop”, that is: the researcher should be critical in their labelling of 
actors and in their analysis in general, thereby being guided by the actors themselves. 
“Abbreviations, short-circuits and simplifications are always produced. [...] The 
ordering these simplifications produce is neither neutral nor ‘obvious’” (ibid, p. 82).
Humans versus non-humans
ANT is debated by many for its notion of symmetry between human and non-human 
actors. The main critique is that people have been reduced to the same level as things 
and machines. However, human qualities such as emotions, which play a vital role in 
human activity, seem to be lost (Mutch 2002). Moreover, with the notion of 
inscriptions, technology seems to have been granted some deterministic property. 
But ANT does not claim humans and machines are the same -  it merely states that 
one should first attempt to discover the influential elements that actually determine 
action, be it technical or non-technical (Monteiro 2000). For example, to discover the 
influential factors that influence the way we drive our car, we need to know the 
engine’s capacity (technical) as well as the driver’s training (non-technical). Rather 
than distinguishing technical and non-technical a priori, ANT argues that they might 
have more in common than not.
To perceive the term inscription as being an action that is inscribed and hard-wired 
into an artefact is a misconception (Monteiro 2000). It merely is used to describe
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how concrete anticipations and restrictions o f patterns of use are involved in the 
development and use of a technology. It is neither the case that the object determines 
its use, nor that an object is infinitely flexible in its interpretation and appropriation 
by its user; it is an interplay between both extremes.
Exogenous contingencies
The critiques on the ANT discussion above can be summarised as a warning that 
ANT might be too ‘flattening’. By perceiving actors equally, important social 
constructions and discourses may be lost. Only relying on the configuration of actor- 
networks is not enough for explaining why and how some actors are more 
empowered (Mitev forthcoming) while others are disempowered; and why and how 
there may be pre-existing conflicts between actors which shape outcomes. Using 
ANT, the role of ‘exogenous contingencies’ such as economic crisis, deregulation 
and IT-supported managerial principles may be underestimated. Mitev 
(forthcoming) argues that conceptualisations, for example, of the market, economics, 
organisations, management or culture should be explored fiirther. It is not sufficient 
to understand that actors hold particular beliefs or interests, but rather an analysis is 
needed to understand how and why this actor has taken these beliefs for granted -  
how they have shaped the actor’s interests. And moreover, how this grants particular 
actors the status o f being more empowered than others.
4.3.5 Conclusion on ANT
ANT provides an approach to analyse our case study that is promising. It offers us a 
language of analysis that sensitises us to new ways of understanding. The dichotomy 
between the social and the technical (see section 2,2.5) is solved by the perception 
that both are intertwined. Moreover, ANT does not reduce a priori IT evaluation 
employment to simplistic factors, but it is able to analyse it in all its complexity. It 
cuts across economical, strategic, social and technical issues related to IT evaluation 
and allows for making sense of the unfolding employment process (Monteiro 2000). 
Though not having a history comparable to that of the diffusion theory, ANT has 
demonstrated its usefulness in IS research.
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4.4 C o m pa r in g  d iffu sio n  t h e o r y  a n d  A N T
We have discussed two theories to help us understand the employment of evaluation 
methods in organisations. In this section we will zoom in on the differences between 
the two.
The main difference between the two is in the social-technical stance (McMaster, 
Vidgen et al. 1997). In diffusion theory, the social system and technology are 
regarded as separate. In the perspective o f technical innovations, the diffusion of 
innovation is the adoption of technology by a social system. In ANT, the social 
system and technology are considered inseparable. Apparent separation between the 
two in case of a certain technological concept successfully being employed by an 
organisation is merely the evidence that the actor-network has stabilised; the 
technology has been black-boxed and therefore appears to be separate. The 
employment o f an innovation thus can be regarded a technology “yet to be black- 
boxed”, whereas diffusion theory would consider it to be a technology which 
attributes have to be demonstrated to the (potential) adopters. Once the innovation 
has been pointed out to the adopters, then it should just be a matter of time before 
everyone, except the most immovable, recognise its advantages (McMaster, Vidgen 
et a l 1997).
In diffusion theory the innovation is transferred and adopted in its original form, or at 
most, it is reinvented in its implementation, whereas in ANT the innovation is 
translated in its enrolment. The innovation is dynamically transformed in appearance 
and meaning. Reacting to diffusion theory, Latour states that “... after many 
recruitments, displacements and transformations, the project, having become real, 
then manifests, perhaps, the characteristics of perfection, profitability, beauty, and 
efficiency that the diffusion model located in the starting point.” (Latour 1996a, p. 
119). In other words, whereas the diffusion theory argues that the inherent qualities 
of the technology and the characteristics of the adopters determine the outcome of 
the diffusion, ANT argues that only through its translation does the technology gain 
such qualities in its associations within the heterogeneous network. The innovation 
has no technological deterministic path of adoption, but by contrast moves only if it 
interests one group of actors or another (Tatnall 2000) who may perpetuate it further.
132
C h a p t e r  4
transforming it along the way. Technological innovation thus is viewed as an 
attempt to build and stabilise a diffuse system of allies composed of human and non­
human entities (Mitev forthcoming).
Furthermore, the diffusion of the technology in diffusion theory relies upon shared 
human interests and beliefs (McMaster, Vidgen et a l  1997) which accounts for its 
spread, whereas ANT is based on differences in interests. The spread o f the 
innovation hereby is based on a translation where interests between actors are 
aligned after which the innovation becomes black-boxed.
One final major distinction between the two is the difference between concerns. 
Diffusion theory has a strong tendency to make links between cause and effect 
(McMaster, Vidgen et a l 1997 ) and search for causal factors that explain why some 
technology transfers are successful and others fail. The concern of diffusion theory 
then is to predict and even influence the potential for success or failure o f future 
innovations. By contrast, the ANT ^proach is concerned with a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon at hand. It strives to study how actor-networks 
(people and things) are created, strengthened and weakened. It does so by offering 
concepts and a language that describe the translations in “all their glorious messiness 
and irrationality, rather than in sanitized accounts created after the fact” (McMaster, 
Vidgen era/. 1997).
4.5 C o n c l u s io n
In this chapter we have discussed diffusion theory and actor-network theory as two 
starting points from which to analyse the case studies. Diffusion theory was chosen 
because it is a widely accepted theory of the diffusion of innovations and for its 
compatibility with the research question. However, after having considered the 
limitations of diffusion theory, the actor-network theory was added to the case 
analysis.
In this research we will start with a brief analysis based on Roger’s adoption theory 
to show where this theory can be helpful in understanding the employment o f 
evaluation methods and where it leaves questions unanswered. ANT will be used to
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analyse even further the same case and investigate how problematic explanations 
from diffusion theory can be understood differently. Both analyses will help to give a 
better understanding of the adoption process o f IT evaluation methods.
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Chapter 5: The Employment of an IT Evaluation Method at an 
Insurance Company
5.1 In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter is devoted to describing the case study and covers the design, 
introduction and employment o f an IT evaluation method (ITEM) at IIC, one of the 
largest insurance companies in the Netherlands. The case spans the period from 1996 
until 2001.
IT is frequently considered to be at the heart of the insurance industry. In theory, this 
industry only sells ‘pieces of paper and promises’ (Knights and Murray 1994, p. 55). 
In practice, however, sales, underwriting, renewal and claims procedures all require 
the collection, manipulation, storage, retrieval and updating o f considerable amounts 
of data. In addition, insurance companies are required to save their data for extended 
periods of time, usually decades, and a considerable part o f the industry’s profits is 
closely linked to stocks and shares investments. Therefore, employing a system that 
is able to handle large amounts of data as well as compute the complex calculations 
necessary to gauge insurance risks and stock investments makes IT vital to the 
industry.
Financially speaking, IT can be considered of paramount importance to the financial 
sector. This sector, including banks, insurers and pension funds, has the largest IT 
costs in the Netherlands. In 1999, this sector spent € 3.7 billion on IT (CBS 1999), 
almost 30% of the total € 12.4 billion spent annually on IT in the Netherlands. Even 
though banks are accountable for the majority of this spending due to the numerous 
transactions that require intensive data communication and security, the insurance 
industry and the pension funds did however manage to account for € 1.7 billion in 
spending in 1999. Moreover, due to ‘all fmanz’ concepts*^ (see section 5.2.3), 
insurance and banking are continually becoming more and more integrated. Typical 
IT costs are hardware, software packages, customised software, externally hired IT
The ‘all fmanz’ concept denotes in financial jargon the integration of types of financial products 
(such as insurance and banking products).
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personnel and a company’s own IT personnel. Included in these are both 
maintenance and new IT investments.
We start this chapter by describing the external context of the case and then move on 
to discuss common technologies and related changes in the insurance industry at the 
time depicted in the case description. Furthermore, we offer some insight into the 
relevancy of IT and IT evaluation for the insurance industry. We will then 
specifically discuss the context, history and culture of IIC, all three of which play a 
role in influencing the way IT is managed. The core of this chapter is devoted to 
discussing the case of IIC employing ITEM. The case will be analysed in the 
following chapter.
5.2 E n v ir o n m e n t  a n d  t e c h n o l o g y  in  t h e  in su r a n c e  in d u st r y
5.2.1 Introduction
To understand the environment of the case study, we detail here some major trends, 
technological and otherwise, in the insurance industry during the period of the case 
study. We consider here important changes such as regulations, competitive 
behaviour and mergers, market demands, Y2K problems, the introduction of the euro 
and general globalisation.
Subsequently, we discuss the changes in the environment of insurance, including the 
change of organisational strategies and the role of IT in the financial sector (based on 
Irsel, Nijland et al 2000). Furthermore, we discuss the topic o f IT evaluation in the 
insurance industry.
5.2.2 Changes in the environment of insurance
The environment of insurance at the beginning of the ‘90s can be characterised by 
high profits. Rising profits were very much linked to Dutch prosperity (Barendregt 
and Langenhuyzen 1995; Irsel, Nijland et a l  2000) that had been increasing from the 
‘60s onward and which had driven the demand for insurance products (e.g. products 
related to financial security and planning). The deregulation that had taken place in 
the ‘90s opened up new markets and allowed for the introduction of new financial
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products (combining banking and insurance services), which in turn generated new 
sources of profit. Moreover, the returns on (stock) investments, linked to fluctuations 
in interest on capital and the overall economic growth, were high and were the 
driving force behind profits in the insurance industry.
In the ‘90s, market trends that had originated in the ‘50s were still gaining 
momentum. These trends included the blurring of boundaries between banks and 
insurers'^, the increased use of other market channels (such a bank offices, direct 
writing and intermediaries'^), mergers between insurers (and banks) and a tendency 
toward international expansion (Barendregt and Langenhuyzen 1995; Irsel, Nijland 
et al. 2000). The general trends in financial organisations included globalisation, 
mergers and strategic alliances with clients who demanded a global and full range of 
services.
Particular trends of the mid ’90s in the Dutch insurance industry included the 
introduction of the euro currency by the European Monetary Union, the privatisation 
o f Dutch social legislation, changes in the Dutch tax system and the rise and boom of 
a new distribution charmel: the Internet. European integration had not only increased 
the number of international transactions in the financial industry, but with the coming 
of a new currency, financial organisations were faced with substantial changes in 
their products. For example, all the insurance policies had to be converted from the 
former Dutch guilder to the new euro. Moreover, a common currency would increase 
price transparency and facilitate cross-border price comparison of insurance 
products, thereby unleashing a further wave of competitive pressure (Mogg 1998). 
By a withdrawal from the Dutch government and the privatisation o f social 
legislation, new opportunities arose for insurers, for example, offering products for 
pension plans and additional health insurance products. Another governmental 
influence was the change o f the Dutch tax law in 2001 which effected insurance
In the beginning of the ‘90s, banks and insurers enjoyed liberalisation under the European 
legislation. From then on, the legislated boundaries that restricted competition between banks and 
insurers were made obsolete.
Financial institutions typically have three distribution channels by which they offer their products 
and services to their clients (Irsel, Nijland et al. 2000): (1) offices (e.g. bank offices or ‘insurance 
shops’), in which the client can have personal contact with the institution; (2) direct writing, which 
means the client is approached by lines of communications such as mail and telephone; (3) 
intermediaries, who can be both independent insurance advisers or agents employed by the institution, 
and who form an intermediary between the institution and the client.
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products. The Dutch tax system prior to 2001 allowed for a large number of 
deductions by which taxpayers could reduce their tax assessments. Insurance 
companies helped by providing the consumer with policies which offer fiscal 
advantages: “Pay a tax free premium now and, once retired, receive the benefits at a 
lower rate o f tax”. The new tax law of 1 January 2001 was intended to make the tax 
system more transparent and simple. A result was a reduction in tax-deductible items 
which effected, among other things, annuity insurances and mortgage provisions. In 
the preamble to this tax change, insurers had to take measures to comply with the 
law, but also devise new kinds of products compatible with the new law that were 
attractive to their clients.
The Internet presented new opportunities to distribute products more efficiently and 
also to create new products. By the end of the ‘90s, the Internet was booming: it had 
invaded the lives of individuals and therefore had the potential to reach large 
numbers o f clients. Moreover, a great many organisations, in particular in the 
financial industry, saw themselves compelled by environmental pressures (i.e. 
isomorphic forces, see section 3.4.3) to make use of the Internet; it seemed a 
necessity for survival. Internet entailed opportunities like transaction cost reductions, 
but also threats like increased competition from new (international) competitors. 
Both opportunities and threats drove the need to consider the Internet as a new 
distribution channel. Characteristic to this development was the number o f insurers 
and banks that outlined their own ‘e-business strategy’.
A last trend to be considered is the individualisation and discerning attitude of 
private clients. Being accustomed to having a broad selection of products and 
services, individual clients become increasingly critical in the products they purchase 
and the quality they expect from them. The resulting demand is that products be 
adaptable for individual considerations.
All these trends have direct and indirect effects on the way insurance organisations 
are operating and behaving. Moreover, they exert their effects on the technologies 
insurers are using, managing and on which they are making their decisions.
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5.2.3 Changing oi^anisational strategies
Organisational strategies for insurers typical to the ‘90s were shaped by the 
developments sketched in the section above. Some o f these major organisational 
strategies included a trend to devise clear combinations of products and markets; to 
introduce consequence management; to add services to products; to reduce time-to- 
market; to adopt an ‘all fmanz’ approach; to have a strategy for Internet and e- 
business; and to reduce costs (Irsel, Nijland et al. 2000). These are discussed below.
The increased competition and higher demands from clients leads to a strategy that 
develops specific products for specific markets. Whereas the focus of insurers used 
to be on products (e.g. life, health and property products), it has now shifted so that 
the products become more focused on the fulfilling the wishes of specific groups of 
clients (markets). By making a very distinct product / market combination, insurers 
can devote their attention and efforts and thus hope to beat their competition. 
Creating such products also entails organising the organisational work processes in 
such a manner that the products and services are optimally supported for specific 
targeted markets. On the other hand, in order to meet client demand fully, the insurer 
also needs to cover a broad range of possible products.
Consequence management concerns the continuous measurement of differences 
between results and objectives and taking actions accordingly. This entails the 
measurement of the return on products, market groups, distribution channels, but also 
the quality o f organisational processes and employees. Improvement and 
measurement programs, such as Total Quality Management and the Business 
Balanced Scorecard, are common concepts in these times.
To discern oneself from one’s competitors, insurers increasingly try to develop new 
products or improve the quality of their existing products. One of the ways this is 
attempted is by adding supporting services and improved quality to products. 
Examples of this are to have international coverage for products, increase the speed 
of payments and provide a high quality help-desk.
Having a short time-to-market for new products is vital to insurance companies. 
Products are often quite easy to copy and the market tends to be saturated quickly.
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To develop new products and be able to deploy them quickly is one way of staying 
ahead of the competition. Insurers therefore follow strategies that allow them to 
create, deploy and innovate new products flexibly; they aim to reduce the time-to- 
market.
With the joining o f banking and insurance activities, an ‘all fmanz’ approach has 
been adopted by many insurers. This entails the use of shared distribution channels 
(e.g. use bank offices to sell insurance products) or the creation of new products by 
integrating bank and insurance products into new ones (e.g. combing insurance 
products with investment products). The operations of the organisations are arranged 
accordingly.
Many insurers, given the rise of the Internet and other distribution channels, have 
increasingly adopted a multi-channel approach to support their clients. The client is 
supported (in the so called front-office function) by a range o f channels, such as 
phone, intermediary, the Internet and offices. Thus, the client enjoys the flexibility of 
being able to operate from any place he or she chooses and at any time that is 
convenient for them. This approach however forces organisations to integrate all 
these channels together in the back-office organisation that produces the products. 
The problems related to this are often referred to as front-office / back-office 
integration.
Finally, increasing competition, decreasing profit margins and decreasing return on 
investments have led many insurers to adopt a cost reduction strategy. Such a 
strategy has an impact on the complete organisation since it affects all o f the 
different business units.
These developments and strategies are not unique to the Dutch insurance industry. 
Knights and Murray (1994) describe similar conditions in the insurance industry in 
the UK during the described period. The range of strategies adopted has its 
implications for the use o f IT.
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5.2.4 Insurance sector and IT applications
This section highlights some of the most important developments in IT applications 
within the insurance sector (based on Irsel, Nijland et al. 2000). We focus on 
developments in applications rather than in technology (such as Internet, software 
development languages -  Java, workflow management, virtual reality, multi-media, 
mobile telephony, etc.), since it is in their application that these technologies become 
meaningful to the insurance sector.
Since the mid-twentieth century the use of computers in insurance was considered of 
major importance -so  important that it was and still is a major issue for merger and 
cooperation considerations (e.g. Adriaanse 1994; Barendregt and Langenhuyzen 
1995). IT already went hand in hand with very high costs. The application of IT was 
then to assist in the central administration of huge amounts o f data. This contributed 
substantially to the efficiency of data processing. Computers were only used 
centrally, not in the office work place. It was not until the ‘70s that microcomputers 
were introduced locally and in the years to follow, desk terminals were introduced. 
These then were followed by personal computers.
Focusing on the ‘90s, typical trends in IT applications for the insurance industry 
were related to the development of the Internet. Internet technology has been used in 
building websites for information purposes (e.g. virtual marketing and offering 
brochures), private client transaction handling (e.g. selling products on-line) and 
business transactions (e.g. communication and transactions via extranets). In that 
time, illustrative to the interest o f the financial industry with regard to the Internet 
was the interest that insurers and banks took in Internet Service Providers'*. The aim 
was to create profiles of clients at an early stage and offer them customised products. 
By offering a portal to the Internet, the insurers tried to commit the client to their 
organisation.
Another on-going technological challenge is that o f the legacy systems. Typically, 
information systems in insurance organisations have their origins in years past. 
Systems that were developed during the’TOs are still operational as a result of
'* Examples include: Postbank with provider Freeler and Achmea with provider NOKNOK,
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enhancements, additions and partial renewal. But through the years, the systems have 
grown in complexity. Reasons for this include the growing number o f customers, the 
increasing number of products and policies and increases in links to other 
information systems. Throughout the years, requests and demands from external 
parties (such as government and powerful customers) have led to numerous 
adjustments and changes in the systems. In addition, due to the long life span of 
insurance products, systems are not easily renewed. Products sold decades ago still 
last for decades (e.g. in life insurance products). Moreover, due to the large number 
of mergers in the past, all kinds o f different technological systems had to be 
converted or linked to existing systems. As a result, contemporary insurance 
companies bear the complex legacy systems that are vital to their operations but very 
difficult and expensive to change. In the ‘90s, a clear trend was visible in that 
insurance companies attempted to make an effort to renew their legacy systems.
Other technological trends are related to call centres being used for the distribution 
and improvement of the quality o f support, the use of new expert systems for risk 
management (e.g. to support insurance advisors and intermediaries, to support 
acceptance procedures for insurances, to assess damages when claims are made and 
to check for possible finaud), systems for Customer Relationship Management 
(CRM), the design of flexible information systems (e.g. to remove the old legacy 
systems) and Electronic Data Interchange (e.g. communication between insurance 
company and intermediary). Moreover, there is always the issue of updating IT in 
the workplaces and local networks which is crucial to the overall operations of the 
organisation.
Like all IT-applying organisations in Europe, the insurance industry saw itself faced 
with two major IT developments at the end of the last millennium, specifically the 
Y2K-problem and the conversion to the euro currency. Both developments had major 
impacts on the IT budgets and available IT capacity. These projects had a 
tremendous impact on organisations in the financial sector which typically had built 
large and complex information systems. In fact, in those times it dominated the work 
processes of the entire organisation: every organisational member in some way or 
another was busy with one of these projects.
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The developments sketched above led to a yearly increase in IT budgets throughout 
the 1990’s. Moreover, it can be seen that many of the developments described above 
additionally increased IT costs in the ‘90s without directly improving benefits 
(Spangenberg, Peters et al. 1999). One reason for this was the shortage o f IT 
resources at that time. At the end of the millennium, there was a high demand for IT 
professionals, but the supply was limited. Moreover, salaries o f IT employees were 
higher and rose faster than other category of employees. Also, a large turnover in 
staff led to losses in productivity which needed to be compensated by increasing 
investments in training. The training costs also increased due to the newness of the 
technology which in turn brought with it a high initial cost. Finally, a large part of IT 
projects (e.g. euro, millennium and legacy substitution projects) had no or little 
return on investment. These projects were considered inescapable and vital to the 
organisation even though they did not produce direct benefits other than avoiding 
fixture problems.
5.2.5 Insurance sector and IT evaluation
During the period discussed in the case study, IT evaluation (e.g. Parker, Benson et 
al  1988; Oirsouw, Spaanderman et al 2001), cost control of IT projects (e.g. 
Acohen and Florijn 1992), the productivity paradox (e.g. Strassmann 1985), IT 
Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1996) and IT benefit management (e.g. Irsel 
and Swinkels 1992) are lime-lighted topics in Dutch management and IT-related 
literature. Also, financial literature addresses these topics. For example, Campbell 
(1992) observed that too many financial institutions blindly invest in the latest 
technology, hoping that it would improve efficiency and control costs. Consultancy 
organisations that are influential in the financial sector increased awareness on this 
topic (e.g. GartnerGroup 2000). Together with the practical experience that IT 
projects frequently last much longer and cost much more than initially planned 
(Genuchten, Heemstra et a l  1991), and even have the reputation to be partial or 
completely wasteful due to failures (Siskens, Heemstra et a l  1989; Berghout 2002), 
these different sources raised the awareness of IT evaluation in general, and 
specifically in the financial sector with its high and increasing IT costs.
However, research demonstrates that overall the financial sector only sporadically 
employs formal IT evaluation methods or methods for IT cost control. For example.
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Nijland (2000) concludes from a study of the financial sector in the Netherlands that 
ex ante evaluations hardly display the use o f formal evaluation methods and ex post 
evaluations are almost never carried out. Stansfield, Berghout et al. (2000) reach a 
similar conclusion about the Scottish financial industry. From a study o f the Dutch 
financial industry (Maanen 2000b), it can be concluded that none of the organisations 
studied applied one o f the IT cost models found in the literature. Research from 
Serafeimidis (1997) shows a case study at a UK insurance firm that did not consider 
IT evaluation methods until the early ‘90s, and then only when they became aware of 
the information economics method described by Parker, Benson et a l  (1988). 
However, the employment of such a method only achieved limited success 
(Serafeimidis 1997).
5.2.6 Conclusion on the dynamics in the insurance industry
In this section we looked at the dynamics in the organisational and technical 
environment of the insurance industry at the time of our case study. The 
developments described have led to an increased importance of IT and the 
management of its costs and benefits. In the next section we will focus on the case 
study organisation.
5 3  IIC AND ITS CONTEXT
5.3.1 Introduction
Before we present our case study, we will describe the specifics of IIC. The history 
and context of IIC and its mission, structure and culture are presented. Furthermore, 
we focus on IT developments and the way IT is managed at IIC. These insights help 
to understand the case study better.
5.3.2 History and context
IIC employs approximately 5,000 people in the Netherlands. It is an all-round 
insurance company which uses intermediaries (agents) as its main distribution 
channel. IIC is market leader in the Dutch intermediary insurance market. 
Financially, the total premium income over 2000 rose 11% to € 5.8 billion. Although 
its main distribution channel is personal, independent intermediaries (at this moment 
IIC is doing business with about 8,000 intermediaries), IIC also uses other
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distribution channels like the Internet, employee benefits (EB), bank offices and 
captive intermediaries (dedicated IIC intermediaries). Its insurance products can be 
divided into three parts: private insurance, employee benefits and business insurance. 
Private insurance concerns all life, property and health insurances for privates. 
Employee b en ê ts  covers all insurances concerned with the relationship between 
employer and employee, such as collective health insurances, pension insurances, 
disablement insurances and other loss o f income insurances. Business insurance 
covers the insurances specifically for the business, such as insurances for company 
cars, technical insurances and all kinds of liability insurances.
IIC is a member o f the Financial Group United (FGU), a group of financial 
organisations, consisting o f a variety of banks and insurers. FGU has grown into an 
organisation that operates throughout the world and offers a broad range o f financial 
products and services. It offers integrated financial services to individuals, businesses 
and institutional clients through a large spectrum of distribution channels aimed at 
meeting their individual needs. According to capital investment, revenue, and net 
profit, FGU is one of the largest companies in Holland. FGU also plays a major role 
in the European market and holds a leading position among worldwide companies 
offering integrated financial services combining banking, insurance and asset 
management. In terms o f shareholder equity, FGU ranks first in the Netherlands and 
third internationally among finance groups. In the world’s top 50 banks, by the 
market capitalisation, FGU ranks fourth as of December 1999. Today the company 
employs almost ninety thousand people in over sixty countries throughout the world, 
offering insurance in North and South America, Europe, Asia, Australia and New 
Zealand. Its market value at the beginning of 2000 stands at over € 59 billion.
Founded in the nineteenth century, IIC has a long history o f insurance and has 
undergone several major mergers. It has grown to be one of the most influential 
companies as it helped to shape the insurance field in the Netherlands. It can be 
considered a commercially healthy company since throughout it existence it has 
experienced almost a continuous growth in profits. IIC has representative offices in 
29 countries in the insurance industry. In most countries, the products it offers 
encompass nearly all types o f life insurance, property insurance and reinsurance.
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5.3.3 Mission, structure and culture of IIC
l i e ’s mission is formulated as: “IIC helps its clients as leading, integrated financial 
service company to realise their ambitions in an innovative way. It does this by 
offering solution-focused financial concepts and excelling in an excellent quality of 
service.” Furthermore, its vision is formulated as: “For IIC, as innovative and high- 
quality integrated financial service company the client is the starting point. We have 
contact with the client through the intermediary channel of his/her choice. Clients 
favour us, due to our reliability, expertise and the quality of our service.” This vision 
places the client at the centre of attention, IIC’s choice for a multi-channel strategy 
allows clients to choose from different channels to contact IIC. However, the primary 
strategy of IIC is not to sell directly to its customers, but to do so via intermediary 
channels.
Since 1998, IIC has made a change from a product-oriented focus (e.g. life, health 
and property products) to a market-oriented focus (e.g. dividing the Netherlands into 
eight regions and shifting the focus to privates, employers and businesses). This shift 
entailed a major reorganisation and integration o f different departments. No longer 
did the similarities in products determine how the business was organised, but rather 
the similarities in market approach and division did. Since then IIC has been a 
matrix-structured organisation, meaning that it is structured around eight 
geographical regions (e.g. all encompassing a part o f the Netherlands) and has one 
business unit for national accounts (one overall unit for the large company clients 
and larger intermediaries who operate across the Netherlands) and three market 
groups: private insurance, employee benefits and business insurance. See Figure 5.1 
for a simplified organisational structure of IIC.
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Figure 5.1 Simplified organisational structure o f  IIC
At the top o f  the hierarchy is the board o f  directors which has eight members. Each 
member is appointed several responsibilities; specifically all market groups, regions 
and staff departments are appointed to a member o f the board. The board o f  directors 
will subsequently be referred to as either top or general management.
Organisational management, besides the board o f directors, comes both from the 
market groups (the horizontal axis in the matrix) and from the regions (the vertical 
axis in the matrix). All o f  these business units have their own business unit director. 
The market groups can be seen to have a more strategic responsibility, whereas the 
regions have a more operational responsibility.
The market groups issue policies and strategies for the regions and national accounts. 
They also determine product developments, market developments and innovations. 
They are responsible for the success o f  promotion campaigns (e.g. marketing), 
innovations in products (e.g. insurance technicalities) and the speed at which 
products are introduced to markets. Market groups are also are responsible for the 
proper functioning o f the insurance information systems as well as the insurance 
operational processes.
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The regions and national accounts are the operational business units that are in 
contact with the intermediaries and give them direct support. Regions are responsible 
within their region for inside services (such as acceptation, insurance claims, 
administration, collections of accounts, calculations, portfolio management and 
tenders), outside services (such as sales, advertisements and support of 
intermediaries) and commercial programs. In having regional offices around the 
Netherlands, they support the intermediaries with, among other things, forms and 
brochures, financial and juridical support and advice about purchase and sale of 
portfolios.
Besides the support offered by the regions, the intermediaries are also supported by a 
technical field organisation (to assess damages technically and advise on damage 
prevention), intermediary staff (to give intermediaries advice on operational and 
commercial management), insurance software support (to give advice on the 
development and use o f different types of insurance software) and the IIC extranet 
(with the latest news on insurance policies, product changes, legislation, etc.).
Both the market groups and the regions are supported by 23 different staff 
departments, such as Financial Services, Human Resource Management (HRM), 
Legal Support, Communications, Software Development, IT and Program 
Management. Each staff department is led by a staff head or staff director.
In its personnel management IIC is very faithful to its employees. It offers many 
educational programs to support employees in their evolvement. It is not unusual for 
employees to work at IIC for their entire career. Moreover, directors and members of 
the board generally come from within IIC rather than being brought in from outside. 
The effect is that top management is very much aware o f the ‘on-floor’ insurance 
processes, products and clients, since they have had their own experiences with them. 
One downside of IIC’s faithful attitude to its personnel is that some employees are 
kept on even though they might not perform too well.
Decision-making in the board of directors can be characterised as fraternal decision­
making and collective board responsibility. Decisions are discussed and made
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together rather than have one CEO decide the direction of IIC. Overall, IIC has a 
culture of making decisions through a negotiated consensus rather than the top-down 
imposition of decisions.
Since IIC does not have direct links to its insurance customers, it is vitally dependent 
on its intermediaries for its business. Likewise, many intermediaries are dependent 
on IIC, which is one o f their largest sources o f insurances. These different interests 
sometimes lead to conflict. One example is the efforts of IIC to adopt an e-commerce 
strategy at the end of the ‘90s with the potential to be able to sell products directly to 
its clients. These developments were observed by the intermediaries with suspicion. 
But overall the relationship between IIC and its intermediaries can be seen to rest on 
the mutual dependence on each other.
5.3.4 History of IT at IIC
The history o f IT at IIC dates back to the early use of computers in organisations. 
During the ‘50s, wages increased and with it the organisational costs of personnel. 
Moreover, there was a tight labour market. To address the rising costs and the 
shortage of personnel, IIC found a solution in automation. A computer set was 
acquired to perform (salary) administrative tasks and carry out complex calculations. 
It was used in a reorganisation at that time to increase profits of one of the loss- 
making business units of IIC. The computer, by making use of vacuum tubes and 
punched cards, could “within 130 hours perform the work of a couple of man-years”. 
In the early ‘60s, a new set of computer systems was bought to support the 
accounting function and the printing of policies. Computer purchases, especially of 
this magnitude (about € 0.5 million), were very extraordinary in those times; the city 
mayor was invited to put it officially to use. In the years following, IIC too was one 
o f the first to purchase new computer models and other technologies (e.g. being one 
o f the first to use integrated circuits rather than transistors and magnetic tapes instead 
o f punched cards).
IT also played an important role in discussions about mergers with other insurance 
companies. One insurance company was considered for merger during the ‘60s
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especially due to its possession of a computer company and its knowledge of 
automation.
In 1975, the first minicomputers were introduced at IIC which were placed 
throughout the organisation rather than in a central processing unit. They helped to 
do work on the work floor that until then done was done by hand. Then in 1983 the 
first personal computers found their way in. The computers increased labour 
productivity and the speed by which mutations could be processed. Moreover, 
difficult business processes that were due to the complex insurance product that until 
then were processed by different people could then be integrated and one person 
could fulfil all necessary activities required to handle a policy.
By today, IT has expanded outside the offices o f IIC. IT now is considered not only 
very important to the business of IIC, as is for all insurers, but also to connect to the 
intermediaries. IT supports the communications with the intermediaries. Using EDI 
and extranets, information is exchanged. Furthermore, all the technological trends 
discussed in section 5.2.4 and section 5.2.5 can be seen to play a part in the 
considerations o f investing further in IT. For example, IIC faces technological legacy 
problems with primary systems that date back as far as the ‘70s.
5.3.5 Organisation of IT management at IIC
Information systems are divided across the three market groups. Each group has its 
own distinct systems'^ that support (parts of) organisational processes and products 
from that group. All in all, an estimate of over 400 information systems (both large 
and small) can be discerned at IIC.
IT management is organised both within these market groups and in the staff 
departments. Each o f the three market groups has an organisational section, a 
department denoted by System Process Support (SPS), responsible for functional 
management of the information systems. These SPS sections are responsible for the 
optimal functioning o f existing systems and configuring them (e.g. to changes in
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policies). New systems or technical changes to systems are to be requested by them 
and addressed to the IT staff departments. In addition, as o f 1999, each market group 
is assisted by an information manager who supports the business unit director in 
linking IT opportunities and threats to the specific business developments.
IT management in the staff departments is divided into two groups: the departments 
o f Program Management and Information Technology. The department of Program 
Management (PM) is responsible for advising the board of members on the spending 
and prioritisation of project budgets^®. Every year budgets (both financially as in 
labour capacity) are specified to build new systems or improve existing ones. PM 
advises on the spending of these budgets. Moreover, it monitors running projects and 
reports on their progress. Finally, it is responsible for comparing project results with 
prior expectations.
The department o f Information Technology, employing approximately 400 people, is 
in turn split up in two departments. First o f all, there is the department of System 
Development (SD) that is responsible for the development and technical changes of 
information systems. It assumes the role o f software supplier, creating systems 
according to the wishes of its customers, the market groups or staff departments. 
Secondly, there is the department o f Inft-astructure which is responsible for the IT 
infi-astructure and hardware at IIC. These include the hardware systems, local area 
networks, automated workplaces (e.g. computers and printers) and connections to the 
Internet and Intranet.
Budgets of IT are allocated centrally to the IT department. This budget is allocated to 
the different departments in the organisation on the basis o f ‘system development 
hours’. The time of SD is divided on the basis of the time requirement estimates in IT 
project proposals coming fi*om the business departments. General management 
decides on the actual division based on a prioritisation o f project proposals.
The boundaries between the systems are considered by IIC to be a problem since information on 
one client can be divided between different systems. Moreover, the same information can differ from 
system to system.
 ^ Though formally responsible for all projects, not only IT, in practice the majority of large projects 
involve IT and therefore are considered to be IT projects.
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Apart from the shift in focus from product-focused to market-focused, as described 
in the previous section, in 1998 an organisational structure was set up especially for 
information management with so called information domains. Based originally on 
the value chain^' (Porter 1985) of the insurance company, different areas of 
information in the chain were appointed to information domains. In such, different 
domains for information policies and applications have been identified. These 
domains include a distribution channel, client, product and supporting services. Each 
domain has one owner (typically a director from a market group, region or national 
accounts) who is responsible for the alignment between IT and business in that 
domain. He or she formulates the business information demands for that domain and 
is responsible for accommodating the domain with appropriate IT applications. The 
idea behind the division in domains is that it divides the complex information 
management within IIC to (more or less) separate, independent areas which are 
relatively independent of the organisational structure. Even if the organisational 
structure in the future changes, these domains continue to be relevant since they are 
based on the lasting value chain. Having separate areas o f information management 
offers domain owners the opportunity to focus their attention on new IT 
developments that might be interesting to their domains. For example, studies on 
CRM innovations are carried out by domain owners in channel services and not so 
much by domains in product services.
However, though the matrix organisation and the division in domains were 
introduced in 1998, it becomes evident in the case description that it has not 
institutionalised much. As one respondent tells:
“We come from a hierarchical organisation with a product focus, but changed to a 
client-focused matrix organisation. However, the old (product-focused) organisation 
has partly remained. The governance model of the matrix organisation has not been 
explicitly adopted. What you now see is people that can choose their own paths to 
come to decisions (either by markets or by regions), wherever they see room. That 
complicates decision-making. To come to a better use of the ITEM-documents [see 
later for explanation] we should have a clearer view on how decision-making takes
The value chain is a common concept for depicting the primary activities (Inbound Logistics, 
Operations, Outbound Logistics, Marketing and Sales, Service) and support activities (Procurement of 
Resources, Technology Development, Human Resource Management, Firm infrastructure) of an 
organisation to create value.
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place within the matrix organisation.” Moreover, the division in information domains 
at the time of the interviews was ‘still mostly fictional’, as was attested by several 
respondents.
Business policies on the IIC intranet show that from 2000 onwards better control of 
IT costs and improved IT evaluation are the goals:
“IT plays an increasingly crucial role in our operational management [...] and 
investments in IT keep on rising. It becomes more and more important to keep a 
good eye on the return on investment o f these IT investments and to control on-going 
IT costs. [...] To improve the decision-making and the priority-setting process of IT 
investments takes up an important position. [...] Every investment in IT should be 
financially supported. [...] Without a costs and benefits analysis IT, investments will 
not be approved. “ (IIC intranet, June 2001).
5.3.6 Conclusion on IIC
Being one of the biggest insurance companies in the Netherlands, all of the business 
and technological trends identified in section 5.2 can be seen to have their impact on 
IIC. Already from the early start of their existence, computers were applied within 
IIC. Reasons for this automation included cost reductions and a tight labour market. 
Moreover, IT was applied to turn around loss-making business units. Thus, IIC 
already has a long history o f investing in IT, even with strategic purposes and with 
great expenses. The introduction of decentralised systems has had a major impact on 
the products and process of IIC. Today, insurance products are so complex that 
without computerised systems they cannot be provided. Moreover, IT plays a vital 
role in the communication with IIC’s main distribution channel: the intermediaries.
The organisation of IIC is matrix-structured around market groups and regions. A 
central role in the coordination of IT is given to Program Management, the staff 
department responsible for IT projects. This department has a central position in our 
case, as we will see in the next section.
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5.4 C a s e  s t u d y : T h e  e m p l o y m e n t  o f  a n  IT E v a l u a t io n  M e t h o d  a t  IIC
5.4.1 Introduction
This section is the empirical heart of the thesis. The data presented is drawn from the 
case study at IIC that was involved in the creation and employment of an IT 
evaluation method. The data are presented in a time-ordered structure. This starts 
with the creation of the department o f Program Management. It is followed by a 
description o f the initial situation at IIC with regard to IT management. Then the 
developments around IT evaluation and the creation of an IT evaluation method are 
presented. The way the IT evaluation method is employed in the organisation is then 
discussed. The section closes with the current and future situation o f the evaluation 
method at IIC,
5.4.2 The creation of Program Management
The introduction of ‘IT Economics thinking’ in IIC can be traced back to 1996. 
Contrary to a widespread belief in the organisation that this line o f thinking was 
initiated by the need for cost reduction, the preliminary ideas on IT Economics can in 
fact be attributed to the overall success o f the company. In 1996 the market for life 
insurance products in the Netherlands was booming, and this continued through 1997 
and 1998.
As one senior manager stated: “Every change in products, no matter how crazy, 
meant more production, [„.] Everything sold at that time, [.„] We had an extremely 
difficult time keeping down the profit figures so that we could show the outside 
world a picture that was a little less rosy, and the same applied to filling our different 
budgetary supplies, etc. You really were talking profit growths of 40% a year. That 
was incredible!”
The success o f the life insurance products required a totally different approach to 
products and systems. To exploit the market, the information systems should be able 
to cope rapidly with changes in insurance products. Driven by the market 
opportunities, the business demanded a shorter time-to-market of new products and 
product changes. The existing information systems were not at all suited for flexible 
and fast changes that were required for changes in products. For this reason, two 
major projects were planned, both of which were intended to change radically the
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existing core legacy systems and convert them to systems that could cope with this 
demand. Changing these systems had a major impact on the whole organisation since 
they affected the core of the company, including the employees, their working 
procedures and the information systems.
To manage these large projects, IIC recruited a project manager from one o f the other 
FGU businesses. At the prior organisation she had been involved in several large 
projects which were renowned within FGU for their success. Before the project 
manager was supposed to start these new projects, she was given the chance to get 
acquainted with IIC and to participate in some smaller projects for the first three 
months. When general management then asked her to start her job as project 
manager, they were surprised to hear her decline. She argued that starting these 
major projects (and all related smaller projects) would lead to major problems as IIC 
had no clear view on current projects running. Neither did they know how much 
budget was allocated to them, how project capacity was managed or how these 
projects were prioritised. As an alternative, the project manager suggested 
introducing a program management approach in order to manage these projects. 
General management agreed and the department of Program Management (PM) was 
created. Since then she has been head of PM.
5.4.3 The initial situation
With the introduction o f PM, a new way o f controlling IT was introduced. It meant a 
new project approach towards IT. This approach meant that IT was no longer 
characterised by unplanned ad-hoc projects where high IT budget overruns were the 
norm rather than the exception. The first thing that was addressed by PM was to 
make a list of all projects that were running that year. In 1996/1997, a first version of 
this ‘project calendar’ was ready. During the process o f establishing this project 
calendar many things became clear with respect to IT project management: until then 
projects were started and managed on an ad-hoc basis. They were only structured 
during system development (using SDM, the Systems Development Methodology), 
and there was no formal identification of or justification for projects. Moreover, they 
were not evaluated with regard to possible impact, let alone ex post evaluation. Even 
more so, IIC did not have a clear overview of the projects that it was running.
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Questions such as ‘what does the project cost? ‘ and ‘what does it deliver?’ did not 
seem to be an issue at that point.
Interpreting the stories of different respondents, IIC seemed like a very chaotic 
organisation in 1996, which makes one wonder how it could ever be one of the most 
successful in the Netherlands. One manager illustrates the situation by a story on 
systems changes and a phenomenon he calls ‘unexplainable projects’:
“And at that time, costs were not an issue - things were going really well. I saw three 
projects being carried out that all had the same scope and objectives. Everything was 
possible since there was no clarity about projects. The director issued an order to SD 
to adapt the system, and two other people also gave orders to change the same 
system, and this happened completely independent of one another. There were also 
projects that had no project owner - we called them ‘the unexplainable projects that 
carried on’. These projects were always passed on to others, and many things were 
carried out as on behalf of these projects. It even happened that things had been 
started up as a project in the past had now turned into a complete organisational 
department.”
The SD department was constantly being overrun with projects and requests -  much 
more than they could ever carry out. This caused project prioritisation to be done 
mainly by SD, which was on the one hand guided by projects that had mandatory 
requirements and amendments of law and legislation, and on the other by ‘managers 
who shouted the loudest’. Since labour capacity shifted quite often from one project 
to another, many projects remained unfinished for years.
Though IT costs did not seem to be a real issue and project prioritisation did not 
seem to be taking place, talking to a senior business manager, we find a somewhat 
different interpretation:
“I can certainly imagine people thinking we had plenty o f money back then. But in 
reality, in all the 10 years I have been at IIC, costs have always been an issue. And 
IT and business capacity has always been a constraint. [...]Of course we prioritised, 
in the sense of making choices. [...] But with the introduction o f the methodological 
approaches everybody now notices [the issues of IT costs, benefits and prioritisation]
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more clearly. Also, a lot more people are involved. In the past, it was small group of 
people operating on their own judgements and gut-feeling.”
5.4.4 Development of IT Economics at PM
The insights gained from setting up the project calendar led PM by 1997/1998 to 
replace the former SDM approach to IT projects with a formal Project Control 
Method (PCM) which was broader in scope. PCM had a project focus rather than a 
technical development focus. It entailed project management approaches that 
structured the project and introduced phases in project planning (IIC-PM 1997). It 
not only considered technical consequences o f the project, but also aimed to control 
commercial, organisational, personnel, administrative, financial, informational and 
technical aspects (COPAFIT) of the outcome of the project. In the project process, 
attention was given to the financials, organisational aspects, time, information need 
and quality aspects (in Dutch abbreviated by the acronym GOTIK^^) of the project.
The project calendar raised the question as to why the projects currently on the 
calendar were actually being carried out: what did they contribute and were they 
compatible with the direction in which the organisation is heading? Since IIC had no 
formal strategy, PM decided to try to make the goals of the organisations explicit by 
interviewing different directors and general management, thus constructing a list of 
the IIC goals and related sub-goals. The intention was that projects could in turn be 
related to these sub-goals. However, experiences of PM showed that the exercise 
proved to be quite hard and resulted in “endless discussions" and “the number of 
main goals varied continuously in the process between 3 and 10”. That did not mean 
IIC had no goals; naturally there were targets to be met. But to look beyond one year 
-  ‘where would IIC be in five years?’ -  was not a common question. In the end, the 
only visible result of the exercise was a poster on the wall o f one of the offices, 
labelled by PM as a ‘relic on the wall’. Only some ‘vague and global’ goals had been 
distilled which could not be made operational in linking projects to them. But, argued 
one o f the respondents at PM, a less visible result was that thinking in the 
organisation in terms o f goals and merits of projects had been triggered. This induced 
PM to search for advanced ways to prioritise and select projects.
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In 1997/1998 a student doing an internship was asked to construct a prioritising 
method. The ‘GAP’ method he suggested (IIC-PM 1998), which considered the 
selection on alternative solutions to a problem by calculation, was discarded by PM 
as being too mathematical and theoretical. It relied too much on quantifying benefits, 
which according to PM, was not always possible. They used however the notions it 
introduced of concepts such as ‘criteria’, ‘critical success factors’ and ‘measurement’ 
to construct internally a list of criteria by which projects could be assessed on merits. 
This led to the construction of the so-called Project Characteristics Template (PCT), 
a template covering one sheet on which projects could be summarised in a few 
criteria. Using both academic and business publications, and ideas from external 
consultants and conferences, this soon grew to become a more detailed document. 
But as we shall see below, it was more than just a document. With it came 
procedures for constructing such documents, prioritising projects and reaching 
decisions.
5.4.5 The IT evaluation method
Not only did the PCT give a quick overview of some of the details from all projects, 
it also made projects comparable. This way projects could be weighted against each 
other and prioritised. But to do that, more information was needed than what the PCT 
provided. An IT evaluation method (hereafter: ITEM) was constructed out of the 
PCT and the GAP method, designed on generally known IT Economics concepts. 
Furthermore, ITEM was based on concepts from Information Economics (Parker, 
Benson et al. 1988) and the Balanced Scorecard^^ (Kaplan and Norton 1992; Kaplan 
and Norton 1996), which was on the agenda of many Dutch businesses at that time 
(see section 5.2.5). Though PM did not use external consultants to construct the 
method, they made use of the help of an external student (from a university in 
Amsterdam) and an internal IIC student (a candidate for management development).
^  Geld (money), Organisatie (organisation), Tijd (time), Informatie (information), Kwaliteit (Quality) 
The Balanced Scorecard advocates a balanced view on IT investments and therefore considers 
different perspectives. The financial perspective considers the financial goals of the organisational 
shareholders. The internal business perspective considers the aspects the organisation wants to excel 
at. The innovation and learning perspective considers how to improve value continuously. The 
customer perspective considers how customers view the organisation. The Balanced Scorecard intends 
to balance these four perspectives in order to avoid sub-optimisation (increasing, for example, 
financial benefits, but decreasing fixture opportunities through innovation).
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Also, at that time, a seminar was held at IIC on the topic o f IT Economics by a 
widely known Dutch consultant and academic Han van der Zee (e.g. Zee and Koot 
1989; Zee 1996). These helped them strengthen their ideas based on the (academic) 
literature on IT evaluation. By 1999, the ideas from the Balanced Scorecard were 
introduced to structure costs and benefits according to four perspectives: financial, 
client/market, operational and learning/growth (IIC-PM 2000e).
The financial perspective included a calculation of the internal rate o f return (IRR), 
which is an accounting calculation to determine the financial value of the investment 
(IIC-PM 1999b). The IRR calculation returns an interest percentage for which the 
investment otherwise should have been put away (e.g. at a bank or stocks & shares) 
to generate value. Projects with an IRR higher than the cost of capital (i.e. the 
interest rate of borrowing money) are acceptable. Moreover, the higher the IRR, the 
more financially interesting the investment.
The client/market perspective includes the appreciation o f the intermediaries and the 
way the proposed project increases this appreciation. The operational perspective 
includes the contribution o f the project in shortening throughput time or delivery 
time. The learning/growth perspective includes both improvement o f the 
professionalism of employees and the decrease of the time-to-market o f a new 
product.
A deliberate choice to include more than only financial costs and benefits was found 
necessary since PM regarded the products and customers of IIC as important issues 
that could not be captured by the financial methods only. Thus, the criteria included 
effects of the investment proposal on IIC’s organisational issues stemming from the 
Balanced Scorecard perspectives. Experiences with the previous GAP method also 
showed that these benefits could not adequately be captured by financial criteria. 
“Financial aspects of the project are regarded as important, but only as part of the 
bigger picture”, argued one PM manager. Therefore, both the financial and non- 
fmancial were included.
In addition to these perspectives, ITEM was constructed to take into account the 
urgency and risk o f the project. The urgency could be influenced by both external
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and internal issues. Externally, for example, mandatory requirements from 
organisations or government could make the project more urgent than others. Or as a 
response to competition to avoid a competitive fall back. Internally, projects could be 
more urgent when they were vital to business policies or required to keep operational 
systems from malfunctioning. The risks of the project include project management 
risks (i.e. risks of the project process) and project effect risks. The first are related to 
the GOTIK elements, the latter to the COPAFIT aspects; both are also part o f the 
PCM.
Covering all the above, an ITEM-report format was prescribed to present IT 
investment proposals with the following aspects (IIC-PM 2000f):
1. Names of related managers: client, information manager, project manager, 
project leader
2. Starting date and final date
3. Summary of the results of the project
4. Relation to other projects
5. The financial return of the project (internal rate of return based on the 
following two items)
6. Total investment costs (i.e. costs of IT and business related to the developed 
system)
7. Financial benefits on increased insurance premium, cost reduction, 
productivity (efficiency) or market share
8. Effect on the appreciation by intermediaries
9. Effect on throughput time / delivery time
10. Effect on professionalism of IIC employees
11. Effect on time-to-market
12. External urgency
13. Internal urgency
14. Risks in project management (GOTIK)
15. Risks in project outcomes (COPAFIT)
In addition, the ITEM-report required the signature of the related business managers 
to show his / her approval of the correctness and feasibility of the effects detailed in 
the proposal.
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Apart from the calculations on the financial return of the project, most of these items 
were in ‘free format’ -  there was freedom in the issues people addressed on each of 
the points, although there was an instruction document (and an example filled-in 
ITEM-report) that pointed out issues that might be relevant.
Though intended to be applicable to a broader range than just IT projects, also 
including other investments than IT related, the actual use o f ITEM only considered 
projects with a significant claim to the IT department (or IT budget). The threshold 
that would require projects to submit an ITEM-report was set at a minimum of 400 
hours of SD. Projects that required less did not require such a report.
Having its origins in Information Economics, ITEM could be classified as a multi­
criteria method as opposed to financial, ratio or portfolio methods (Renkema and 
Berghout 1997b). This entailed much more than ITEM just being some written 
report. It included a particular view on how projects and criteria should be scored, 
how the projects should be prioritised and how a decision on projects could be 
reached. PM describes it like this (IIC-PM 2000e, p. 12):
“Before an idea becomes a going project, a process o f analysis, justification and 
prioritising precedes. [...] Within this process ITEM is used to list project proposals, 
to score and to prioritise. In this, different people have different functions and 
responsibilities.”
Scoring was envisioned to take place by means of a broad group of people who 
would value the effects of each individual proposal (IIC-PM 2000c). The participants 
in the scoring group score the projects based on the score model of ITEM (e.g. - I  for 
a negative contribution and a score o f 0 to 5 for a positive contribution). If necessary, 
scores could be discussed by participants and further tuned. Scores of all participants 
were combined on each of the criteria in a database and each project proposal thus 
had a set of final scores. Rather than having one final score for each project, the 
different scores on criteria were kept so that all projects could be viewed according 
to their contribution to each of the criteria. The database allowed various views of 
different criteria, for example, in different scenarios. This was intended to help those 
who wish to prioritise.
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Prioritising was done initially by PM, They constructed advice on the optimal 
portfolio of projects for general management. In this, the directors of the three 
market groups assisted PM. Prioritisation was based on the fit between the scored 
project effects and the organisational strategic goals and bottlenecks given the 
available budget. The prioritisation included a check on technical feasibility and 
practicability. The IT departments o f SD and Infrastructure were consulted for this 
check. PM then presented the final advice to general management. In turn, general 
management would make the final decision on prioritisation. To selected proposals, 
they granted budgets, which by then had become projects.
ITEM entailed both a process (of scoring, prioritising and decision-making) and 
several documents. The complete IT Economics method comprised (IIC-PM 2000e):
• the ITEM-document, with an assessment o f the effect of a proposal in terms 
of costs, benefits (both financial and non-financial), risks and urgency that 
justifies the investment;
• an internal rate of return document, a calculation sheet for calculating the 
financial rate of return for the proposal, where financial costs and benefits are 
analysed based on a 6 year timeline (IIC-PM 1999a);
• a scoring process for valuing project effect;
• an automated database used to generate and support prioritisation based on 
the scoring process and a statistical analysis;
• a prioritisation process for determining the ranking o f project proposals;
• advice to general management about which projects should receive a budget 
(the priorities proposal);
• a decision process by general management that decides which proposals will 
be granted a budget.
It is visualised by PM in Figure 5.2 (adapted from IIC-PM 2000e). Summarised, the 
phases of carrying an idea to a project were:
1. The business creates ITEM-reports for their new investment plans and ideas 
(which require over 400 hours of systems development), including an IRR 
calculation;
2. PM checks the ITEM-reports on accuracy and completeness;
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3. ITEM-reports are scored by (a group of) business managers;
4. Differences between scores o f managers are tuned by discussion;
5. Final scores result in a preliminary list of prioritised proposals;
6. The preliminary list is prioritised by PM and market directors;
7. The prioritised proposals are checked on technical feasibility and 
practicability;
8. The feasible prioritised list is presented to general management in a 
prioritisation proposal;
9. General management determines the final priority list o f projects;
10. The final priority list is communicated to the business;
11. The approved proposals are granted budget and become projects.
As is visualised in this figure, ITEM is actually the first step of the PCM. After 
general management agrees on a final list of priorities, the investment proposal 
becomes a project. By applying PCM it is further shaped into a project by making 
plans and project analyses and is then carried further through different phases (fi-om 
idea and planning phase, to project definition, design and implementation). After 
implementation, PCM discerns a (continuous) phase of usage and management of the 
resulting information system.
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Thus, the first ITEM-report was developed in 1998 and with it, ITEM was created. 
According to an internal report by PM describing the methodology, “the method 
excels in simplicity, objectivity and uniformity” (IIC-PM 2000e, p.2). Its ultimate 
goal is to assist in making a “right prioritisation” (ibid, p.I) to “improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency o f  the portfolio projects within IIC” (ibid, p.2).
Though the way ITEM was used, as we shall see, was very dynamic over time, the 
ITEM-report underwent only minor changes in its first year. During 2001, however, 
the criteria discussed in the ITEM-report can be seen to have replaced the Balanced 
Scorecard elements to elements from the explicit strategy o f IIC. The reason for this 
is that the general management o f IIC by that year had made its strategic focal points 
explicit; something which at the top organisational level was by then a visible trend 
in more financial organisations. The seven points o f  this strategy replace the four 
perspectives o f  the Balanced Scorecard. These points include a strategy on product 
innovation and reduction, a strategy on operational excellence and a strategy on e- 
business. For example, under the point o f  product reduction, special attention was 
given to the way a project proposal was geared to eliminating loss-making insurance
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products. Under the point of e-commerce, attention was given to how a proposal 
helped improve the communication to clients and intermediaries.
Moreover, by 2001, specific attention was being given to the various costs of the 
project. Whereas the ITEM-reports in 1999 and 2000 only asked for costs related to 
the information system (i.e. IT costs for development, testing, training and user 
related costs), by 2001 the costs over a broad spectrum were requested (e.g. 
including marketing and promotion costs, costs for organisational change, costs for 
juridical assistance, etc.). Costs were now requested on all COPAFIT aspects.
5.4.6 Introduction of ITEM to the business
ITEM had already been developed in 1997/1998, but it was not until the end of 1999 
that it was widely spread throughout the organisation, and ever since it has been used 
for dividing up the budget. In fact, the first phase o f the PCM, which was introduced 
around 1997/1998, had already requested an ITEM-report as deliverable of its “idea 
& planning” phase.
However, the introduction of PCM itself was not without difficulties. It was initiated 
by PM at the SD department, the only department that was accustomed to working 
with project management instruments (such as SDM) before. Though PCM 
supposedly was intended for general business projects, the strong link with IT-related 
project management is recognisable in expressions used in PCM. “Functional” and 
technical design” are typical project planning phases related to systems development, 
rather than phases of other business projects (e.g. reorganisation or marketing 
project). Business managers were not too eager to adopt PCM according to some 
because ‘it did not relate to their way of thinking’. An internal assessment by IIC 
concerning the usage o f PCM reports that by the end of 2000 a lot of people were 
claiming that they used PCM, but in practice it was only used in a limited and partial 
way (IIC-PM 2000a; IIC-PM 2000b). In fact, the assessment states that by then only 
the ‘planning phase’ o f PCM, which is actually related to ITEM, was carried out -  
project definition, design and implementation do not use the tools PCM offers or 
make use of formal evaluation points in time.
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Since PCM had not been implemented throughout the organisation, before 1999 the 
ITEM-report was hardly used in practice. Moreover, some respondents even contend 
that the first phase of the PCM was skipped on a regular basis during this time. The 
reason for this can be traced back to senior managers and directors. They were more 
interested in the results than the planning. On the one hand, they urged SD and 
managers to carry out the projects as soon as possible, while on the other hand they 
provided extra funding for projects -  even without the involvement of PM. One 
manager argues: “When the project manager showed up with the project description, 
the business director asked: ‘What are you doing now? A project description? Just 
leave it at that and get on with carrying out the project.’ Well, that is our kind of 
culture. The intentions are alright -  they really are convinced that they have found 
the ultimate idea and put pressure on the organisation to realise it. The idea might be 
great, but they forgot to look for alternatives, requirements, etc. It was very common 
that systems had been built that afterwards had to be partially or completely rebuilt, 
because only at the end of the day did the real desired functionality become clear.”
However by 1999, this situation changed. With the introduction o f new procedures 
for project budget allocation, ITEM-reports became a major requirement in order to 
receive budget. On 8 December 1999 PM sent a memo to the information managers, 
SD account managers and Infrastructure account managers. It explained the 
procedure by which project budget 2000 would be allocated. The addressed were 
asked to hand in ITEM-reports regarding the planned and continuing (IT) projects in 
2000 before the 15^** o f February 2000. According to the memo (IIC-PM 1999d, p.3), 
“only projects that fulfil all requirements will be dealt with by SD”. One PM 
employee explains the message PM communicated to the rest of IIC: “The strong 
message was: he/she who does not join in the ITEM-report round does not join the 
round of prioritising. If you do not hand something in, you do not get approval. So it 
was agreed with general management.”
There is no single reason for this change in budget allocation and project 
prioritisation. One of the ft-equently mentioned reasons was the need for cost 
reduction which became important in 1998. The market for insurance products had 
changed and profit margins decreased. A report published by FGU in 1998 
highlighted the relationship between IT costs and benefits and alignment between
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business and IT. This also had its impact on general management’s thinking, which 
after all had to account for their financial results to FGU. Moreover, in that year a 
new general manager for IT came to IIC. He brought along a strong focus on IT costs 
and benefits. Ironically, the better insights in IT costs already gained from the first 
activities by PM and IT also increased cost awareness at the level o f general 
management. Undoubtedly, the need for IT cost reduction was one o f the major 
reasons for the necessity to make selections in projects, since not all projects could 
be funded anymore.
An issue that already was a prominent factor for the requirement of prioritisation was 
the limited IT labour capacity. This issue grew more and more at the end of the 
nineties. IT labour edacity in the whole of the Netherlands was scarce. Moreover, a 
lot of the capacity was claimed by so-called must-do projects, such as conversions 
needed for euro and millennium developments. Moreover, a radical change in Dutch 
regulation required some major changes on the systems, something that demanded IT 
capacity as well (see section 5.2).
Another major issue was the reorganisation of IIC, which entailed the merger of the 
prior business units within IIC to a new market-focused structure (see section 5.3.2). 
Because of the integration of business units, the three different systems development 
departments merged into one. With the integration of the three IIC business units, the 
total systems development capacity was centralised. Instead o f each business unit 
having their own systems development department, they now had to staff their IT 
projects from one central pool. Decision makers were faced with choices to make 
between the three columns -  a process that was new to everybody. Up until then, 
they only had to make decisions within their own line of business. Suddenly, they 
had to consider the whole organisation in their decision process. The previous ways 
o f prioritisation and considering impacts of investments to the organisation no longer 
applied. Nobody in the organisation could oversee the overall totality which led to 
the need for a more so-called ‘objective evaluation method’.
Moreover, the method not only had to be used to improve decision-making, but also 
as a means o f communicating and legitimising decisions to the organisation. 
According to one manager: “We noticed we lacked a certain tool, a certain
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uniformity in our decision-making, with which we could serve all our users in an 
equal way; a tool we could use to convince them of the choices we were making. [...] 
Having to make choices is not that difficult. If I am told to choose, I will. However, it 
is more of a matter of convincing others of the choices I have made. Therefore, we 
needed a tool.”
So although prior use of ITEM-reports with certain projects had occurred, the wide­
spread distribution of the format including the related procedures started for various 
reasons at the end of 1999 -  parallel to the new procedures by which budget for 2000 
would be allocated to IT projects. The persons to fill in the ITEM-reports typically 
were the SPS managers at the three market groups. The distribution o f ITEM to them 
took three channels: written instructions, some workshops and the information 
manager.
The first channel, written instructions, included a memo detailing the phases of 
ITEM use (IIC-PM 1999d), instructions on how the ITEM-report should be 
completed (IIC-PM 1999c) and an empty ITEM-report form. In addition to the 
written instructions, a second channel of communicating the use o f ITEM to the 
business was through organising workshops. PM managers organised some 
workshops with different business managers explaining the written material on 
ITEM.
The third channel of communication to the end users was the information manager. 
The function of information manager was new to IIC since the beginning of 1999. 
The information managers functioned as a communication partner from PM to the 
end-user and vice versa. They distributed the ITEM-report format to the end users 
and made sure the process of ITEM-report fulfilment was carried out. More 
importantly, they convinced the business o f the need for the process. The information 
manager, as a staff member to the business unit director, was in a good position to 
ask the business to make an effort to use ITEM. He had both good access to the 
business and to the director, with whom he could discuss the importance of ITEM.
From the business managers, PM found little direct opposition to ITEM. Most 
questions were related to some lack in the clarity of the ITEM-report. Only one
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business unit had a different reaction. The unit arranged a meeting with PM, 
questioning the need for the introduced method. In their questions relating to the 
process o f handling ITEM, PM found backup from the information managers, since 
the information managers were strong supporters of a better link between IT and 
business impact. With their support, the part o f ITEM concerning the construction of 
ITEM-reports found its way to the business.
Although the SPS managers were instructed on how the use ITEM, and PM received 
few questions about this, the writing of the ITEM-reports was not without its 
problems. The SPS managers had different backgrounds, as diverse as technical 
specialists, project specialists, process specialists and business specialists. Just a 
small number of them was familiar with a broad view on investment proposals. One 
information manager reports typical questions asked by SPS managers, such as 
“What is an IRR?” and “effects on market share? How do I know?” Although ITEM 
supposedly had been constructed to be simple and plain with good documentation, in 
practice it required both specific knowledge and experience to be able to cope with it. 
As a result, some ITEM-reports focused only on technical aspects, whereas others 
focused primarily on business benefits. Moreover, the ITEM-report was regarded by 
some to be more of a checklist than supporting a justification, scoring, prioritisation 
and decision process. Rather than taking the time to think proposals through and 
consider thoroughly the costs, benefits and risks, ITEM-reports were thoughtlessly 
filled in within a short period o f time. Rather than using it as strategic or tactical 
instrument, it was used as an operational tool. What actually should take weeks when 
done properly was finished in one afternoon, so tells one information manager. To 
him it was not surprising since operational managers, not strategic managers, were 
asked to do the job. He argued for specially training some SPS managers in the trade 
of constructing ITEM-reports, rather than ask all SPS managers to take on the job. 
He asserts that constructing such reports is a speciality on its own; it requires insight 
into technical, business as well as economic aspects.
In practice, some SPS managers actually demonstrate that already they had found a 
way to dodge this. SPS mangers who felt familiar with the way of thinking 
demonstrated in ITEM also wrote ITEM-reports for others. One such SPS manager 
states that others were overly anxious not to commit themselves to ITEM-reports -
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"you can do it, just let me solve my technical system problems”. According to her, 
this is not a matter of better education or explanation regarding ITEM; or of being 
able to oversee the broad scope of project proposals, or to having the patience to 
gather relevant information from different sources and to write such documents, but 
instead is something that should ‘suit’ you. Thus, the reality of the situation was that 
ITEM-reports were drafted by only a handful o f SPS managers, specifically those 
who felt at ease with ITEM.
Another difficulty in the process of constructing ITEM-reports was the requirement 
o f the Financial Department to assist in calculating in the IRR. In fact, PM demanded 
that the Financial Department carry out IRR calculations. However since the 
Financial Department did not have all the underlying assumptions on project 
proposals, often additional communication with each of the three SPS departments 
was required. When SPS managers were busy with other activities or not present at 
that time, the process was delayed or lesser quality was accepted. In addition, a 
financial manager notes that too often project leaders had not secured the 
commitment of business managers for their estimated savings. That means that 
projects that promise high financial benefits might not be able to be realised because 
the involved business managers are not committed to obtaining them (e.g. to make 
the required changes in work processes or decrease the number of employees). One 
example is an instance where the Finance Department received a project promising 
to deliver 1 fte^ '* savings in their own department, but they themselves had not been 
consulted about it. This problem is related to the fact that often the benefits of 
projects reside somewhere else in the organisation rather than with the department 
that makes the project proposal. Although in theory FD should validate all such 
financial assumptions underlying the proposals, the manager contends that in practice 
this is simply impossible. Under the pressure of time therefore, the IRR calculation is 
often made only on the basis of provided financial estimates and without a second 
opinion on these estimates. Moreover, FD is aware of the difficulties in estimating 
certain benefits related to IT. One anecdote is the justification o f an investment in a 
company-wide Intranet which was said to save each IIC employee 10 minutes a day. 
The financial manager contends that in these cases it is better to argue that IIC
A  cost reduction equivalent with one flill-time-empioyed (fte) employee.
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simply needs an Intranet for its normal functioning, rather than trying to make a 
financial estimate for it.
Conflicts between SPS and the Finance Department due to ITEM can be clearly 
illustrated by a story told by one SPS manager who drafted a proposal for a project 
which would relieve the workload of a particular operational specialist. “The 
specialist would save about half his time if this project would be carried out. Being 
one of the few specialists with knowledge of a particular system, it would be a very 
welcome relief for the whole department involved. The idea was that he now could 
spend time addressing other issues with regard to that system, ones that urgently 
needed attention. But the reaction o f the Finance Department was that his time 
savings were not actually a savings at all since he was not losing 50% of his 
employment. Therefore, costs would remain the same! For the Finance Department, 
the project delivered no savings. We did not know how to quantify the benefits o f the 
project in another way. The specialist was not going to deliver more products -  only 
address arrears work. To the Finance Department the benefits of the project were 
zero. But for people on the work floor it would have meant so much relief!” The SPS 
manager solved the problem by viewing the additional categories ITEM provided to 
show the benefits of the project. Benefits such as increased knowledge due to the 
specialist possibly training other people in his or her spare time and increases in 
professionalism, were thus selected. “You go about quite artificially, trying to fit the 
benefits somewhere. You think to yourself: at least I can get a positive score on those 
items, because on the other items there is no chance.”
One SPS manager adds another perspective to problems relating to the ITEM- 
reports. It concerns the perception of SPS managers that ITEM came from the 
System Development department. The relationship between SPS and SD had always 
been that of customer and supplier. This had had its typical problems (e.g. Applegate, 
McFarlan et a l  1996 show that similar problems occur commonly between IT and 
user departments): SPS managers complaining that SD managers took too long to 
build or change systems, and SD managers likewise complaining SPS had been too 
vague or too late with their requirements. In prior years, SD had been involved in 
different quality improvement programs (with quality improvement programs, such 
as the Software Improvement Process and the Capability Maturity Model). Although
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not actively involved in these programs, SPS managers were faced with all kinds of 
techniques and models introduced by SD, For example, as part of these improvement 
programs, change request related to IT now had to be filled in using particular forms 
that contained specific language related to these programs. In other words, SD had 
confronted SPS in the past with all kinds o f forms, methods and particular 
requirements. ITEM, being related to IT, was perceived as one of these improvement 
programs coming from SD. ITEM-reports having some similar terminology as the 
prior SD improvement processes, strengthened this idea. The somewhat strained 
relationship with SD thus placed ITEM in a poor light for SPS. It was not received 
too positively and motivation to work with it was not high.
One of the major difficulties in drafting ITEM-reports, an SPS manager notes, is 
gathering the relevant data. For development costs and IT capacity it inquired at SD. 
However, to estimate benefits, more often than not, information is required from 
particular specialists who are vital to operational business -  “it is always the person 
who is the busiest you need for your information”. For example, they must be probed 
for the potential impact of the investment on their work processes. Moreover, asking 
these persons to free time to deliver information for ITEM-reports proved to be hard. 
According to formal IIC regulations, a written request should be made two months 
before the time and efforts of the specialist are required. However, that was 
impossible given the limited time available to fill in ITEM-reports.
Despite the difficulties in constructing ITEM-reports, by 15 February 2000 all 
required ITEM-reports were completed and turned in to PM. However, PM was not 
satisfied with the quality of the ITEM-reports they received. Especially the 
quantification of costs and benefits left room for improvement. Also in many cases, 
when asked for risks in carrying out the project, people had written ‘not applicable’. 
Risks of the project had not been made as explicit as PM had wanted.
PM explains the lack of quality in ITEM-reports as being due to different reasons in 
the business. One manager contends, “we [at IIC] do not yet know how to look 
further (beyond 1 year). Absolutely not. That remains a big challenge. People cannot 
do it, do not get it, do not want it or find it boring. It figures. ‘And what is the 
result?’ [ they wondered].”
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The problems relating to quality in ITEM-reports might not be such a great problem 
as might seem at first glance. According to a business director:
“The initial quality of the ITEM-reports left room for improvement, let’s put it that 
way. [...] However, general management is not making decisions based solely on 
these documents. When general management needs to make decisions, it turns back 
to the business -  general management is only human too. They go back to the 
business and form an opinion on the information they get back fi-om their colleagues. 
[...] If you do not know the background of the proposal and would just use the ITEM- 
report for decision-making, that would be too mechanistic. That is not the way it 
happens in real life.”
An information manager argues that the step PM wanted to make was perhaps too 
large a step for the organisation to take. He contends that “the organisation has to 
grow into the process. We cannot just take a standard method and implement it in the 
organisation. We have to go through some stages. We have to grow into the
competencies needed to exploit such a method.”
In March 2000 a meeting was planned by IIC’s general management to prioritise the 
projects that were submitted. Before this meeting, the process of scoring by 
managers was planned by PM. The goal was to provide general management with an 
overall project portfolio proposal and thereby assist them in making decisions.
5.4.7 Prioritisation 1999^000 -  a first time
In the first round, the process delivered 52 ITEM-reports. Due to the large number of 
reports (and large amount of data the ITEM-reports delivered -  the ITEM-reports 
were bundled in ‘books’), they were divided in two to prioritise by a scoring group.
PM asked all directors of market groups, the regions and some staff departments to 
score (twelve people in total); ten were willing to do so and in the end eight actually 
did. Each of them was asked to score all ITEM-reports (e.g. to give a score ranging 
fi-om -1 to 5 on each aspect of a project). All scores by each scoring member were 
put into a database. By statistical comparisons an analysis was made on the final
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scores of the proposed investments. PM stated that “when this analysis shows that 
too large deviations appear between scores to come to end scores for certain items, 
then a group discussion will be organised. In this session the group will come to an 
end score for the relevant items by group consensus” (IIC-PM 2000d, p. 2). 
However, PM managers concluded that the scores were not statistically different 
among the eight, and only one difference was resolved by communication o f e-mail. 
From the database, PM created an overview of the projects from different 
perspectives (product variation, market segmentation, etc.). The priority list was 
presented to general management in March 2000. But rather than taking the advice to 
carry out the prioritised selection o f the projects, general management decided to 
approve all 52 projects by granting more budget. Moreover, general management 
argued that due to external developments some projects would, during the year, 
prove to be unnecessary and thereby give more room to the other projects. When this 
wishful thinking did not occur, general management was forced to make additional 
decisions on projects and some projects were passed on to the next year.
The reason for approving all projects was a result of the great many projects that had 
a must-do status. Due to the large number o f projects necessary because of the euro 
currency adjustments, millennium and mandatory changes by law and regulatory 
changes, only a small number of projects remained that were eligible for choice of 
investment. Because those remaining constituted such a relatively small number of 
projects, general management decided to allow all projects that had a valid ITEM- 
report to carry on. Apart from the negative effect on the motivation of managers to 
cooperate in a new round of prioritisation, it also had some negative effect on other 
PM plans. Rather than a one-time prioritisation, PM had intended to institutionalise 
an on-going prioritisation o f projects with a so-called ‘rolling-calendar’ where 
projects were monitored throughout the year. But because all projects had been 
approved right away, the extra prioritisation was made redundant.
In retrospect, the first use of ITEM shows some mixed results. An evaluation of the 
scoring group shows that they had been able to make scores, but the quality and 
meaning of the texts in the reports was too varied for them to be very confident in 
their scores. In an informal evaluation memo (IIC-PM 2000g, p.l), PM notes that 
ITEM had provided increased understanding o f the aims o f projects, it increased the
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involvement o f region directors in the process of project proposals and it induced 
project developers to thoroughly think through their ideas. On the downside, it notes 
that the quality and depth of ITEM-reports was low, that some market group 
directors felt passed over in the scoring process and that general management did not 
have a set of goals on which to rely to support its decisions.
Moreover, although prioritisation had taken place, by the time projects were ready 
for executing, new discussions arose. Estimations of needed capacity for projects 
proved to be incorrect. As a result, projects that had been approved were delayed.
PM concludes in a formal written evaluation o f the first use o f NW-documents and 
the prioritising process (IIC-PM 2000e) that “the method proved to be very useful 
and valuable for the organisation. The organisation has become more critical. People 
are better at thinking through their projects, because a thorough study has to be 
carried out to write ITEM-reports”. The report shows a much brighter perspective on 
the use o f ITEM than the interviews do. Rather than suggesting changes in the 
approach to prioritisation, scoring or decision-making, the formal evaluation report 
only suggests some minor improvements relating to the contents and textual format 
o f the method.
5.4.8 Prioritisation 2000/2001 -  a second time
At the end o f 2000, a new round of project prioritising had started to set up budgets 
for the year 2001. All business units had to hand in their new project proposals. This 
second round of prioritisation has been characterised by one of the PM employees as 
a ‘black page’. Not only because the quality of the ITEM-reports was still 
unsatisfactory, but more importantly because the process of scoring and prioritisation 
went differently than planned.
The quality of ITEM-reports still was not satisfactory to PM. Some persons even 
regarded the quality o f the documents to be worse than the first time. This was due to 
a number of factors: other people were involved and experiences from the last time 
were lost; people were busy carrying out projects from the first round, demanding 
time from IT people to do some work and also time to help them with estimates for 
completing ITEM-reports; and people thought it would be as easy as the last time.
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and they would all get the budgets anyway. In addition, people underestimated the 
time it would take to make a proper proposal.
The major reason for this prioritisation to be described as a ‘black page in history’ is 
the way the process proceeded after the construction of ITEM-reports. Rather than 
asking the market and some region directors to prioritise the projects by giving 
scores, PM planned a session where six directors were present. The aim of the 
session was to come up with a proposition for general management about which 
projects to approve. Again, the total number o f project requests fi'om systems 
development was twice the available capacity. The proposition was intended to be 
created by an agreement among the senior managers. However, no agreement among 
the managers could be reached mostly due to the fact that everybody was pleading 
for their own projects.
The managers did not reach consensus on a plan that fitted the available capacity. As 
a result, PM handed over a list of, according to them, must-do projects to general 
management. General management however concluded that several projects without 
the must-do status, but which were crucial in their own view, had to be carried out. In 
the end, general management spent two days at the beginning of 2001 prioritising all 
the projects on the list which resulted in the project calendar for that year.
In the prioritising process of general management, in which ITEM only played a very 
minor role, decisions were reached that were not at all clear to the business. Some 
projects that were regarded urgent by the business managers were scratched in the 
meeting.
At the end of the second prioritisation round, general management commented: “This 
actually is crazy. [By prioritising ourselves,] we are doing the work o f our business 
directors. We do not want to do that.” They asked PM to come up with a solution. 
PM came with the solution of a prioritisation platform: the IIC Portfolio 
Management (IPM) platform.
5.4.9 A prioritisation platform
The idea of a prioritisation platform had already been launched at an earlier point in 
time. But, as PM observed, “a real decision fi-om general management had to be
176
C h a p t e r s
issued before it actually took form.” A possible reason for this delay, suggests a 
manager at PM, was that such a platform proposed little benefit and was a real threat 
to many of those involved. It proposed a risk in that people could lose the few things 
they had. And past experience had shown that they could get extra budget from a 
director during the year.
At the start of 2001 the platform was created. Besides the evident cause of the failure 
of the second prioritisation round, there were other reasons why such a platform 
could count on more support by that time.
PM noticed a shift in the people involved in prioritisation. They started to think more 
from a IIC perspective rather than from their own market group perspective. “A 
movement occurred in the sphere of interest o f the people involved.” This view is 
supported by the interpretation of a market group director who says: “With the 
organisational change in 1998, people came into new places. At that time, the idea of 
independence was propagated. Managers were responsible for the success of their 
part of the total IIC organisation. But concern for the larger organisation faded into 
the background. [...] People had the feeling they had to prove themselves in their new 
positions. This feeling decreased through time. Instead, people are now thinking that 
it is ridiculous that we cannot agree on these things.’”
Moreover, some argued that PM matured in its role as well. A market group director 
explained: “It used to fulfil a role of administer and bookkeeper. Now it plays the 
role of catalyst in the decision-making process.” Whereas PM was first only seen as 
an organisational unit that makes an inventory o f investment proposals, now it is 
considered to have matured into a business unit that makes informed suggestions to 
the prioritisation platform. By taking a lead in the discussions in the platform, PM is 
better capable of avoiding the things that went wrong in the second prioritisation 
round.
Other respondents such as the information managers saw it somewhat differently. 
They argued that business managers have matured in managing IT. Whereas before 
PM was seen as the one to solve the IT decision problems, by now managers (both 
general and business management) had become aware that they are responsible for 
IT. PM received a supporting role in presenting a particular view on these problems,
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but it was up to business management to solve them. In other words, PM was not in a 
position to prioritise and thereby solve the problems of limited IT budgets and IT 
capacity -  they could only support this problem-solving. By installing a prioritisation 
platform, this awareness was translated in the involvement o f more business 
managers in this process. In this view, general management should not address PM to 
reduce IT costs (by limiting their budget) but should instead address this to the 
business managers. Such a perspective is supported by the Finance Department 
which has expressed doubts about the way IT budget is currently allocated centrally 
to IT. In the meantime, however, it is up to business departments to decide how to 
spend it.
5.4.10 Current and future situation
In the situation at the time the research was conducted, all respondents regarded 
ITEM as being employed by the organisation. It has become common practice to fill- 
in ITEM-reports when a new project is proposed. PM notices that people come to 
them to request the ITEM-report form when they want to start a project and 
information managers notice business managers telling each other not to forget to use 
ITEM. ITEM is also considered to be the normal road one has to take in order to get 
project approval; without an ITEM-report, projects do not enter the project 
prioritisation and decision process. Moreover, SD no longer works on projects that 
have not been approved. They first ask for projects to be put on the project calendar, 
something which requires an ITEM-report, before SD will start working on them.
Not only has ITEM become regarded as integrated in the business, it also is regarded 
as an improvement to the (lack of) prior evaluation practices. The financial 
department argues that ITEM in making explicit assumptions, supporting budget 
allocation and leading to more disciplined use o f budgets is a step in the right 
direction as opposed to previous practices where IT budget overruns were the norm. 
IIC has changed to be more cost-conscious in IT projects. Moreover, ITEM filtered 
away initial ideas that could not yet be worked out thoroughly. In the past these 
proposals slipped by, but now they are already halted at the very start. They do not 
enter the process of prioritising at all.
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Business managers contend with regard to the overall success o f ITEM that “now we 
really make plans, make choices and follow projects. Everything is much more 
methodical and structured” than it used to be.
However, although the format has been adopted, the use of ITEM differs from the 
way PM intended. The quality o f ITEM-reports in their view could be improved. 
People continue to fill-in the document at the last minute and leave out information.
More importantly, ITEM is only used during budget allocation. There is no ex post 
evaluation to match results with project goals as stated in the document. A number of 
respondents have pointed out that as long as there is no ex post evaluation, the 
quality of ITEM-reports in terms of accuracy of estimations will not improve. They 
expect the figures in the ITEM-report to become more ‘realistic’ once an ex post 
evaluation is part o f the process. IIC is looking for ways to incorporate such an 
evaluation in the process. The financial department states that if no ex post 
evaluations are made, ex ante evaluations are redundant. However, with ITEM 
providing an ex ante evaluation, it lays the foundation for ex post evaluation. This 
should be the next step.
In the future situation, respondents see ITEM as an integral part of the organisational 
process. The results ITEM produces will be used throughout the investment process, 
starting with budget allocation and going on until the ex post evaluation of performed 
projects.
Moreover, some information managers argue that in the future ITEM should play a 
more strategic role in the organisation. They argue that currently it is perceived as an 
operational instrument to determine yearly budgets. ITEM is applied to project 
proposals for projects for the next year. They argue ITEM should extend its time 
span and include ideas that are further down the road. It should feed strategic open 
discussions on the direction in which IIC should be heading -  not merely arrange 
financial budgets for ideas that already have almost reached an operational project 
status. Whereas others stress the importance of operational tasks o f the new 
prioritisation platform to include project monitoring, the information managers argue
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that the platform should try to look ahead and advise general management on 
strategic routes and not only operational ones.
5.4.11 C onc lusion  on th e  case s tu d y
Since 1996, IIC has come a long way with regard to getting a grip on the economic 
aspects of IT. An overview of relevant events is presented in a timeline displayed in 
Figure 5.3. All respondents see the introduction of the project calendar and ITEM as 
an improvement in handling IT projects. Although some notice that the ultimate goal 
of an ideal rationalised grip on IT may never be reached due to the flexibility to 
shape the ITEM-reports and difficulties in making valid estimates of all benefits, 
they regard ITEM as major contribution to IT decision-making and communication.
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5.5 C o n c l u s io n
This chapter has presented our case study and its context and history. It shows that 
from a contextual point of view it is not so strange that our case study organisation
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started to show interest in IT evaluation concepts during the ‘90s. Many contextual 
developments have urged companies to get a better grip on the costs and benefits o f 
IT, and this in turn has fiielled the need for an IT evaluation method. The events that 
occurred during the studied period have been detailed. These will be analysed in the 
next chapter.
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Chapter 6: Case Analysis - From Adoption to Translation
6.1 In t r o d u c t io n
In the previous chapter we described what happened at IIC during the introduction of 
the new evaluation method ITEM. In this chapter we discuss the case by applying the 
theoretical insights as outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 and attempt to explain^^ why this 
process happened the way it did. The issue we address is to see how we can 
understand the employment of IT evaluation methods better when we draw on 
insights gained from our case study.
The case of IIC is analysed from two different theoretical perspectives in an attempt 
to gain a deeper understanding of the employment o f IT evaluation methods: an 
analysis using the diffusion theory and an analysis using ANT.
As explained earlier, the diffusion theory is a very generally applied research 
approach to analyse the adoption and spread of innovations. Therefore, it seems 
justified to use this theory to see how much understanding can be gained in analysing 
the case study. Although many limitations with regard to the diffusion theory have 
been pointed out in Chapter 4, we will employ it here to analyse our case and see 
where it leaves questions unanswered in understanding the IIC case. We will further 
show how using the actor-network theory in this particular case study provides a 
better understanding.
In the analysis we will show that the introduction o f ITEM at IIC can best be 
understood as the mobilisation of an actor that translates and is translated. The 
perspective o f the evaluation method as an acting actor helps to understand the 
dynamic process o f the introduction o f ITEM at IIC. In the next chapter, we will take
In section 4.3.4 we discussed that in ANT explanation is used for describing in detail the events that 
took place in this case, rather than explaining findings fi-om generalised social theories. Explanation 
thus should be understood as presenting the events fi-om the case study in such a way that they 
become clear (make sense) to the researcher and the reader.
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this further and try to come to a new perspective on the employment of IT evaluation 
methods in general and address the paradox stated in Chapter 1.
6.2 A n  a n a l y sis  u sin g  d if f u sio n  t h e o r y
6.2.1 Introduction
In this first analysis we will use the diffusion theory by Rogers (1995) to analyse the 
case study. In applying this theoretical framework, we follow a common thread in 
our analysis according to his five stages of diffusion (knowledge, persuasion, 
decision, implementation, and confirmation). Furthermore, we study other concepts 
of diffusion theory, such as the characteristics o f ITEM (relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, trialability, observability) and re-invention. We conclude 
with whether or not the adoption according to our difflision-theory analysis can be 
considered successful, and we identify which questions are left without a satisfactory 
answer.
6.2.2 ITEM seen as the adoption of an innovation
According to Rogers, an “innovation is an idea, practice or object that is perceived as 
new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers 1995, p. 11). Since ITEM 
was a new approach to the economic valuation o f IT for IIC, it can be viewed as an 
innovation. From the perspective of the diffusion theory, the research analysis can be 
seen to promote an understanding of the difficulties related to the adoption of ITEM. 
To define the innovation, we consider ITEM to be the evaluation method that 
encompasses the ITEM-report which describes costs, financial benefits, intangible 
benefits, risks and scoring tables for prioritising. But ITEM was more than just some 
report on paper. Its explicit goals entailed the justification, scoring, prioritisation and 
decision-making of investment proposals. The innovation thus entailed both artefacts 
(documents, written instructions and a database) and processes (justification, scoring, 
prioritising and decision-making).
PM intended ITEM to be a neutral, universal method that unified proposals in such a 
way that they could be prioritised objectively. Decision-making in this view can be 
seen to be based on the rational decision-making model. In other words, when all the 
alternative investment proposals have been ranked, the best choice can be made
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(objectively). This rationality discourse expressed itself during interviews with PM 
employees and with some managers and was evident in several documents regarding 
ITEM. It can be seen to be inherent to ITEM itself -  e.g. the scoring of alternatives in 
which the best choice of investments can be calculated.
6.2.3 Becoming aware of the need for ITEM
To understand the adoption o f the innovative ITEM, the diffusion theory suggests an 
analysis of the prior conditions that led to the awareness of or need for an innovation. 
Prior conditions significant to the adoption were visible at the beginning of the ‘90s.
Before 1996, IIC found itself in a seemingly very comfortable position. The market 
for insurances was doing well, and IIC was exploiting these conditions in a 
favourable way. So well in fact, managers had to search internally for ways to 
obscure their successes to the outside world. Things were going so well that products 
were sold even before they had been completed technically. The marketing people 
sold, sold and sold. In our case study, one manager mentioned a product that was 
intended solely for entrepreneurs but was sold to private individuals just the same -  
“Back then, people were eager for insurance products.”
But the success on the outside had its toll on the inside. The heated market was 
demanding more products, and with the marketers selling all kinds of innovative 
products, the clockwork that produced the products was being put to the test. At the 
basis o f the products lay complex information systems which had been developed 
and changed throughout many years. Insurance information systems constructed 
many years ago had evolved due to the introduction of new products, innovations in 
products, removal of products and impact of adaptations required to meet laws and 
regulations. As a result, many ‘patch-work’ and workarounds had been introduced 
into the system, and it proved difficult to remove the old parts of the systems. 
Changes that were considered temporary became permanent and due to impatient 
demands and low development budgets, a lot of system changes had not been 
developed as neatly as system developers would have wanted. By that time, IIC’s 
information systems were referred to as ‘legacy’; they were old, complex and 
inflexible systems that carried past burdens (other insurers faced similar problems -  
see section 5.2.4).
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Another thing that contributed to systems becoming complex was the culture and 
external image o f IIC. During its long history, IIC had acquired an image o f a large 
and powerful company. This image was expressed not only in its business operations 
and relations, but also in other ways, for example by the impressive and prominent 
office buildings of the company. Being one o f the biggest insurance companies in the 
Netherlands, its powerful customers and intermediaries had high demands and 
expectations. By the ‘90s, these historical successes resulted in IIC acquiring the 
status o f usually being able to live up to these expectations -  the creed adhered to 
seemed to be ‘your wish is our command’. Upholding this image meant that through 
the years various requests for system adaptations of important intermediaries were 
granted. Legacy systems thus became even more complex.
From 1998 on, other conditions drove the innovation of IT evaluation further. An 
increase in cost awareness heightened the demand for better insight into costs and 
benefits, in particular the need to get a better handle on future IT investments. 
Additional drive for IT evaluation came from the evaluation practices at IIC before 
1998, which were characterised by respondents to be suffering from unknown IT 
costs, unplanned IT resource use and decision-making based on gut feeling. In 
addition, the group of insurers and banks within FGU, including IIC, all had 
numerous experiences with costly failures in automation projects.
Moreover, competitors were involved in all kinds of IT Economics and quality 
improvement exercises. Back then, these types of management issues were 
considered important (the ‘hypes’ and ‘buzz-words’) in banking and insurances (see 
section 5.2.5). One business manager contends that “ten years before, no one thought 
o f methodical and structured approaches towards projects or IT. Neither at IIC, nor at 
any other financial companies. That thinking arose during that time.” Another 
manager confirms this and adds that consultancy companies that were operating in 
the financial sector at that time increased such awareness.
These conditions led to a need for change. It remains unclear which came first, the 
need (e.g. ‘market puli’) or the awareness o f a new evaluation method (e.g. 
‘technology push’). It is most likely that one influenced the other. In any case, PM
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saw itself confronted with the issue o f evaluation. By combining ideas from different 
methods from research (IT Economics and Balanced Scorecard) and models already 
used in IIC (PCX, GAP-analysis), they created ITEM.
It is difficult to determine which business units actually were involved in the decision 
to use ITEM at the end of the ‘90s -  PM started to inform departments about the 
possibility of introducing ITEM, specifically those departments that felt the need for 
better insight into their projects. An actual decision to use ITEM was made at each 
unit individually. Then again, a formal decision to adopt or reject ITEM does not 
seem to have happened at these business units at all. They simply wanted to give it a 
try, interested in the results it could bring. Only for general management did such a 
formal adoption take place, although at a later time (late ‘90s). PM introduced ITEM 
to general management. At this knowledge stage, the knowledge general 
management gained on ITEM could be, according to diffusion theory, typified as 
‘awareness-knowledge’ (knowing that the innovation o f ITEM existed) as apposed to 
‘how-to knowledge’ (knowing how ITEM was to be used) and ‘principle knowledge’ 
(knowing what functioning principles support ITEM and how it actually works). 
After general management decided that ITEM was to be employed, ‘how-to 
knowledge’ was disseminated throughout the organisations to the people who had to 
work with it.
6.2.4 Attitudes and behaviour towards the adoption of ITEM
According to diffusion theory, after becoming aware of an innovation an individual 
can develop an attitude (feeling) towards it. This persuasion stage is understood as 
the formation of an attitude towards an innovation and a change in the (overt) 
behaviour of an individual. Persuasion in the diffusion theory is not necessarily 
meant as a change in a particular direction intended by some particular source, such 
as a change agent, but it is governed by characteristics of the innovation. By 
becoming aware o f the innovation, the individual develops his/her own attitude 
towards it, which can either be favourable or unfavourable. A favourable attitude is 
likely to result in the adoption of the innovation, whereas an unfavourable one is 
likely to result in a rejection. However, the actuality o f the situation was not as clear- 
cut as the diffusion theory leads us to believe. People developed mixed attitudes
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towards ITEM, favourable to some ideas embedded in ITEM and unfavourable to 
others. We will elaborate on this phenomenon below.
According to the diffusion theory, the development of an attitude is informed by the 
perceived characteristics of the innovation. These are relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability. The relative advantage of 
ITEM as positioned by PM included the possibility to prioritise IT projects and 
investments, to give better quantitative insight into the financial impact of 
investments and to give more qualitative insight into costs, benefits and risks for 
investments. PM argued that it provided better control over the budget and IT 
resources, improved decision-making by rationalising it and made it more objective. 
Finally, they said it gave people the opportunity to assess outcomes o f investments 
(IIC-PM 1997). Since general management felt the need for more insight, better 
control, cost reduction and better decision-making in IT investments, they seemed 
easily persuaded to adopt ITEM based on the promises it entailed. However, as seen 
in the implementation stage, the actual adoption did not proceed as was intended. To 
the dismay of PM, general management neglected the prioritisation proposed by 
ITEM, and on both occasions o f decision-making used their own scoring techniques.
One manager of PM expressed his confusion regarding the actions of general 
management as follows: “General management actually negated everything because 
they thought all 50 projects were important and decided to allocate enough budget to 
execute them all. In essence. General management just dismissed the whole thing. 
Incredible! We told everyone that there was a limited budget and that we needed to 
prioritise. And what does general management do? They just grant extra budget! You 
shouldn’t do that too often because people will start wondering why they spent time 
scoring all these projects, and why they even bothered to make proposals in the first 
place.”
In the second prioritisation round, general management again ignored the 
prioritisation given by PM and ITEM. Moreover, the envisioned prioritisation 
through a scoring process by business managers, as was carried out in the first round, 
was abandoned due to budgetary constraints. PM notes: “The second time, we 
skipped the prioritising round with the managers since there was only enough budget
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for the most urgent projects and current projects running. We made a list of all urgent 
projects, and gave that to general management. They responded by saying that things 
do not work that way. They took their pencils and went through the whole list, 
including the other (less urgent) projects. They prioritised all 80 projects 
themselves!”
The prioritisation general management used was not transparent to the rest of the 
organisation. Projects that were considered of paramount importance by information 
managers were neglected by general management. General management obviously 
had its own ideas about what was to be considered urgent or not. Some projects that 
PM had classified as ‘not urgent’ or ‘to be declined’ were considered by them to be 
mandatory for legislation or of paramount importance to IIC. General managers 
argued that they had a better perspective than PM on the broad spectrum of issues 
IIC was facing and the direction in which IIC was heading and therefore had made 
their own prioritisation.
With regard to compatibility of ITEM with existing needs, values and previous 
experiences, we see that the situation at hand was compatible with ITEM. The 
conditions expressed a problem of financial control of IT; ITEM was able to propose 
a solution to these problems and therefore seemed compatible with current needs. 
The complexity of ITEM is perceived differently by various individuals. PM, having 
full knowledge of the method, saw it as an easy-to-use tool. Though they realised 
that ITEM might require ‘some exercise’ (IIC-PM 1997), they were confident that 
people would quickly pick it up. However the business managers, the potential 
adopters of ITEM, had a different view. To use ITEM, they argued, much specialised 
knowledge about making business cases, assessing future costs, benefits and risks 
and making financial calculations is required. Rather than viewing ITEM as 
something that could be used by all, they saw it as requiring specialists. Trialahlity of 
ITEM, the degree to which the innovation may be experimented with, is low. Though 
the method can be used selectively, only when all the investment proposals use the 
method are the results o f ITEM visible. Moreover, the necessity for using ITEM for 
budget allocation at the end o f the 90’s left little room for experimentation. Finally, 
observability, the degree to which ITEM gives visible results, is moderate. Of course 
the overview of projects and their possible impact is something easily observable, but
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decision-making being improved is hard to demonstrate. Rather, the observation that 
general management was not using the prioritised results demonstrates that ITEM did 
not have the intended beneficial results.
In the decision stage, a decision is reached on the basis o f the attitude formed. 
Attitudes and behaviour were however not very consistent. As Rogers describes it 
(Rogers 1995): a favourable attitude towards an innovation does not necessarily lead 
to adoption, neither does it mean a guarantee for action. There may be many reasons 
why an individual, although having a favourable attitude towards an innovation, does 
not make the decision to adopt, or does not take the actions required for adoption. 
Such reasons, Rogers claims, include undesirable side effects caused by the 
(adoption of the) innovation, lack of resources or means to act or uncertainty about 
outcomes. In this case, this is visible by the fact that although general management 
formally decided to adopt ITEM, it was left unused. In many cases, this was due to 
the stress of the workload. Using ITEM had the undesirable side effect of taking 
quite some time and resources away fi’om day-to-day operations. In addition, 
managers were more eager to get tangible results than fill out ITEM-reports. 
Moreover, general management neglected the results of the prioritisation proposed 
by ITEM in both cases it was used. So while being adopted in intention (words), an 
important part o f ITEM can actually be regarded as rejected in practice.
Just as having a favourable attitude towards an innovation does not automatically 
result in adoption, neither does having an unfavourable attitude towards it 
automatically lead to rejection. Reasons for adopting the innovation given an 
unfavourable attitude involve pressures such as mandatory requirements, avoiding 
something more unfavourable (e.g. a kind of threat) or complying to some force (e.g. 
physical, military or market force). In the IIC case, the decision to use ITEM was 
clear and simple: favourable or unfavourable attitude, those departments that did not 
deliver ITEM-reports did not get budget for their projects. In the terms o f the 
diffusion theory, it can be viewed as an authority innovation-décision: a decision 
driven by authority, rather than an optional (“individual”) or collective (“group”) 
decision to adopt.
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6.2.5 Re-invention of ITEM
PM took on the role of change agent. By persuading general management that there 
was a need for ITEM and thereby securing its support, PM more or less pushed 
ITEM onto the organisation. “Plans without the ITEM-report do not get a budget” 
was the message. In addition, PM supported the adopters by organising training 
programs and offering help during the use o f ITEM. Moreover, the information 
managers were used throughout the organisation as promoters of change. Although 
these tactics all seemed to lead to a successful implementation o f ITEM, a 
phenomenon of re-invention, which can be related back to Rogers’ work, took place 
during this process.
Rogers defines re-invention as “the degree to which an innovation is changed or 
modified by a user in the process o f its adoption and implementation” (Rogers 1995, 
p. 174). Re-invention expressed itself in the case of IIC through:
• users only partially completing an ITEM-report, for example leaving out the 
risk assessment;
•  users making their own (favourable and/or partial) estimates o f benefits and 
costs;
•  users making their own (favourable) retum-on-investment calculations -  
leading to the Finance Department having to make these calculations 
afterwards;
• adaptations made by PM during the implementation (changing criteria and 
other content of ITEM and skipping the scoring process in the second round);
• use of results: results were used (also) for other purposes than IT decision­
making, e.g. for operational activities, such as planning and assigning IT 
capacity -  and possibly in the future for ex post evaluation;
• the scoring process being replaced by a meeting and thereby trying 
(unsuccessfully) to come to agreement via discussion;
• general management neglecting the prioritisation proposed by ITEM, but 
using their ‘own pencil’ to scratch off proposals and suggest others for 
execution.
After ITEM had been used for the first time, PM asked an external audit team to 
perform a survey about the adoption of PCM, of which ITEM is a part. Such an
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assessment can be regarded by the diffusion theory as part of a confirmation of the 
adoption. Results from that survey (IIC-PM 2000a) showed a less bright picture than 
what was written in PM’s own evaluation, which concluded that “ITEM has proved 
to be very well applicable and o f great value to the organisation. [...] The 
organisation has on many accounts become more critical and profound towards 
projects and project proposals. [...] The method has experienced broad acceptance in 
the organisation and is valued very highly.” (IIC-PM 2000e). By contrast, the PCM 
survey shows that only a small part of the organisation is effectively using PCM, 
including ITEM.
Actually, ITEM fulfilled only a few of the promised benefits in terms o f assisting 
justification, scoring, prioritisation and decision-making on IT projects. Moreover, as 
discussed above, ITEM was ‘re-invented’ (i.e. had changed so much) so that “the 
original innovation may even have lost its identity” (Rogers 1995, p. 177). 
Suggestions were even made to change ITEM further. These included an ex post 
evaluation to verify ex ante evaluations and the introduction of a portfolio 
management group to handle the scoring and prioritising.
In this sense, the innovation was neither adopted nor rejected, but rather continues to 
be ‘re-invented’ as to adopt it further (or a new version of it). In fact, almost all 
persons encountered in the research state that it “certainly is a step forward”, though 
many claim “still a long route has to be progressed”. In Rogers’ view, maybe the 
confirmation stage has not yet been reached in our case.
6.2.6 The adoption of ITEM using the diffusion theory
In terms of a drawing a conclusion about the adoption of ITEM, the diffusion theory 
would suggest a failure, or at best a very limited success. Both the ITEM-reports and 
the Internal Rate of Return documents are criticised by most involved to lack quality, 
and are thereby not commonly considered as proper justification for the proposed 
investments. The scoring process was only carried out once and with very limited 
success. Though the process delivered scores, they were not used in the decision­
making. The second time, people were unmotivated and due to lack of budget 
scoring did not take place at all. A substitute discussion by managers intended to
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arrive at a consensus regarding the valuing of projects degenerated into a fierce 
debate. No agreement on the importance of the proposed projects was reached. Both 
times, the prioritised list of projects was neglected by general management in their 
decision-making process. They used their ‘pencil’ to prioritise the whole list of 
projects and finally reached a decision based on discussion with each other, rather 
than follow the advice given by ITEM. From the perspective of the diffusion theory, 
all these outcomes point to the failure of ITEM.
Though the ITEM-report had been applied, the additional ideas involved in ITEM 
(using it for justification, scoring, prioritisation and decision-making) were mainly 
lost in the process. Many respondents in the case argue that there still is a long way 
to go, supporting the view that they too agree that ITEM is far from being actually 
adopted. Some suggest further adaptations with regards to ex post evaluation so that 
prior estimates can be evaluated afterwards.
6.2.7 Discussion of diffusion theory
A large number of the factors suggested by diffusion theory for the adoption of IT 
evaluation methods (such as mentioned in section 3.3.4, in addition to all kinds o f 
factors identified in earlier innovation-diffusion research) can be seen in the case 
description to play more or less important parts in the adoption of the evaluation 
method at IIC. For example, it was not until top management subscribed to applying 
ITEM that it actually was used; IIC, judging from its history with IT, can be 
classified as ‘innovator’ or ‘early adopter’ (Rogers 1995, p. 263), making it more 
open to IT related changes; and an economic climate of cost reduction can be seen to 
stimulate the adoption. The characteristics of ITEM (its relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability) might however be the cause 
o f its limited adoption. Maybe PM was not a powerful enough change agent to 
influence others to adopt ITEM, or other (more powerful) change agents may have 
prevented adoption due to undesirable effects (Rogers 1995, p. 335).
Identifying and assessing all of these factors, so argues diffusion theory, can help to 
understand why ITEM failed to fulfil its promises. But already from the limited 
analysis given above, we see conflicting explanations for our case. Some factors 
would suggest success, others failure. More importantly however is that a number of
192
Ch a p t e r  6
prominent observations cannot be explained by the diffusion theory. Most 
importantly, we see that the innovation is neither completely adopted nor rejected. 
Moreover, we see that re-invention plays a vital role in understanding the case. Not 
only do we see that ITEM is used in different ways than was intended (the traditional 
view of diffusion theory on re-invention where the artefact remains the same but is 
used for different purposes), but also that ITEM is shaped and altered along the way 
and ‘re-invented beyond recognition’.
This leads to the conclusion that the diffusion-theory analysis leaves many things 
unexplained and many questions unanswered:
• What actually gets adopted? The evaluation method that in the end gets 
adopted does not entail the results envisioned by its initial creators (e.g. PM). 
Moreover, the way the method is used (‘irrational’ and political) is in many 
ways contrary to what was envisioned (improved ‘rationality’). But although 
the adoption can be said to be a failure, it changed the organisation in a 
profound way. Not only was ITEM used for different purposes than was 
intended (also see the next bullet point), it also changed dramatically. For 
example, the valuing of the different projects (the scoring) drifted fi-om 
scoring to discussing (actually back to the prior situation, but now a 
discussion with ITEM-reports as input for discussion).
• Who has adopted the method? Saying that the organisation has adopted the 
method would not do justice to the observations o f the case. Though 
everybody works with the ITEM-reports, who in the end really uses ITEM as 
it was intended? What about the justification, scoring, prioritising and 
decision-making ITEM was meant to improve? In constructing a justification 
of investment proposals, the method has been ‘re-invented’. It does not show 
the costs, benefits, urgency and risks, but only very partial views on some of 
these aspects. The scoring, prioritisation and decision-making also 
demonstrates a limited use o f the true nature o f ITEM. Has ITEM been ‘re­
invented’ so much so that we can still talk about the same innovation? Every 
actor seems to have re-invented it to his/her own interests, leading to different 
interpretations and uses (see section 6.2.5).
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• In many ways, ITEM changed the organisation (rather than ITEM being 
diffused in an immutable organisation). For example, organisational work 
processes changed: people now had to construct reports and give scores in 
addition to their normal work processes; organisational functions changed: 
SPS managers suddenly were faced with making future predictions on 
projects; the responsibility o f departments changed: ITEM moved PM to a 
position where it gained influence over the decision-making ITEM cannot 
be seen as the same tool that is now being used by the same organisation -  
roles changed, people changed, decision-making changed; the organisation 
changed. Innovation adoption does not seem to be a matter of ‘fitting ITEM 
into the organisation’. Instead, the question becomes: in what way did ITEM 
change the organisation? Putting it differently: in what way did ITEM re­
invent the organisation (rather than the other way around)?
In more detail, if ITEM changed the decision-making, how did it change it? 
The case shows that ITEM changed the way of thinking about investment 
proposals. If it was used for communication, what did it communicate? What 
did ITEM ‘tell’? Or, differently phrased: what kind of world did ITEM 
create?
How was ITEM adopted? The stages o f the diffusion theory seem hardly to 
fit in this case. For example, the ‘ innovation-décision’ has not been made 
formally, and we see that actually every person (and as we will see in the next 
chapter, every non-human as well) involved makes his/her own decision. 
Moreover, there is a big difference between attitude and behaviour. Some 
people adopt the method in words but do not demonstrate this in their 
behaviour (see section 6.2.4).
Why were the results that ITEM provided not followed by the decision 
makers? Using the ITEM-report does not simply seem to imply using the 
decision-making process ITEM proposes. What are the reasons for only
26 This is demonstrated, for example, in a document by PM addressed to business managers stating; 
“Only those assignments which PM feels have met the requirements will be carried out by System 
Development” (IIC-PM 1999d, p. 3).
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adopting part of the innovation given that the perceived characteristics of the 
innovation seem favourable?
The diffusion theory as expanded by some of its proponents provides only limited 
help in answering these questions (e.g. by the concept of re-invention, or arguing that 
the decision to adopt does not automatically lead to actual adoption). But surely, to 
understand the adoption of evaluation methods, these questions need to be addressed. 
We turn to the actor-network theory to attempt to answer the questions stated above. 
This perspective holds that it is not so much some static, given properties of the 
innovation (i.e. ITEM), or the individuals and the social network that determine its 
adoption. Rather, it is the emergent and changing properties of the adoption process, 
as well as the individuals and other actors in the network which in the end accounts 
for the resulting use of the innovation. One of the most fundamental ideas of ANT is 
that how actors (with their interests and inscriptions) form part of the heterogeneous 
network, and how the adoption of the innovation takes form, is very dependent on 
those surrounding actors.
6.2.8 Conclusion on diffusion theory
Diffusion theory proved to be a good initial candidate for the analysis o f our case. It 
offered a language (e.g. with terms as diffusion, adoption, characteristics of the 
innovation, re-invention, influential factors in adoption, etc.) to think about the 
spread of ITEM. Moreover, it provided a structured approach to analyse our case in 
the stages of diffusion (knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and 
confirmation). However, the analysis shows that these stages are not easily 
ascertained in practice. For instance, the decision to adopt is not as explicit as first 
thought. Sometimes it happens during the knowledge or persuasion stage, other times 
during implementation (i.e. due to an authority decision). In addition, the decision is 
constantly being challenged by different people.
Looking beyond the common criticisms of diffusion theory (discussed in section 
4.2.4), we have seen that the notion of re-invention plays a crucial part in our case 
study. This includes the re-invention of the innovation itself as well as the 
unintended ‘re-invention’ it causes within the organisation. The limited
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understanding the diffusion theory presents on this phenomenon leaves many 
important questions unanswered.
In conclusion, diffusion theory offers a structured approach for understanding the 
spread of IT evaluation methods. Many of the influential elements of innovations and 
its environment, which have been uncovered in previous studies, have positively 
shaped the way this research could focus on relevant aspects in our case study. Such 
elements as described in section 3.3.4 have broadened our understanding of the 
issues in the case at hand. Without insights from the diffusion theory, some would 
most likely have been overlooked. Thus, it sensitised us to look for the influence of 
those aspects and then to look beyond them. The questions that appeared are 
addressed in the next section when we carry out another analysis o f the case study 
based on the actor-network theory.
63  A n  ANALYSIS USING ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY
6.3.1 Introduction
To address the difficulties that diffusion theory presented in the prior section in 
understanding our case study, we now employ ANT. In contrast to diffusion theory, 
ANT looks beyond the supposedly innate nature of an irmovation and the specific 
characteristics of the change agents or society to a process of network formation and 
black-boxing. The process of introducing ITEM at IIC is a ‘process o f network 
formation in which all actors seek to persuade others to become their allies in 
promoting the acceptance o f their own view of the way the problem can best be 
solved’ (Tatnall 2000). In this process, the evaluation method itself is one of the 
prominent actors involved in shaping the network. It is a process o f mutual 
translation, where actors in a dynamic negotiation and persuasion mutually define 
each other.
Drawing on empirical data from our case study, we will throughout this section 
suggest that ITEM can be perceived as an actor. We will start by defining PM’s 
position since it is essential in understanding the analysis of the translation o f ITEM. 
We continue the chapter by demonstrating that ITEM is a punctualised 
heterogeneous network, a black-box, with associations with other (social) actors; it is
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a spokesperson for other (silent) actors; and it tries to (and partially succeeds to) 
translate other actors by establishing itself as a relationship between actors (Gallon 
1986a).
Actors are not defined by themselves but by the position they assume in the actor- 
network (Law 1992). ITEM is ‘translated’ to reach a position in the network. But 
which position does it assume? We will see in these subsequent two sections that it 
has become part of the network but not in the way PM (and ITEM’S own 
inscriptions) had intended. We will focus on the process of translation and will start 
by outlining the process in which PM attempts to enrol ITEM at IIC. In this 
translation process we see “the continuity of the displacements and transformations” 
(Gallon 1986a, p. 223); the continuous interplay between actors.
The translation is neither a complete success nor failure. We will discuss the 
translation and analyse why the resulting outcome is not the same as the intended 
outcome. Before we conclude our analysis o f ANT, we explicitly demonstrate the 
‘actomess’ o f ITEM in a section that draws out the translations caused by ITEM.
6.3.2 The actor network before ITEM
Our story begins in 1996. After some close calls on major system failures (which 
would have been disastrous) and numerous small failures, IIC’s management came to 
the conclusion that the legacy systems had to be renewed. To achieve this, they 
recruited someone from inside FGC who had a good track record with managing 
complex projects. The suggested project manager was asked to run two major 
projects to improve the situation. But before she started, she was given three months 
to acquaint herself with IIC to ‘see how things work’. Within that time, the project 
manager came up with her own vision of what needed to be done. She noticed, due to 
her experience with another FGC company, the messiness of IT project management 
at IIC. Projects were stopping and running on an ad-hoc basis, there was lack of 
insight with regard to current IT projects and a lack of IT project management. She 
presented these problems to IIC’s general management and convinced them that 
undertaking two complex legacy-renewal projects were doomed to fail if no proper 
project management could be introduced.
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The demand for new products, problems with current legacy systems, plans for new 
information systems, the lack of IT project management and the arrival of the project 
manager from outside IIC, responsible for identifying the abovementioned problems, 
led to the creation of a new department, namely Program Management (PM).
PM was positioned as the solution to current problems (lack o f management 
regarding IT projects) and future problems (by facilitating renewal o f the legacy 
systems). In this process of translation (Callon and Law 1989) the interests o f the 
suggested project manager, to strive for a successful implementation of the legacy- 
renewal projects, and the interests of general management, to solve current legacy 
problems and create new information systems, are connected by a common interest 
to develop Program Management that improves IT project management. Within the 
context of IT project management, PM became the spokesperson for general 
management; general management was mobilised through the creation o f the new 
department. This translation can be termed ‘problematisation’ (Callon 1986a), where 
one actor convinces (potential) allies that it holds the answer to their common 
problem. Thus, PM was bom.
6.3.3 ITEM as an actor
In this section we describe how ITEM can be seen as a (non-human, socially 
constructed) actor in the process of employment of IT evaluation. Drawing on the 
data of our case study, we discuss in this section the justification of considering a 
social construction as an actor, the coming into being of such an actor and ITEM as a 
spokesperson for other actors. In the remainder of this chapter we build on the notion 
o f ITEM as an actor and strengthen such a perception. Such a view, it will be argued, 
gives a broader understanding o f the phenomenon o f evaluation method employment. 
ITEM is considered as a network element here, an actor that translates and gets 
translated in the actor-network.
A social construction as an actor
In the use of ANT in information systems research, one might think that something 
technological is required to justify the use o f ANT. However, ITEM cannot be 
considered a technology, but rather something that involves certain techniques (e.g.
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writing, calculating and scoring techniques). In this sub-section we address the issue 
o f considering ITEM to be an actor in ANT, even though it is neither pure 
technology nor a physical artefact.
ANT seeks to dissolve the a priori distinction between the social and the 
technological. Social and technical elements should not be given any special 
explanatory status. To argue then that ITEM is not purely technical (nor purely 
social), and that ANT therefore is not appropriate for analysis, goes completely 
against the premises o f ANT. ANT attempts impartiality towards all actors in 
consideration, whether technical or social, whether human or non-human, and makes 
no distinction in approach between the social, the natural, technological or any other 
a priori distinction between actors. They are to be analysed using the same 
vocabulary and the same register (Gallon 1986a). This can also be seen for example 
in the case studying the domestication of scallops, analysed by Gallon and Law 
(1989), where ANT is used in a setting where none of the identified actors is purely 
technological. In fact, the scallops are considered actors that refuse to be enrolled by 
the scientists who seek to domesticate them.
Though ITEM expresses itself in physical artefacts, such as the ITEM-report, the 
ITEM-instructions and the database to support prioritisation, in essence it is much 
broader. Its main purpose is justification and prioritisation and therefore includes 
scoring techniques, prescribed ways to perform assessments and particular views on 
decision-making. In the broadest sense, ITEM can be seen as a social construction 
involving a social process rather than a physical artefact. It can be viewed as “a 
human artefact which is drawn on and used to create or reinforce meaning by the 
interacting human participants involved” (Doolin 1998, p. 302). It forms part of an 
environment within which managers interact in order to develop shared meanings 
and interpretations of an ambiguous social reality which are a basis from which 
action is constructed (Doolin 1998).
One of the main premises o f ANT is that the world is full of hybrid entities 
containing both human and non-human elements which are not easily separated when 
analysing phenomena. However, in most uses of ANT, non-human elements are 
equalled with physical and tangible matters (e.g. scallops - Gallon 1986a; car park
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access control system - Vidgen and McMaster 1996; transportation system - Latour 
1996a). Some notable exceptions are work from McMaster, Vidgen et al. (1997), 
who consider the employment of a structured method as systems development 
methodology (SSADM), Hanseth and Monteiro (1997), viewing a communication 
standard in infrastructure (EDIFACT^^) as an actor and Boland and Schultze (1995), 
discussing an accounting technique (activity-based costing). If it already seems like a 
radical move to grant artefacts the same explanatory status as human actors, since it 
seems to reduce human actors to mere objects (Walsham 1997), is it not even more 
radical to grant the same status to social constructs (i.e. to mental concepts about 
how to perform managerial or organisational processes)? To say that they have equal 
explanatory status in analysing a phenomenon does not however mean that they are 
equal, that is, ‘have the same kind of intentions, feelings, ethics or interests’ 
(Monteiro 1999). Or as Law argues, “to say that there is no fundamental difference 
between people and objects is an analytical stance, not an ethical position” (Law 
1992).
Moreover, the critique that non-human actors cannot act themselves does not lead to 
the conclusion that human actors are therefore different (in analytical sense) from 
non-human actors, for both are heterogeneous networks (see section 4.3.2). For 
instance, a machine is also a “set o f roles played by technical materials but also by 
such human components as operators, users and repair-persons. So, too, is a text. All 
o f these are networks which participate in the social” (Law 1992).
Does ANT indeed require an actor to be either a human or non-human artefactl The 
answer to this question is undoubtedly negative. An actor itself is a folded actor- 
network, an association of heterogeneous elements themselves constituting a network 
so that each actor is also a simplified network (Law 1992). To make sense of 
complex phenomena, it is essential to simplify. Actors in ANT are constructed 
(Gallon and Law 1989) to delimit the phenomena under analysis. “[T]he ‘actor’ of an
“It is crucial to recognise that EDIFACT is not a self-contained piece of technology. It is a 
heterogeneous actor-network which includes: syntax for defining data structures; tools like converters 
and data bases for definitions of messages and message elements; a hierarchy of standardisation 
bodies on global, regional and national levels; prevailing conceptions and established practices for 
how to define and implement messages; an EDIFACT industry of vendors and consultants; artifacts 
like manuals, documentation and educational material about EDIFACT” (Hanseth and Monteiro 
1997)
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analysis is of the ‘size’ that the researcher chooses as most convenient relative to the 
direction of the analysis” (Monteiro 2000, p. 82, original quotes). Actors hence can 
denote elements such as organisations, scientific communities (Gallon 1986a), 
methodologies (McMaster, Vidgen et a l  1997), professions (Monteiro 2000) and 
software standards (Walsham 1997).
ITEM can be regarded a heterogeneous network in which “bits and pieces from the 
social, the technical, the conceptual and the textual are fitted together” (Law 1992). It 
has a material form in the ITEM-report, its written instructions and the prioritisation 
database, but also is made up out o f social and conceptual ideas on justification, 
scoring (and valuing), prioritisation and decision-making.
An actor coming to being: the black-box
The early start of the IT evaluation method (ITEM) can be traced back to 1997/1998 
when PM introduced a ‘project calendar’. The main purpose of the project calendar 
was to have an overview of the projects that were running and scheduled for that 
year. The results presented by the project calendar led to new insights, strengthening 
the need for an enhanced evaluation method (i.e. strengthening the problematisation). 
It paved the way for people to question the purposes o f all these projects. An attempt 
by PM to link all of the projects to explicit business strategies failed due to 
difficulties in creating a consensus on business strategies. In ANT terms, they failed 
to translate the interests o f the different departments at IIC into a common 
formulated business strategy to which they could relate the projects on the project 
calendar.
Instead, PM developed a basic project template (the PCT) which could be used to 
capture some of the characteristics of each project (name, date, purpose, etc.). This 
evolved through further research on concepts such as Information Economics 
(Parker, Benson et a i 1988) zmd Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1992) by 
PM into the ITEM-report. The document thus packs different ideas on evaluation 
(i.e. it is inscribed by different backgrounds and discourses). The financial 
background provided the need for basic financial costs and benefits, including 
financial return ratios (e.g. the Internal Rate o f Return calculation); the IT evaluation 
methods in the literature, such as Information Economics and Balanced Scorecard,
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provided criteria for assessing qualitative and intangible costs, benefits and risks; and 
lastly the ideas of PM about decision-making, being able to judge and prioritise 
(including scoring techniques) proposals were inscribed in the method (e.g. visible in 
the documents on how this scoring should take place - IIC-PM 2000d). PM intended 
the method to give a comparable representation o f projects on the basis of which 
decisions could be made as objectively as possible about the approval o f projects. 
This demonstrates a discourse of rational decision-making (see section 3.4.5).
All these ideas were embedded into ITEM. PM succeeded in simplifying the 
complexity behind ITEM and making it the obvious and natural way to handle IT 
project proposals -  thereby actually making it an actor (Monteiro 2000 -  see section 
4.3.2). Thus, ITEM has black-boxed (Vidgen and McMaster 1996) the interests of 
several actors, including the Finance Department (financial justification), other IT 
evaluation methods (IT Economics and Balanced Scorecard with their embedded 
ideas on how to value information and prioritise projects) and the PM department 
(inclined towards a form of ‘rational decision-making’). In other words, ITEM 
conceals all kinds of notions stemming from different actors, and presents itself as a 
straightforward method (a black-box), that other actors can take for granted. 
Moreover, ITEM was inscribed in later years with the focal points of the ‘business 
strategy’ (see section 5.4.5). Each proposal was required to state explicitly to which 
o f the focal points it contributed. By embedding the business strategy, as formulated 
by general management, ITEM sought to mobilise general management. However, as 
we shall see below, the case shows that ITEM did not black-box general 
management, since they too had their own interests apart from the business strategy 
(see section 6.3.5 below).
Inside the ITEM black-box, we find some tangible components in which the above 
were inscribed: ITEM-reports, Internal Rate of Return documents and instructions on 
how to legitimise, score and prioritise and a database for statistical analysis.
ITEM consists of a network of complex associations in which different network 
elements have been drawn together. According to Law (1992) such a network can be 
‘punctualised’ and considered in the form of a single actor. But although these 
different components may be seen by PM as being black-boxed in ITEM, we shall
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see in the further analysis that ‘these components have become painfully visible’ 
(Vidgen and McMaster 1996) during the employment of ITEM. They become visible 
in the sense that only part of what is considered to be the actor ITEM is enrolled. 
“Note that the heterogeneous engineer cannot be certain that any [components] will 
work as predicted. Punctualisation is always precarious, it faces resistance, and may 
degenerate into a failing network” (Law 1992). Moreover, an actor is not only a 
punctualised heterogeneous network, a black-box, but also becomes an actor in its 
association with other actors -  in its participation in the social.
ITEM as a spokesperson for others -  a faithful representative?
In a way, ITEM can be seen to become a spokesperson for the investment project 
proposals (in their turn being black-boxed ideas, intentions, actions, beliefs and 
experiences of a business unit or department). In a translation between ITEM and the 
proposals, ITEM will represent the proposals in the further decision-making process. 
This raises the question as to whether or not ITEM is a faithful representative for 
these proposals.
A critical perspective shows that in its representation ITEM does not capture an 
independent reality, as was initially envisioned by PM, but rather it can be seen to 
create reality (Power and Laughlin 1992). It is not what an evaluation process says, 
but rather what it allows to be said that makes the difference (Smithson and Tsiavos 
2003). By choosing an evaluation process that emphasises financial elements, other 
elements, such as social ones (e.g. the quality of the work e?q)erience, a consideration 
for the impact for people and their working environment -  Garrity and Sanders 
1998), may lack representation. In other words, ITEM is inscribed with a distinct 
pattern of use derived from different actors (i.e. Finance Department, PM and 
evaluation concepts), as described in the previous section.
As argued above, this inscription can be seen to be informed by a rational discourse 
in which the world is reduced to a series of numbers or some kind of classification so 
that it can be compared and managed. The evaluation concepts used to inscribe 
ITEM are inherently linked to instrumentalist and functional assumptions (see 
section 3.2.5) in their aim for (technical) control. Through their perspective, ITEM is 
inscribed with the notion that evaluation is to be a formal-rational process. The
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assumptions associated with the instrumental and functional reasoning view (i.e. 
suggesting that projects and evaluations contribute to particular ends, objectively 
articulated and shared), however, have consequences that are likely to prove 
dysfunctional, as Symons (1994) convincingly demonstrates. In reality, ends are not 
agreed upon: they are controversial and the subject of considerable disagreement and 
debate. In our case study, PM experienced this when they initially tried to link IT 
projects to a list of organisational goals. From a critical perspective, pre-specified 
ends can be said to benefit certain actors at the expense o f others. Evaluation 
methods thus are far from, what is usually believed in a rational discourse, neutral 
instruments that give objective insight into costs and benefits (Nijland 2001).
In a way, the employment of ITEM resembles the change described by Boland and 
Schultze (1995) from traditional accounting techniques to a new activity-based 
costing technique. The same warning Boland and Schultze give can be issued here. 
By including in ITEM a broader branch of issues to consider (e.g. to extend financial 
analysis with a formal analysis of all costs and benefits, including intangible benefits 
and risks) than was done previously, it has the appearance of giving a more faithful 
representation of what is ‘out there’. However, ITEM is still only a simplification 
that in further cutting the edges of the representation fails to recognise the narratives 
underlying the investment proposals. One might even argue that previous ways to 
estimate costs and benefits o f IT investments may appear simple, “but by not pushing 
too far to sharpen the outlines of [the investment proposal, they] allow a space for the 
complexity of interrelations in mental work” (Boland and Schultze 1995, p. 322). Or 
as Smithson and Tsiavos (2003) argue, although evaluation can be seen as 
simplifying representation, at the end of the day managers still have to deal with the 
full complexity o f the investment.
Thus, we can conclude that ITEM can be seen to be an actor in the role of a 
spokesperson for other actors, though its faithfulness to the representative can be 
questioned. In the case study, the anecdotal stoiy from the SPS manager trying to 
quantify the benefits of the timesavings of a specialist illustrates this point. Actual 
benefits of an investment proposal did not fit in the representation of ITEM, and a 
workaround had to be invented (see section 5.4.6). The final representation of the 
proposal in the ITEM-report differs widely from the actual proposal.
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6.3.4 Employing ITEM -  a successful translation?
In a first attempt to get ITEM enrolled into business operations, PM associated ITEM 
with the standard way of project management: the Project Control Method (PCM). 
But PCM had its own problems with enrolment; it was found to be too technical in 
nature to be accepted in business.
In a new attempt to enrol ITEM, PM tried to ally themselves with general 
management. In the light of changes in the organisational context, PM pleaded with 
general management to support the use of ITEM by managers. General management 
supposedly was enrolled to support this based on several arguments: the need for cost 
reduction (by organisational context, FGC and by general management directors, 
who when informed about IT costs, wanted cost reduction), the need to cope with the 
strain placed on IT edacity (by organisational context, with issues such as the 
millennium, euro-currency and a tight IT labour market) and the organisational 
restructuring in which business units now had to share (and compete for) IT 
resources which formerly had been allocated to them. However, in daily practice 
both business managers as general managers neglected ITEM on numerous 
occasions. With the pressures of time and money, they often considered ITEM a 
waste of time and resources. Moreover, their main interest was to get good results for 
their area of business -  when a good opportunity came up, the main attitude was to 
grasp it as soon as possible and not incur delay by first writing ITEM-reports and 
then wait for approval.
As a result, ITEM-reports were only seldom constructed the way they were intended. 
To get ITEM accepted, a stronger form of enrolment was needed. By appealing to 
the clear constraint of IT budget and resources in the year 2000, PM convinced 
general management to support a stricter use of ITEM. By enrolling this strong ally, 
PM had the opportunity to take on the role of decision maker -  judging which project 
proposals were to receive budget and which did not. PM positioned itself thus as 
obligatory passage point. The strong message it sent out to the business was clear: If 
projects have not been turned in properly (with proper ITEM-reports), they do not 
get approved. Projects that are not approved will not show up on the project calendar 
and therefore will not get any IT resources. PM allied with SD to hold firmly to this 
latter fact.
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“SD is no longer accepting straight orders to make changes to the systems, but they 
will use the project calendar to see if the project has been approved. People now saw 
that ‘it really was serious’. They often are faced with things that are said to be 
relevant, but it blows over. Now most people realise that this is here to stay”, one PM 
manager illustrates.
Another helpful interessment device (Gallon 1986a) to persuade business managers 
was the information manager. From their background (such as financially controlling 
IT, compatible with visions enfolded in ITEM) and their position of being 
responsible for IT in the business, they persuaded business managers to leave behind 
their old ways of constructing proposals and follow this new one. One information 
manager says: “We created an enormous push. We said that it was necessary! [...] 
We had to convince all of them.” PM acknowledges the help it got from the 
information managers, stating that “if  we did not have them, 1 do not know if we 
could have pulled it o ff’.
By this time, it seems that PM had successfully enrolled ITEM in the organisation. In 
the process of network formation, PM persuaded others to become their ally in their 
view and solution to the problem (Tatnall 2000). In this enrolment, business 
managers changed their work processes to write ITEM-reports. By now “ITEM- 
reports are an established notion. Business managers now tell each other: we first 
have to draft an ITEM-report”. Whereas people were used to explaining their project 
informally via a memo, now they had to think through costs, benefits and risks and 
shape them into the format ITEM provided.
Moreover, ITEM had positioned itself to become the spokesperson for the IT 
investment proposals. ITEM-reports were filled in for most investment proposals. 
And th o u ^  they might not have the quality as envisioned by PM, the reports were 
filled in according to the format used for prioritisation. The financial details (such as 
the Internal Rate of Return) were calculated by the Finance Department and (at least 
in the first prioritisation round) were used for scoring and filling the database.
Having a clear list of all investment proposals, including a description o f what each 
entailed, ITEM can also be seen to feed the decision-making process in which
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general management allocates budget. With the clear overview of proposals, they no 
longer have to rely on their own knowledge o f projects. It gives a basis for 
considering the whole of IIC rather than only their own part.
A SPS manager notes that at IIC “we used to have the ‘beep’ system with regard to 
getting project proposals approved. Those who beeped the loudest got their proposals 
approved. Today this is different.” The structured approach of ITEM gives voice to 
otherwise unheard proposals. However, one might argue that ITEM is just another 
beeping game with a different beep, since the way projects display themselves with 
ITEM as a spokesperson is not as objective as one might think. Some proposals, by 
highlighting certain benefits and downplaying particular costs and risks, still might 
sound or be voiced louder than others.
In sum, ITEM can be seen to be mobilised (Callon and Law 1989) since participants 
drew upon the information, rules and resources embodied in ITEM in their daily 
activity. In doing so, they reproduce and reaffirm its importance, form and content 
(Bloomfield, Coombs et al 1994). In other words, end-users by themselves ask for 
ITEM-reports to be filled in, accept that it is part of the job, that SD will use the 
‘project calendar’ to determine if resources are to be allocated to a project and 
general management look to PM to give them advice on project proposals. In 
addition, we see in the process described that the method enforces itself -  insight into 
costs o f IT strengthen the demand for more control and hereby the demand for using 
ITEM.
At the beginning o f the translation, IT investment proposals, business managers, 
general management and PM were separate. After translation, ITEM had linked them 
together and “brought them in relationship with one another in an intelligible 
manner” (Callon 1986a, p. 223), thereby creating an actor-network tuned to perform 
formal IT evaluations. Through the creation and strengthening o f network 
associations, ITEM acquires the features of a black-box. That is, it becomes hard fact 
(Vidgen and McMaster 1996).
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6.3.5 Employing ITEM -  a failed translation?
But, as we shall see in this section, the ITEM-report was providing results that 
differed from the outcomes PM had intended. The inscriptions proved to be too weak 
to produce the results PM preferred. Moreover, on closer examination, only part of 
ITEM could be seen to be employed. The ITEM-report can be seen to have become 
enrolled, while the actual decision-making process, envisioned by PM and strongly 
tied to ITEM, failed to be enrolled. The black-box ITEM was deconstructed (Vidgen 
and McMaster 1996), so to speak, and only some of its components had been 
enrolled. Having people use the format of ITEM was one thing; having them comply 
with the other elements of ITEM was another. In other words, besides the results 
ITEM produced, the use of ITEM did not resemble its intended use as envisioned by 
PM. We will discuss subsequently four parts ITEM entailed: justification, scoring, 
prioritising and decision-making.
Justification
By the middle o f 2000, the documents that ITEM provided were used throughout 
IIC. PM was of the opinion however that the documents were ‘below standard’. Cost 
and benefit estimates were unrealistically positive, financial ratios were not properly 
calculated (e.g. proposals use different interest rates and thereby become 
incomparable), in a large number of cases risks were qualified as ‘not appropriate for 
this project’ and many projects were classified as ‘strategic’ or ‘must-do’, having 
been put under the label ‘millennium-project’ (the Y2K-problem). In addition, some 
managers noted high rising maintenance costs by some departments (as opposed to 
lowering project budgets), thereby insinuating that some projects were evading 
ITEM by qualifying themselves as maintenance costs (which do not require an 
ITEM-report and almost automatically get budget). Such expressions o f politics in IT 
evaluation are very common (Nijland, Berghout et al. 2002).
“The last years we saw maintenance costs growing and growing. People started 
thinking that if they did not get a budget to carry out their projects, then they would 
list the required system changes under the budget for maintenance. By broadening 
the scope of maintenance, things became visible. For example, goals stated officially 
on paper did not match the results people intended to achieve. It was a kind of 
shortcut for managers, enabling them to carry out some projects that were crucial in
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their view”, one manager contends. Another manager notes ironically that “if you 
add all the savings predicted by the ITEM-reports from a year back, half the 
company would have disappeared by now. But if you now look a year later, you see 
that more people have joined.”
Some managers confess that some costs and benefits maybe somewhat more positive 
than realistic. Superficial analysis of this behaviour would qualify it as political 
behaviour designed only to serve the self-interests of individuals. Politics in 
decision-making is often seen as disruptive and as something that should be 
suppressed. They are regarded as disrupting the ‘rational model’ which is deeply 
rooted within Western society (Morgan 1986). The comments made by some PM 
managers on these expressions of politics demonstrate a similar viewpoint and show 
the rational discourse. The politics are blamed for the low quality of ITEM-reports, 
thereby failing to be a proper justification for the project. On the intranet o f IIC, the 
page concerning ITEM states that the “improper use and hiding behind these 
procedures and methods should be prevented and where observed, be corrected” (IIC 
intranet, June 2001).
However, quite a different view comes from one of the market directors. He argues: 
“Self-interest is the source for new initiatives. If everybody had the same interest, 
nothing would happen! Moreover, self-interests often are not just solely linked to the 
individual interests, but to the role one plays in the organisation, the function you 
have.” Being committed to those interests serves the interests of the organisation. 
Thus, such politics are very healthy and taking them out of the organisation would be 
disastrous, he argues. Rather than marking a (too) positive view on project proposals 
as a ‘bad thing’, he sees it as a sign o f support and motivation for the project. Such 
support is crucial to the success of any project. The director argues that when people 
are enthusiastic about an idea, who can blame them for not seeing all its negative 
sides? Such behaviour can thus be explained as a form of “bounded rationality” (or 
cognitive dissonance), where people who are excited about a project see the positive 
sides more than the negative ones. Political actions can then be understood, in 
contrast to personal interest, as being committed to the interest o f the department, 
business unit or even IIC as a whole.
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Farbey, Land et al. (1993) noticed the same paradox: on the one hand you need a 
project champion to lead the project enthusiastically, on the other hand you do not 
want him to ‘cheat’ to get the ‘go ahead’ for a project. “If we praise the champion we 
diminish evaluation; if we promote the proper role of evaluation, we marginalize the 
champion” (ibid, p. 154). Brunsson (1985) speaks o f action rationality, which was 
discussed in section 3.4.5. Organisations that have to solve both the problem of 
choosing the right thing to do and then get it done in practice are better served by 
such an organisational action perspective. Organisational action can be understood 
on the basis of three interrelated concepts: motivation, expectation and commitment. 
Actors should believe in the considered action to be a ‘good’ one; they should expect 
it to be carried out by the organisation; and they should commit themselves to it. 
Brunsson argues that “effective decision processes break all the rules of rational 
decision-making; few alternatives should be analysed, only the positive 
consequences of the chosen actions should be considered, and objectives should not 
be formulated in advance.” (ibid, p. 22). The action rationality reduces rather than 
increases uncertainty and conflict between the decision-makers and thus leads to 
higher motivation, expectation and commitment. It leads not only to choice but also 
to action.
The wish to suppress these political expressions can explain PM’s decision to let the 
department of Finance calculate the financial ratios and financially judge the project 
proposals from a certain point in time. One manager o f PM illustrates: “We decided 
to calculate the Internal Rate of Return ourselves, rather than let the people do it. 
Because if the people do it themselves, they change the different rates o f interest. We 
have seen proposals that adjusted the profit margin from the standard 5% to 10%. 
Our financial controller said: ‘What’s this crap? I have worked for 20 years at IIC 
and have never seen a margin of 10%! That is impossible!’ But still the project leader 
simply puts his signature under the proposal!”
Another idea from PM to come to better justification in ITEM-reports was to 
introduce ex post evaluation and hold people personally responsible for the 
estimations in the project proposals. As Farbey, Land et al. (1993) state: “It is 
sometimes said on current affairs programmes that the reason criminals continue to 
commit crimes is the small probability of being found out. The same could also be
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true of evaluation: the reasons people cheat on evaluation is that they won’t be found 
out. [...] Organisations have no procedures by which unachieved or exaggerated 
benefits, or suppressed or underestimated costs, can ever see the light of day.” (ibid, 
p. 155).
From an ANT perspective, these actions can be seen as strengthening the inscriptions 
in ITEM in order to persuade other actors to follow more closely the interests of 
ITEM. However, some managers express doubts as to whether these inscriptions 
would be strong enough. A business director argues: “If done correctly, ex post 
evaluation will not change much. It will influence all project proposals and all 
expected benefits will fall, since we all are guilty o f making (too) positive estimates 
-  I know how the game works. So everything is brought down to a more realistic 
level, but the list of priorities does not change. The same list of projects will be 
carried out.”
Using ITEM however for ex post evaluation would mean another translation from 
aiding decision-making to a tool for accountability. Some people would call that 
misuse of the method. As one o f the information managers noted, ITEM-reports 
should determine a strategic direction for IIC and be used less for operational 
management. He argued that the quantitative results it yields may not be misused for 
these purposes. Using ITEM for such purposes will diminish insight into strategic 
direction, since such a direction will lead to less quantitative results. People would 
fall back to more qualitative assessments, thereby potentially giving less information 
that could be beneficial to the decision-making process.
Another reason why the proposals were ‘below standard’ was that the end-users 
found the report very difficult to work with. It required people that were suited to 
ITEM -  that could look beyond the current and specific problems and have an eye 
for broader and future issues. The case shows that not all SPS managers were able to 
do that. Moreover, most o f the time specialised employees were needed to provide 
input for the proposal. These were people already involved in a large number of 
things, and writing ITEM-reports had a low priority since their job was also to keep 
‘business running’ on a day-to-day basis. In addition, particular benefits that were 
considered important to the managers did not fit in the ITEM-report and 
workarounds had to be found. For example, time savings that could not be regarded
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as financial benefits were appropriated into increases in the professionalism of 
employees. In this way, they made the proposal fit. It is however doubtful if such 
proposals were faithfully represented by ITEM once they entered the scoring and 
prioritising round.
Motivation for end-users to fill-in ITEM-reports proved to be low, something which 
had its impact on the quality. Especially in the second prioritisation round, people 
were unmotivated to write complete ITEM-reports again. Having had the experience 
that in the end general management still made decisions by relying on their own 
(covert) ideas about the project, they did not want to go to the trouble o f writing a 
proper ITEM-report. Moreover, end-users complained about the amount o f time they 
had to wait to hear if their projects would be approved, and if they were rejected, 
they did not receive any reasons as to why. This was also de-motivating. In addition, 
in the second round, knowing that only very few projects would be approved due to 
limited budgets, people did not want to make the effort to work out ideas fully, ideas 
that most likely would not be approved anyway.
By looking at the observations together, we conclude the following. In the attempt to 
come to a proper justification of proposals by enrolling business managers in ITEM, 
a negotiation took place about how ITEM-reports were to be constructed. The weak 
inscriptions o f the ITEM-report left enough room for interpretation and enactment so 
that ITEM-reports could be constructed contrary to their intended construction. The 
story o f an SPS manager artificially finding categories to demonstrate the benefits of 
the project is an example. ITEM-reports, as was the experience in other studies 
(Farbey, Land et al. 1999b), may exaggerate benefits or may distort or hide features 
o f the project that might endanger the approval o f the project. This could be seen as 
an act o f improvisation (Weick 1993; Orlikowski 1996), where “procedures and 
instructions [are] not followed blindly, but regarded as an input, not always reliable, 
to get the job done” (Ciborra 1999, p. 145). In other words, the intéressement and 
enrolment o f proposals by ITEM seemed to be a failure due to the intéressement of 
proposals by business managers -  their proposals were allied too strongly with 
business managers who translated the proposal / ITEM-report not as an ‘objective 
representation o f the expected results’ but more as a ‘means to get budget’, or as a 
‘time-consuming activity that needed to be done’. Surprisingly, however, the ITEM-
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report was enrolled under these circumstances so that the competitive definition 
given by business managers could also be sustained. ITEM was used, but not in the 
way intended. It was made to fit both purposes.
Scoring and prioritising
It was not only that the delivered reports did not meet PM’s expectations, but also the 
way in which these reports were subsequently used in the scoring, prioritising and 
decision-making that was quite different than PM had intended.
ITEM did not actually live up to the expectation of providing those who employed it 
with a neat and objective method of valuing the proposals (as described in IIC-PM 
2000c), but shows failures in this area both times the process was carried out. 
Although the scoring technique was employed in the first attempt, the results were 
discarded in the subsequent decision-making round. The second time the technique 
was abandoned straightaway. A fierce discussion, which failed to lead to decisions 
regarding advice about prioritisation to the board, was the result. The unsatisfying 
outcome of the discussion can be attributed to the conflicting interests of the 
directors. Each o f the directors was arguing for their own interests and there was no 
one party that could unite the others based on common interests. One director 
explains that “reaching decisions is of course more than objective weighing. It is also 
your own patch, your own business, your own interests -  that is all part of it. That’s 
just the way it goes. If there is no party that acts as catalyst in that process, then 
nothing happens. I can guarantee that because nobody will hand in their projects 
spontaneously.” This was intensified by the dynamic context of the IIC business 
units o f IIC after 1998 (see section 5.3.2). People still had to ‘defend’ their newly 
acquired position within the matrix organisation.
As a result, ITEM was translated by general management, business management and 
PM. The scoring technique was replaced by a prioritisation platform. It was no 
longer the case that a mechanical technique was used to formulate advice for general 
management, but a group of various actors, informed by ITEM, made up the list. In 
this process, PM was also translated. It received a catalysing role which replaced its 
role of administrator or bookkeeper.
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Decision-making
General management welcomed the ITEM-report, but the analysis and advised 
prioritisation were discarded; the ‘old’ way of prioritising (by discussion, rather than 
being guided by statistical analysis) prevailed. The database with statistical analysis 
was designed to be a spokesperson for the ITEM-reports but was never mobilised. 
General management still made decisions based on what they knew about a project, 
how they felt about it and what their entrepreneurial instinct told them to do. This too 
can be seen as improvisation, where “there is much more intuition, instinct, and 
background experience even in carefully planned actions than meets the eye when 
analysing rational decision-making” (Ciborra 1999, p. 145). The decision-making 
process can be seen to be a negotiation process (see section 3.2.6).
This behaviour surprises some managers. PM commented; “That is the ‘nice’ thing 
that happens when you come up with a list of projects, which was constructed by 
using a neutral and objective tool; because then discussions start. Then individual 
directors say: ‘But my projects falls just below the line!”’ One information manager 
demonstrates his expected behaviour of general management. He tells that “We have 
tried to work with a prioritising system, on the basis o f all kinds o f criteria per 
project. But general managers then say: ‘Huh, what is coming up at the top of the list 
now?’ They should actually say: let us have another look at the criteria, but they do 
not. They say: the outcome does not please us, so we just rearrange some of the 
projects. That is a strange mechanism, but also very human. They should actually 
first rank the criteria, then rank the projects and then say: as manager I will follow 
the results. But ok, of course I am no general manager.”
General management gives another view. They argue that they see all proposed 
projects as being valuable. But they need and want to take responsibility for the 
decisions they make. When you drop projects, ‘it hurts,’ so argued one manager. He 
states: “O f course it hurts! It would be strange if you would go through the whole 
process and someone would say [when his project was declined] ‘Oh well, I don’t 
mind’. If that was the case, then the wrong things were proposed. It is always that 
these things hurt; they have to hurt. And in the end it is always agreed that it is a 
shame that not all proposals could be granted. If not, the preliminary work was not 
carried out properly.”
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Some argue that too much attention might be given to the evaluation method in 
decision-making, arguing that general management do not make decisions solely 
based on ITEM-reports.
Moreover, stemming from the culture at IIC, general management consisted mostly 
o f people with a wide background and range of experience in insurances at IIC. They 
had their own ideas about the prioritisation. Some questioned the use of ITEM- 
reports, stating that it “If it already is clear that a project is important, why do I have 
to read an ITEM-report to tell me that?” And although general management initially 
seemed inclined to use ITEM-reports for prioritisation, when new problems arose, 
they easily abandoned it and changed prioritisations of projects without the use of 
ITEM. A statement by an information manager illustrates the importance of this 
culture at IIC: “We have general managers that in the old days wrote their own 
insurance policies. They say: ‘What does an information manager know about the 
urgency of a system? I have been at IIC over 25 years, I know better.’”
Thus, the method can be seen as one of many inputs. It does not make decisions 
(though it shapes them through ITEM-reports), but is added to the other motives, 
including background experience, covert motives, intuition and instinct. Farbey, 
Land et a l  (1993) found that projects that are justified with a formal evaluation 
method can use the method ‘for real’ or for ‘rationalisation’, meaning that the formal 
decision was already made on other grounds. In the latter case, the method was used 
to substantiate the decision. That this does not always lead to the best solutions is 
illustrated by the story o f an information manager at IIC. He said: “Last year I had a 
discussion with my boss. We had to exchange our systems for healthcare because 
they had become too old. My boss said he knew which system we should implement 
because a colleague of his at another insurance company told him how much cost 
reduction it could deliver.’ I first had to convince him to do a preliminary study to 
see if the suggested system would also fit our situation. In the end, the system was 
the last on the list of analysed systems,”
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63.6 Translations by ITEM
Although the resulted outcomes of the translation process differ from the preferred 
outcomes by PM, the case demonstrates that ITEM does have an influential impact 
on the organisation in terms of translation. One major impact o f ITEM is the way it 
translates different actors to other positions in the network. Illustrative is the 
document describing the process by which ITEM has to be carried out. It states that 
in this process “different persons have different functions and responsibilities” (IIC- 
PM 2000e, p. 12). ITEM, allying with PM, redefined responsibilities and roles. In 
practice, however, this achieved only varying degrees of success. In the process of 
ITEM employment, several translations are attempted: translations of the roles of 
Program Management (from project administrator to decision-aiding), business 
directors (from sole decision makers to shared decision-making), general 
management (from decision-constructing to decision-making based on the worldview 
of IT evaluation method), software development (from influential actor on decision­
making to an efficient software factory) and general decision-making in IIC (from 
‘irrational’ to ‘rational’ decision-making).
Translation of PM
The PM department was set up to manage IT projects. It started out as project 
administrator, listing the projects that were executed. From there on, PM took on the 
role of gathering project proposals. Being the actor that is strongly allied with ITEM, 
it eventually assumed the role of decision-aiding, and even the role o f decision­
making (by becoming the department that prepared list of the prioritised projects). It 
had become an obligatory passage point (Callon 1986a) through which investment 
proposals had to pass to get budget. Thus, ITEM helped to shift the role of PM, 
which at the beginning had no voice, to become an obligatory passage point. ITEM 
translated PM from administrator to decision-influencer, since the ITEM-reports 
were gathered and prioritised by PM. In the first round of the use o f ITEM, PM 
enlisted business managers to help in prioritising; however it influenced this process 
by prescribing the way the prioritisation should take place (IIC-PM 2000d). In the 
second round, when business managers failed to make a priority, PM took over this 
role and made their own prioritisation. General management was not enrolled in this 
translation, since in both previous encounters they took the liberty to re-prioritise the 
projects again themselves, neglecting ITEM and its procedures. ITEM did however
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translate PM into a substantial role in collecting, ordering and arranging IT project 
proposals. At the time of the research, the output is being used in the Portfolio 
Management Group as a basis on which they prioritise the proposals. PM has ended 
up in the role of catalj^t in this prioritisation process.
Translation of business directors
Business directors in the past were used to judging projects based on their own 
knowledge of the project proposals; their own gut-feeling so to speak. With the 
introduction o f ITEM, this no longer could be the case. ITEM translated them into 
decision-makers who had to make use of the ITEM-reports and make a decisions 
based on the information that was provided to them. The manual to draft ITEM- 
reports impresses on the reader that ‘in formulating the text describing your project 
you should take into account that it should be clear to [managers in the scoring 
group] who are absolutely unfamiliar with the project (proposal)’ (IIC-PM 2000ft p. 
I ). With the changing of the previous product-focused organisation towards a matrix 
organisation (see section 5.3.2), the business directors enrolled ITEM as the 
‘objective way’ to prioritise -  a necessity because it is impossible to know all the IIC 
projects by heart. Although they did initially enrol the ITEM-reports (albeit just one 
o f the inputs), they did not follow ITEM’S procedures. The second prioritisation 
round proved to be a failure -  the translation of shared decision-making by ITEM (by 
scoring all the projects) was not enrolled. Currently, after the disappointing results 
from the second round, business directors undertake the prioritisation by discussing 
proposals -  having abandoned the scoring techniques ITEM proposed.
Translation of general management
ITEM, allied with PM, attempted to translate general management into accepting the 
decision-making it provided. This failed. General management, in both cases ITEM 
was used, took their pencil to make their own prioritisation. The statistical analyses 
were cast aside. However, general management did make use of the ITEM-reports 
and the way it represented investment proposals.
Translation of software development
Whereas the department of System Development in the past used to be at the basis of 
ad-hoc deciding which projects were manned, ITEM by allying with PM, translated
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them into efficient software developers rather than decision-makers. They were 
enrolled by ITEM because of the problems they had in prioritising. Everybody was 
demanding IT capacity, but they had no means to allocate their resources properly. In 
the past, resources were given to the people who ‘shouted the loudest’. Now ITEM 
took care o f prioritisation, giving SD the mandate to focus on what they do best: 
develop systems.
Translation of decision-making
ITEM also translated the vision of decision-making: from a personal to a shared 
decision-making. It even tried to translate the discourse from decision-making -  from 
‘irrational decision-making’ (based on instinct, gut feeling, personal attitudes, etc.) to 
‘rational decision-making’ (based on shared goals and shared solutions, calculation 
and neutral information). As seen in the translation o f business directors and general 
management, this failed. Though ITEM is inscribed with ways to ‘rationalise’ 
decision-making, practise shows that managers do not just copy the outcomes of the 
ITEM scoring or prioritisation. However, most respondents agree that ITEM does 
help in a process to come to a shared agreement (or at least one that is justifiable and 
explainable to others) o f prioritisation. It provides a means to legitimise decisions. 
Former explanations as “general management just decided that your project was not 
important enough” were translated into explanations such as “Careful analysis and 
comparison of all projects lead to the decision that other projects currently have 
priority over yours”.
In sum, we see ITEM carried out with it its own preferred behaviour and roles of 
surrounding actors. The degree to which it succeeded in establishing this behaviour 
in the actor-network is, however, limited. It imputes others “with interests, projects, 
desires, strategies, reflexes, afterthoughts” (Latour 1991), but also is imputed itself 
(as was demonstrated in the previous section). In other words, it translates, but at the 
same time is translated itself. Both directions o f translation have mixed (i.e. stronger 
and lesser) effects. But that it had an important effect is indisputable.
6.3.7 Conclusion on actor-network theory
In sum, we conclude the following on our analysis using actor-network theory. 
Through the years, PM problematised the lack o f program management to the lack of
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insight into which projects were running, and beyond that, to a lack of insight into 
what kind o f projects were running. Eventually, by enrolling ITEM, PM became the 
obligatory passage point through which IT investment proposals had to pass if they 
were to gain approval. Through this successive translation, PM and ITEM were 
increasingly mobilised. PM enrolled ITEM, which can be considered an actor in its 
own right. The method translated Program Management (from project administrator 
to decision-aiding), business directors (from sole decision-makers to shared decision­
making), general management (from decision-constructing to decision-making based 
on worldview of IT evaluation method), and the department of software development 
(from influential actor on decision-making to an efficient software factory).
As an alternative to the diffusion model, the perspective of ANT offers an approach 
to explaining innovation that does not rely on any supposedly innate nature o f the 
innovation, or specific characteristics of the change agents or society, but rather on a 
process o f  network formation in which all actors seek to persuade others to become 
their allies in promoting the acceptance o f their own view of the way a ‘problem’ can 
best be solved (Tatnall 2000).
ITEM ended up being part of a translation, though not the translation initially 
preferred by PM. Only part of the black-box ITEM was enrolled. While being 
enrolled, it acted in quite a different way than was intended. The actors enacted 
ITEM to suit their needs but in ways that contradicted the (rational) inscriptions of 
ITEM. The different interests of the actors at IIC shaped the employment of ITEM -  
the obtained results were quite different from the intended results as initially 
envisioned by PM; both visible in the produced ITEM-report and in the decision­
making process it was supposed to support.
The above demonstrates that different actors surrounding ITEM can be seen to have 
quite different interests, shaping ITEM and its format. Accepting that all actors have 
multiple interests, we highlight here some that are most influential in shaping the 
actor-network. We discuss the interests o f PM, general management, business 
managers and investment proposals.
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In its search for more control over IT management, PM is interested in becoming the 
defender of rational decision-making in IT investment decisions, employing ITEM as 
an aid. In PM’s view, more control entails investment proposals that are 
quantitatively and financially supported, that can be compared objectively 
(statistically) and assessed in an ex post evaluation. Its interest therefore is to have all 
business managers employ ITEM in its prescribed way.
General management are concerned with the future of IIC. In times o f uncertainty, 
they seek to make the investment decisions that are necessary to keep IIC a 
successftil company. To make decisions, they rely on information gathered by PM 
(using ITEM) but also on their (‘irrational’) entrepreneurial insights and background 
experience. In the division of the company in different areas o f products, different 
general managers are responsible for different areas of business. Apart from the 
success of the company as a whole, each o f them seeks to make their own area 
flourish.
Business managers have a similar attitude. Their interest is to be able to make the 
investment required to develop and expand their specific areas of business. In 
addition, they are responsible for day-to-day operations and thus face the balancing 
o f long-term versus short-term focused decisions. In the long term, they are 
interested in getting budget for new investments (by employing investment 
proposals), and they are required to develop ITEM-reports. By contrast, in the short 
term, their interest is to keep business operational. Investment proposals need to get 
funding so that the ideas, plans and opportunities identified can be pursued.
In conclusion, ITEM impacted the way of thinking about IT projects and their 
approval, but in another direction than PM initially intended. Whereas people were 
used to explaining their project informally via a memo, now they had to think 
through costs, benefits and risks and shape them into the format ITEM provided. 
Although to some extent they were enrolled to use ITEM-reports, they hardly were 
enrolled (and give up time and effort) to use it the way PM had intended. Moreover, 
the other elements of ITEM related to the scoring, prioritisation and decision-making 
can be seen not to be enrolled at all. This fact only seems to upset PM -  the decision­
makers are used to these ‘irrational behaviours’ and are at ease with them. They do
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not seem to share the vision of ‘rational decision-making’ that PM holds. However, 
the department o f Finance supports PM in their view. This can be understood by the 
fact that PM and Finance would also like to use ITEM for ex post evaluation (which 
requires hard measurable statements), whereas the decision-makers are comfortable 
judging ex ante non-measurable information. The functions (Legge 1984) they 
attribute to ITEM are different.
Still, ITEM is enrolled and all actors find it a way forward, although some of them 
say it is just a start; they point out that ITEM-reports should have more quality and 
that they should also be enrolled in other life cycle stages -  not only in decision­
making, but also in ex post evaluation and evaluation at realisation.
6.4 C o n c l u s io n  -  u n d e r s t a n d in g  t h e  e m p l o y m e n t  p r o c e s s  o f  it e m  a t  IIC
To understand the employment of IT evaluation methods, we have analysed the case 
o f lie . Applying the diffusion theory we come to see the results o f IIC as a failure or 
at best a limited success in the employment o f ITEM. Though diffusion theory has 
provided us with a structured analysis of the case and identified numerous potential 
influences affecting the employment process, it was found to be too limited to 
sensitise us to the actual impact of the evaluation method. To discard the innovation 
as a failure would neglect the profound impact ITEM has had at IIC.
For a better understanding, we have suggested applying ANT. We shifted focus fi"om 
seeing ITEM as a type of fixed innovation {diffusion theory), to a perspective where 
ITEM can be regarded as an actor in a translation process {ANT). Similarly, 
understanding o f the employment process has shifted from a black-or-white adoption 
{diffusion theory) to a view of a dynamic attempt to black-box ITEM and mobilise it 
in a translation process {ANT).
We argued that the evaluation method cannot be seen as a neutral or objective tool, 
but as an actor inscribed with all kinds of assumptions and interests. Many of the 
assumptions are based on a discourse of rational decision-making and particular 
views on how to value IT investment proposals. The method can be regarded as
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black-boxing the interests o f a number o f actors that have inscribed their ideas into it. 
ITEM is not a simple form of report, but a way of seeing; creating a world rather 
than describing a world. Moreover, it brings along its own preferred behaviour and 
roles for surrounding actors. For example, behaviour for shaping investment 
proposals, for valuing (score) the proposals and deciding on which proposals to 
approve. Moreover, it shifts roles, moving from an actor who used to have no voice 
to an obligatory passage point (e.g. PM).
During the dynamic employment process we see ITEM as an actor trying to find its 
place in the existing actor-network o f IT evaluation within IIC. In the process, 
different actors impute ITEM with interests, but at the same time ITEM through its 
inscriptions and allied actors, imputes with certain roles as well. In a way, ITEM is 
telling them how they should use it and what kind o f behaviour is expected from 
them to suit its specific purpose. The surrounding actors on their part tell ITEM how 
(and if) they are going to use it and for what purposes. This process generates 
friction. On the one hand, we see actors changing their work processes to write 
ITEM-reports, we see ITEM becoming a spokesperson for the IT investment 
proposals, shaping their plea for budget and we see ITEM influencing decision­
making. On the other hand, we see that the way ITEM is used goes against its 
inscriptions: political behaviour influences the way ITEM-reports are written; 
discussion on investment proposals is a fierce debate rather than a neat scoring 
technique and the actual decision-making does not resemble the envisioned rational 
decision-making. ITEM struggles to translate its surrounding actors. Vice versa the 
surrounding actors translate ITEM, each fi"om their own interests and inscriptions. It 
is a process of mutual translation.
Followed over time, we see a transformation of ITEM under the influence o f all 
(both human and non-human) actors. Changes occur by planned actions (e.g. 
adapting ITEM according to newer insights gained fi'om Information Economics and 
Balanced Scorecard), by improvisations to unexpected events (e.g. strengthening the 
inscriptions o f ITEM along the way, to get it adopted and PM scoring the projects 
themselves, when business failed to do it) and by emergent events (e.g. ITEM not 
being used in times o f budget crisis). From an outside perspective, ITEM seems to
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drift away uncontrollably from its original ideas. It changes roles, varying fi-om tool 
to listing investment proposals, to communicating them and even deciding on them.
This complex social process is governed by strategic, political, economical and 
technical forces, all of which make up the result. When we unpack the black-box 
ITEM, we see that a few of the original ideas have been translated in the resulting 
actor-network. The adoption o f ITEM cannot be seen as a successful translation since 
what gets adopted does not resemble the planned results as envisioned by PM. 
However, it is no failure either; there is no reverse translation to get back to the 
previous actor-network. In fact, ITEM has had an indisputable effect on the 
organisation with regard to visibility, communication and decision-making o f IT 
investments. An effect that is welcomed by all (human) actors, who in varying 
degrees express satisfaction with ITEM (discussed in sections 5.4.11 and 6.3.4).
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Chapter 7: Research Discussion
7.1 In t r o d u c t io n
Our research questions is formulated as; “Why do organisations generally seem to be 
unsuccessful in employing IT evaluation methods that help them in clarifying costs 
and benefits o f IT, despite multiple expressions o f the need for more insights into 
costs and benefits o f IT?” In this chapter we will try to formulate an answer to this 
question.
Using the insights gained in the case study, we will explore how our perspective on 
IT evaluation employment has changed and how this new understanding helps to 
answer our research question.
Based on the limitations of diffusion theory and the insights gained from ANT, we 
will argue that seeing an evaluation method as a (neutral) tool or innovation that can 
be adopted by an organisation is too limited in its scope to understand fully the 
process o f introducing IT evaluation methods in organisations. Instead, we will argue 
that an IT evaluation method can be viewed as an actor which translates and is 
translated -  a mutual translation. The introduction of an IT evaluation method can be 
understood as a dynamic and complex social phenomenon. Failing to enrol actors 
gives the appearance of failure. However, viewing the events from a perspective of 
mutual translation, changes in both the evaluation method and the employing 
organisations often do take place, though these changes may not resemble the 
initially intended outcome. This chapter gives evidence to support this argument. 
This perspective helps to understand the dynamic process of introducing IT 
evaluation methods in an organisation.
Furthermore, we discuss the contributions of diffusion theory and actor-network 
theory in the analysis o f our case study. The apex of this chapter is its conclusion 
which addresses the research question and how its underlying paradox may be 
solved.
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7.2 D is c u s s io n  o f  f in d in g s
7.2.1 Introduction
In this section, we will have a conceptual discussion about the findings of Chapter 6: 
How did it change the view of IT evaluation employment (discussed in Chapter 3)? 
How can we understand IT evaluation employment? How does this conception help 
us understand the (sometimes peculiar) things that happened in our case study?
The case study clearly shows that during the construction of the method certain ideas 
were employed while others (consciously and unconsciously) were not. This shapes 
the nature of the evaluation method. During its employment, it changes both with 
respect to its content (e.g. format, criteria used, etc.) and its use (e.g. application for 
justification, scoring, prioritisation and decision-making). This occurs under the 
influence of many different actors who act based on their ideas, blue-prints and 
inscriptions, but who also react to emergent situations. At the end of the day, the 
method is employed, but in a sense it does not match the initial intentions. The 
method itself during employment influences actors’ behaviour, roles and 
prerogatives.
Our case study is an example of how an IT evaluation method can be employed by 
organisations. It will vary according to the context and from actor-network to actor- 
network. The employment of such a method is a complex social phenomenon, and it 
should be understood accordingly.
This section, based on the analysis in Chapter 6, is devoted to a new understanding of 
the employment of IT evaluation methods. The major findings subsequently 
discussed are:
• IT evaluation methods are not ‘neutral tools’;
• IT evaluation methods can be viewed as actors when attempting to 
understand the dynamics of the process o f employment;
• Mutual translation: the actor (en)acts and is enacted. What gets employed 
does not resemble the original intentions;
• Employment as emergent rather than blue-printed.
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7.2.2 IT Evaluation methods are not neutral
One of the important premises that underlie the results of this research is a critical 
perspective towards IT evaluation methods. Many researchers concerned with the 
topic o f IT evaluation base their knowledge on the idea that IT evaluation methods 
are neutral objects that have no politics. Though nothing new to critical researchers, 
this research has reinforced the fact that evaluation methods are far from neutral or 
objective. An evaluation method is in fact a social construction which locks in many 
assumptions and notions.
In the evaluation employment process the interests of different actors are translated 
in a ‘program of action’ inscribed into the method. A translation presupposes a 
medium or a ‘material into which it is inscribed’, that is, translations are “embodied 
in texts, machines, bodily skills [which] become their support, their more or less 
faithful executive” (Gallon 1991, p. 143). In other words, the ideas and notions of 
different actors become embedded in the evaluation method.
A dominant notion locked in many of the evaluation methods, including the one in 
our case study, is the notion of rational decision-making (see sections 3.2.5 and
3.4.5). Another important notion is the perspective on the (financial) value of 
information. Failing to see that the value of information is a social construction, with 
multiple relevant views through different interpretations, results in a misconception 
that the value of information can somehow be measured objectively and captured by 
a neutral tool. This feeds the idea, for example, that a tool can measure the value of 
information and come up with the best investment proposals.
This research argues that IT evaluation methods could be regarded as black-boxes 
which lock in different actors and assumptions. There are two ways in which such 
methods can be perceived to be black-boxes. First of all, they black-box the notions 
and ideas of different actors, obscuring them and presenting themselves as generic 
solutions to IT evaluation problems in different contexts. Secondly and closely 
linked to the first, IT evaluation methods are not self-contained text formats that 
produce (just) informative reports, but they also bring along ideas and visions about 
which criteria are important when it comes to making decisions (see section 3.2.7),
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how to carry out decision-making and how investment ideas can represent 
themselves in fixed formats.
Though often not explicitly described, these processes and notions are inextricably 
bound up with these methods (see section 3.2.5). All o f these notions are ‘packaged’ 
(Newell, Swan et al. 2000) within the evaluation method. Hasselbladth and 
Kallinikos (2000) contend similarly that distinctive forms of organisational 
actorhood (such as a controller, a financial analyst, a personnel administrator) are 
inextricably bound up with methods and techniques (accounting, financial 
techniques, human resource management) for fi-aming action and measuring its 
outcomes. The better an IT evaluation method can shape such an actorhood (i.e. 
create and support an IT evaluation function), the more chance it has to be 
institutionalised (Hasselbladth and Kallinikos 2000) since actors (e.g. in our case 
PM) will mobilise it.
We argue that to understand IT evaluation employment we should not focus on the 
employment of certain (technological) artefacts, but on the employment o f the 
particular (overt and covert) ideas underpinning the evaluation method and the 
interests they serve. Just as the other actors in the actor-network, the IT evaluation 
method brings its own ideas, politics, definitions of roles and inscriptions to the 
scene, influencing its surrounding actors and the flow of events.
7.2.3 IT Evaluation methods as actors
In Chapter 6 we have argued that viewing an IT evaluation method as an actor in its 
own right gives a better understanding of the process o f IT evaluation employment 
than by viewing it merely as an artefact. It is regarded as an actor since it is a 
network, a black-box that participates in the social; it becomes spokesperson for 
other actors; it translates other actors; it becomes translated itself -  results do not 
match intended outcomes. During the process of employment, the method and its 
attributes is negotiated by many different actors and must find its own spot between 
them. The method imposes its inscribed program of action on its users, thereby 
becoming an actor in its own right.
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7.2.4 IT evaluation employment as a process of mutual translation
In our case analysis, we have argued that the employment o f ITEM is governed by a 
mutual translation: the method translates other actors and is it itself is translated as 
well. Usually the notion of translation in ANT is used to denote the process between 
two actors in which one of the actors gives definition to another actor, “imputes 
him/her/it/them with interests, projects, desires, strategies, reflexes, afterthoughts” 
(Latour 1991). The actor tries to align the interests of the other actors to its own 
(Gallon 1986b). In our case study this is visible in the way ITEM is translating the 
roles o f different actors (see section 6.3.6). Moreover, the method gives voice to the 
investment proposals and in doing so shapes how they are able to present themselves 
(see section 6.3.3).
But the (new) technology with its inscriptions is not the only actor that is involved in 
carrying out a process of translation. Other actors in the network also carry out 
translations -  attempting to translate the technology to a form and position that is 
aligned with their interests. Clearly, the efforts of PM are visible in ITEM. Over 
time, PM translates ITEM to change working processes fi’om an optional reporting 
process to an obligatory and decisive decision-making process; in this process PM is 
aligning it more and more with its interests. More covert are the translations by 
business managers and end-users who are aligning it to their interests (see section
6.3.5). Users may use the system in an unanticipated way (follow an anti-program) 
rather than following the assigned program. In the end, the method is used in many 
different ways and for all kinds of different purposes (the re-inventions of ITEM, see 
section 6.2.5) that go against most o f the ideas inscribed in the method itself.
In the process of obtaining a position in the network, ITEM assigns roles to its 
surrounding actors. It imposes particular views on them, with regards to the purpose 
and use o f ITEM. This imposing is partly due to the inscriptions in ITEM and partly 
due to the way ITEM is positioned by other actors (e.g. PM) in the network. The 
other actors in turn have their own ideas on how they aim to use ITEM for their 
purposes and in a way that is appropriate for them. There is fiiction between the 
interests of the two, visible, for example, in the political behaviour in which the 
method is used as opposed to its inscriptions (see section 6.3.5). In a way, the method
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tries to translate the roles of its surrounding actors, while the actors are 
simultaneously trying to do the same to the method.
As a result o f different acts of translation, the final shape and position o f the 
innovation in unlikely to be that of the original developers (Mitev 2000). Actors 
adapt the evaluation method during the process, and the technology often cannot 
fully persuade other actors to follow its initial goals. The employment process is a 
dynamic negotiation (Monteiro 2000). Moreover, unintended effects occur resulting 
in changes in the network. The resulting network is the (combined) translation that 
becomes irreversible; it becomes impossible for other (past or future) translations to 
develop and impose themselves.
Some researchers compare this process of translation to a battle (Mitev 2000) where 
only one of many possible translations is able to ‘win’ and become irreversible. This 
process can however also be viewed as negotiation and sense-making (Weick 1990), 
drifting (Ciborra, Braa et al. 2000) or improvisation (Orlikowski 1996), implying not 
a given number of possible translations, but rather one translation that is shaped by 
different actors during an emergent process. A difference between the latter three and 
the prior is that the notion of translation stresses the pursuit of interests (i.e. a form of 
intentional and pro-active behaviour) rather than mere local adaptations (i.e. a form 
o f interpretation and more reactive behaviour); hence the term ‘battle’.
Moreover, as discussed here, the notion of mutual translation implies that the artefact 
that is improvised or made sense o f  can itself play a vital and active part in this 
process. In fact, it is not a passive artefact that can be shaped (within certain 
boundaries) at will by its surrounding actors, but it is an actor that imposes 
worldviews and its inscriptions on its surrounding actors: it makes sense and 
improvises its surrounding actors itself. Or, as Akrich states: technical objects may 
be reinvented and reshaped in use, as “technical objects and people are brought 
together into being in a process of reciprocal definition in which objects are defined 
by subjects and subjects by objects” (Akrich 1992, p. 222). So the process of 
translation is not unidirectional. Actors are invariably self-interested^*, and network
For a non-human actor such ‘self-interest’ can be viewed as striving to hold on to its inscriptions 
(for example, to hold on to a rational view of decision making).
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building is thus a process of mutual enrolment and shaping (Doolin 2001; 
Bloomfield and Best 1992; Law and Gallon 1992). We have used here the term 
mutual translation.
7.2.5 IT evaluation employment: translation failure or success?
One of the main reasons for this research was the observation that although 
organisations express the need for having a better grip on IT costs and benefits, they 
fa il to employ IT evaluation methods. But what does the success or failure o f IT 
evaluation employment mean? Employment can be seen as being a success (by an 
actor) when intended or preferred outcomes (by that actor) have occurred (see 
section 1.2.2). Success in ANT can be seen to depend upon the ability to create and 
sustain black-boxes (Vidgen and McMaster 1996); the technology has become 
ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand (in case of break down). In other words, 
successful employment would entail that the evaluation method has become a black- 
box; it is taken for granted and employed by those intended. Law (1992) states (cited 
in section 4.3.2) that the core of the actor-network approach is its concern with how 
actors hold together the bits and pieces out o f which they are composed and how 
such heterogeneous networks come to pass as a punctualised actors.
We see a dichotomy in our case study if we regard the results intended by PM to be 
the preferred solution. On the one hand, ITEM is visibly being used by IIC and can 
therefore be said to have been punctualised and black-boxed. On the other hand, the 
results ITEM is giving is not what PM had envisioned when it had introduced ITEM 
at IIC (see section 6.3.5). The resulting translation can be said to have happened 
{success o f  translation), but does not resemble intended (or 'preferred^ outcomes 
{failure o f  outcome). The reason for this can be understood from the perspective of 
mutual translation. The intended outcomes did not fully occur due to translations that 
different actors imposed on the innovation.
But the success of the translation may well be the result o f the failure of outcome. Or 
as Latour argues (Latour 1986), “the movement o f an innovation through time and 
space is in the hands o f actors, each of whom may react to it in different ways. They 
may accept it, modify it, deflect it, betray it, add to it, appropriate it, or let it drop.” 
Each of these actors shapes the innovation to their own ends, but if no one takes up
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the innovation then its movement simply stops; inertia cannot account for its spread. 
Instead of a process of transmission we have a process of continuous transformation 
(Latour 1986) where “faithful acceptance involving no changes is a rarity requiring 
explanation” (Tatnall 2000). The seemingly self-perpetuating process whereby a 
solution spreads, gains inertia, irreversibility, gathers momentum or picks up speed is 
neither automatic nor necessary (Monteiro 1999), but an ongoing effort to keep a 
decision alive, to conquer opponents, to co-opt opposition, to seize opportunities for 
support and improvise on ‘surprises’ and unintended consequences. Without this on­
going alignment process, the motion would stop -  the actor-network would fail to 
become stable, and the evaluation method would not be black-boxed.
In fact, to think that the method is employed once and for all is a myth, as Law 
(1992) argues: “I have insisted that punctualisation is a process or an effect, rather 
something that can be achieved once and for all. Thus, actor-network theory assumes 
that social structure is not a noun but a verb. Structure is not free-standing, like 
scaffolding on a building-site, but a site of struggle, a relational effect that 
recursively generates and reproduces itself. The insistence on process has a number 
o f implications. It means, for instance, that no version of the social order, no 
organisation, and no agent, is ever complete, autonomous, and final.” In other words, 
if the evaluation method would not be translated - would remain fixed and stable - it 
would likely die (Monteiro 1999).
Due to mutual translation, the result of the employment o f IT evaluation becomes 
unpredictable. It is an emergent rather than blue-printed process (Orlikowski 1996); a 
continuous process rather than one that ends (Law 1992). Understanding the 
evaluation method as a black-box, which packs different interests and actors, can 
help describe how only some of the elements in the method become employed while 
others are rejected, modified or appropriated.
Moreover, to expect a clear-cut success or failure might be too simple. This already 
is voiced in the discussion by Rogers in his idea of adoption versus rejection o f 
innovation (discussed for our case in section 6.2.4), Moreover, just as evaluations 
themselves may have no dramatic effect, but a more gradual effect over time (see 
section 3.3,3), so we can perceive the employment of IT evaluation methods as well.
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It seems unrealistic to expect that all actors employ the evaluation method and 
dramatically align their interests to this method. This is a gradual process with 
mutual alignment and mutual translation. It seems reasonable to assume that many 
evaluation method employments in the past have been classified as failures only 
because they did not cause the dramatic effect hoped for. These hopes are however 
unrealistic. An expectation of a more gradual impact seems a more faithful 
representation o f what is happening. Our case study highlights this by the 
respondents who claim that ITEM has been employed and that it is in fact a way 
forward, but still argue that more ‘improvements’ should be made.
In sum, we can see that certain ideas and parts of the evaluation method are 
employed, but also that some important parts are not. What happens depends on the 
inscriptions, the influences the method has on connected actors and the influences 
other actors have on the method itself. The selection is improvisational but reflects 
actors’ interests. Overall by selectively and partially enrolling its inscriptions, the 
character of the evaluation method changes. Thus, it becomes unlikely that the 
employed method will resemble the intended method; this could be a reason for the 
described gradual effect o f the evaluation method described above. However, 
important parts of the method have been employed, be it in a modified way. In this 
sense, the method does have a profound impact on the organisation and the way IT is 
managed from an economic perspective.
7.2.6 Conclusion on the findings
To deepen the understanding of the employment of IT evaluation methods and its 
apparent problems, we need to reframe our perspective. It is not a matter of ‘adopting 
a tool’, but about the translation of ideas and artefacts packaged together as a black- 
box -  an actor. Seeing the evaluation method (the innovation) as a given, neutral 
thing, results in the idea that adoption of evaluation methods fail. Looking at it from 
an actor-network perspective, we see that the method changes over time. In a 
dynamic process (which cannot be reduced to a set o f simple factors), it translates 
actors and is translated by actors; it acts and is enacted. In the process of 
employment, a metamorphosis (under the influence o f planned, emergent and 
improvised change by different actors) shapes the method and in so doing allows it to 
transform in someway so that it can find its place in the network. But not only that,
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the method has profound impact in the sense that it translates (the roles of) many 
organisational actors. In this way, it is not just an improvisation (Orlikowski 1996) 
from one actor on another, but rather a mutually transformative improvisation.
Moreover, efforts to get a method employed are not fruitless, but have a more 
gradual, emergent impact instead of a dramatic impact. The results are not likely to 
resemble the intended outcomes, but can have a profound impact on the way costs 
and benefits are managed in organisations and on how managers tackle problems 
when faced with addressing this issue. In fact, it could be argued that translations of 
the method might be the reason for its employment altogether; the necessary on­
going alignment process leading to a stable network where the evaluation method is 
black-boxed.
13  D is c u s s io n  o f  t h e  t h e o r e t ic a l  f r a m e w o r k s
7.3.1 Introduction
Here we will discuss the analysis o f the case and the contribution o f the diffusion 
theory and ANT and their limitations in the analysis of our research.
7.3.2 Insights gained from diffusion theory
In retrospect, the most important contribution o f the diffusion theory to this research 
is that it was a useful point for departure for understanding the employment of IT 
evaluation methods. Our literature review (Chapter 3) and hypothesising in the light 
of a diffusion-theory approach about possible influences in the process of 
employment from the start, helped to sensitise us in our data gathering and analysis. 
We acknowledge that diffusion theory has provided and is still providing research 
with many useful insights -  and indeed these insights have impacted what we 
consider to be relevant for our case description and analysis.
However, rather than perceiving such influences as generalised predictors o f change 
or automatic mechanisms to control change, we have argued that the localities and 
context o f a particular case need more attention than diffusion theory can provide. 
Moreover, a simplistic explanation of the case study is to see ITEM as a tool which 
failed to be adopted due to its characteristics. Diffusion theory has a strong focus on
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the characteristics o f the innovation (the evaluation method), rather than on the 
difficulty o f the context and process by which the employment (should) occur. The 
innovation in fact has no general ‘characteristics’, and Rogers is right in saying it to 
be ‘perceived characteristics’ (Rogers 1995) -  they might be very different from 
individual (actor) to individual (actor) due to diversity in interpretation. Or more 
accurately, the innovation is interpreted differently by different actors and therefore 
is different to these actors. It is not a matter of some ‘clouded’ perception, it is the 
fundamental view that there are multiple realities where underlying beliefs, values 
and assumptions shape these realities (see section 2.2.3).
In our analysis using diffusion theory, we came up against some interesting 
problems. These problems could not, however, be dealt with by using this same 
theory; for example, the problem of the profound impact of re-invention. However, 
diffusion theory helped in uncovering and formulating these problems so that they 
could be tackled. The questions raised were (see section 6.2.7): What gets adopted? 
Who adopts? How does the evaluation method change the organisation? How does 
the method change decision-making? How does the adoption o f the evaluation take 
place? Why were suggestions from the method in this case not followed by targeted 
adopters (e.g. general management)?
These questions show that although popular in many studies concerning adoption or 
employment of innovation, diffusion theory, apart from its other limitations (see 
section 4.2.4), in this case highlights but cannot address the problems that in the end 
turn out to be the most crucial to this research.
Some notions crucial to this understanding are hinted at by diffusion theory. For 
example, Rogers notes that “flexibility in the process of adopting an innovation may 
reduce mistakes and encourage customisation of the innovation to fit more 
appropriately to local situations or changing conditions.” In other words, “re- 
invention is beneficial to the adopters of innovation” (Rogers 1995, p. 178). 
Moreover, he concludes that the designer o f an innovation can affect the degree of 
re-invention by making the innovation easy or difficult to re-invent. He wonders if it 
may even be a good idea for change agents, formerly opposed to re-invention, to
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encourage clients to modify an innovation (ibid, p. 179). This comes very close to the 
notion of flexibility and inscription in ANT (further discussed in the next section).
But although Rogers talks about re-invention, he focuses strongly on the innovation 
itself -  disregarding the way the innovation changes the organisation, individuals and 
actors. Technology and evaluation methods in this view play a passive role -  they are 
used, but do not act themselves. To make a short detour, the opposite critique could 
be given to researchers that grant the evaluation method a definite (almost 
deterministic) role. For example, Legge (1984) considers an evaluation outcome (or 
report) something given -  something that has been constructed and can be used in 
planned evaluation (overt and covert) ‘functions’ (see section 3.2.1). She concludes 
that the gradual impact o f the evaluation can be seen in most cases and considered a 
successful use (as opposed to a radical impact, which positivist researchers only 
would classify as a ‘success’).
But as we have seen in our analysis of the case study in section 6.2.5 and section 
6.3.6, once the evaluation is constructed it also plays an unplanned role -  it is 
creating its own overt and covert functions. Examples include: before ITEM existed, 
users did not plan to use an evaluation method to get budget; users did not think of 
quantifying IT benefits; when the initial evaluation experiments showed the high 
costs of IT, general management gained interest in knowing about costs in more 
detail; prior unheard investment proposals came to see ITEM as an opportunity to 
enter the investment process; ITEM presented the opportunity for PM to become an 
obligatory passage point.
So it does have impact (is utilised) not only in a planned way, but also possibly in 
other areas than was intended. In ANT terms, it becomes part of a network that is 
influenced by its creation. It is not only ‘utilised’ for different functions as a passive 
artefact which a (human) actor can choose either to use or not, but becomes part of 
an actor-network in which it also defines (‘utilises’) its surrounding actors. The 
evaluation method may be ‘reinvented’, but also ‘reinvents’ its surrounding actors. 
Its existence alone already makes a difference -  both in planned, but also in 
unplanned, emergent ways.
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In our case, ‘re-invention’ rather than being something out-of-the-ordinary seems to 
be the norm. Just like improvisation as form of organisational change can be seen as 
the norm in organisational behaviour. Orlikowski (1996) suggests that planning is 
not an activity which is unnecessary or should be abandoned, but instead, that a plan 
is a guide rather than a blueprint, and that deviations from the plan, rather than being 
seen as a symptom o f failure, are to be expected and actively managed. The 
employment of evaluation methods can be understood this way. The planned and 
unplanned interaction between all actors (both human and non-human) results in an 
emergent phenomenon.
An extension to the traditional diffusion theory is a knowledge-focused perspective 
(Newell, Swan et al. 2000), discussed in section 4.2.5. In this view, the evaluation 
method can be seen to be a packaged object o f knowledge, bundling general 
knowledge on IT costs / benefits management, which needs to be unpacked in the 
process of employment. However, the way this is perceived, it still looks like the 
innovation (e.g. the evaluation method) packs the knowledge itself (though packed). 
ANT by contrast would argue that the method is an actor which is not only defining 
itself, but is also defined by its surrounding actors. In other words, the ‘knowledge 
the method packs’ depends on the surrounding-actors (which are context dependent). 
This goes beyond the notion of some general (neutral) knowledge which can be 
unpacked differently in different contexts. In our understanding, there is no such 
thing as ‘one package o f the evaluation method’ which is packed earlier by some 
actors and can be unpacked at different times and contexts differently, but rather in 
employment the ‘packing and unpacking’ of the method occurs at the same time -  by 
all its surrounding actors. The knowledge-focused perspective is limited in 
understanding that the actors packing the evaluation method (or any other 
innovation, such as BPR, for example) have neither detached themselves from it, nor 
that it can be inscribed ‘strongly enough’ to determine the outcome of the 
unbundling. Moreover, much of the knowledge is not pre-packed, but rather created 
in the context while ‘unbundling’.
In conclusion, diffusion theory has served in defining questions to sharpen our 
understanding of the evaluation process, although it did give clues that pointed in the 
direction of ANT to look for answers to these questions. Rather than focusing the
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analysis either on the (attributes ot) the innovation, the actors that supply the 
innovation, the actors that receive the innovation, or the channels by which the 
innovation is diffused (in a political way), we looked for a holistic explanation -  
coming to ANT as a possible sensitising holistic approach to understand the spread 
o f this innovation. We come to see the method not as a passive artefact that is 
enacted by some external actors, but as an actor in its own right with its own 
inscriptions, ideas and visions.
7.3.3 Insights gained from ANT
Clearly, the results obtained by this research have been based heavily on ANT’s 
central notions of actor and translation (see sections 6.4 and 7.2). Some additional 
notions in understanding the employment process of IT evaluation methods from an 
ANT perspective are taken somewhat further here. We will discuss the notion of 
flexibility and inscription, the process o f  creation o f  a black-box and the notions of 
intéressement devices and competing translations. Furthermore, we will explore 
some of the limitations of ANT that we have encountered in our research. We discuss 
the limitations of social structures and a political analysis (which have been 
acknowledged in section 4.3.4 as limitations in ANT).
Flexibility and inscription
Discussing the design of an infrastructure, Hanseth and Braa in applying ANT 
propose a strategy to deal with new infrastructures with respect to their irreversible 
installed base (e.g. the existing infrastructure it is supposed to replace). They suggest 
“to fight against the power of the installed base by building an infrastructure in a way 
that makes it possible to avoid being trapped into it. This means making it as flexible 
as possible. Flexibility can be obtained through general strategies like modularisation 
and simplicity” (Hanseth and Braa 1998, p. 195). In ANT terms, this means that 
irmovations, or in our case evaluation methods, with inscriptions that are too strong 
are likely not to be employed since “inscribing patterns of use is a way to confine the 
flexibility of use” (Monteiro 2000, p. 78). If the method is flexible and less inscribed 
it is better able to ally with other actors and appropriate and align (to) them. 
Moreover, Law (1992) argues that the core of the actor-network approach is this 
ever-changing actor. Punctualisation (or black-boxing) is not something that is 
achieved once and for all but is a continuous process.
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The more flexibility the evaluation method has in dealing with this ‘struggle’, the 
better it can appropriate itself. In the case of an evaluation method, this would argue 
for keeping the method simple and aligned with current practices with regard to IT 
evaluation in the organisation (as was proposed in section 3.3.4). Moreover, adhering 
to an improvisational form o f organisational change, rather than a blueprinted and 
fixed one, the evaluation method might be adjusted and improvised (Orlikowski 
1996) on the basis of actions the other actors take. The act of mutual translation 
resides on this.
In the case study, the flexibility o f ITEM is apparent. Under the influences of the 
translations o f surrounding actors, ITEM moves around flexibly. Changing 
appearances and properties, it stays the ‘ultimate answer to the problems at hand’. 
Firstly, to support the organisational changes required in the solution to the legacy 
problem, then to support program management with their incomplete view on 
projects running (project calendar), and then continuing on by informing 
management o f some of the contents of the projects (PCT) and later doing this in 
more detail (ITEM-report). Finally, it attempted to support the envisioned rational 
decision-making.
This notion of flexibility relates to strong inscriptions which actually seem to be 
contradictory. It states that rather than flexibility, the employment of evaluation 
methods could be served better by having strong inscriptions. This seeming 
contradiction will be discussed after we have elaborated on this point.
Inscriptions are about ‘disciplining use’ by actors. The strength o f inscriptions, 
whether they must be followed or can be avoided, depends on the irreversibility of 
the actor-network they are inscribed into (Hanseth and Monteiro 1997). Gallon 
(1991) discusses the concept of (possible) irreversibility, where translations between 
actor-networks are made durable, to the extent to which it is impossible to go back to 
a point where that translation was only one among others and, secondly, to the extent 
to which the network shapes and determines subsequent translations. Some 
technologies inscribe weak/flexible programs of action while others inscribe 
strong/inflexible programs. Examples of the former are tools, the hammer being a
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classic example, and the assembly line of Chaplin’s “Modem times”' a standard 
illustration of the latter (Monteiro 2000).
According to Latour (1999b) the strength of inscriptions can accumulate by adding 
and superimposing them. By adding and linking inscriptions the inscription becomes 
stronger; for example, by inscribing the same pattern of use in a training program, a 
manual and an information system. Thus the same work routine may be inscribed 
into different materials, strengthening each other (Hanseth and Monteiro 1997). 
Inscription can also be made stronger by a succession of stronger translations. This is 
demonstrated by Latour (1991) when he discusses the example of a hotel manager 
who steadily increased the weight o f the knob on hotel keys to the point where he 
was able to adjust the behaviour of guests to return their keys to hotel desk. Prior 
attempts to achieve this effect by inscribing the desired behaviour on a sign behind 
the counter failed. Making the key knob heavier strengthened the inscription 
resulting in the desired behaviour.
In other words, it could be argued that the more an evaluation method is inscribed 
with a certain behaviour, the better it is able to appropriate (or discipline) other actors 
surrounding it. In the case of an evaluation method this could entail inscribing the 
preferred behaviour strongly in the method itself by having clear criteria and 
explanations and examples o f use. Furthermore, the inscription can be strengthened 
by adjusting the contents and evaluation procedures along the way to better obtain 
the preferred outcome (e.g. enforcing the method by changing the behaviour of the 
other actors). One example o f this in our case study is PM’s intention to have an ex 
post evaluation and compare the evaluation results with the ex ante evaluation 
results, and thus make actors accountable for their ex ante estimations. Actors who 
(continuously) have big discrepancies between ex post and ex ante results can be 
‘disciplined’ further. Another stronger inscription can be obtained by inscribing the 
preferred behaviour in other artefacts, for example, in other management processes 
(such making the use of the method in the construction of long-range plans 
obligatory).
We can see that there is a seeming contradiction here in ANT. On the one hand, a 
translation seems to be helped by keeping the evaluation method flexible. On the
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other, it can be argued that stronger inscriptions can help to reach more stable 
networks. However, even very strong inscriptions do not have to lead to a successful 
translation. The actual use may deviate from the inscribed patterns of use by 
following an anti-program (Latour 1991) in which actors use the innovation in an 
unanticipated way rather than following its assigned program of action. Even more 
so, Hanseth and Monteiro (1997) argue that unanticipated consequences, stumbling 
and opportunistic choices are always happening. The direction in which an actor- 
network is evolving through inscriptions is generally speaking much more vague 
than Latour's example of the keys in the hotel. The possible directions of network 
evolving are only spelled out as one goes along, constantly improvising and open to 
surprises.
Moreover, for “technology, every day is a working day” (Latour 1996a): actor- 
networks never become stable once and for all. The stability of a network lasts only 
as long as its constituent actors do not resist the role or definition they have been 
enacted to fulfil. If one o f the actors enrolled in a network resists enrolment and 
defines itself differently from its simplified definition (that is, the simplification 
fails), that actor becomes complex, possibly leading to the modification or 
disintegration of the network (Doolin 2001; Gallon 1986b). For complex innovations 
this means they are balancing between being inscribed in an actor-network, but also 
constantly being threatened and resisted by its constituent actors. Moreover, the 
durability o f a network is a relational effect, not something given in the nature of 
things (Law 1992). If materials behave in durable ways then this an interactional 
effect. “Walls may resist the escape attempts o f prisoners -  but only while there are 
also prison guards” (Law 1992). In other words, the strength of an inscription is not 
localised or fixed to the inscribed artefact but depends on the network in which it is 
inserted.
In the end, it is not possible to know beforehand exactly what it takes to make an 
inscription strong enough; it is a question o f practical trial and error (Hanseth and 
Monteiro 1997). The question then becomes how to accumulate enough strength for 
this inscription to actually enforce the desired behaviour o f general practitioners. In 
the examples given above we can see that keeping the method at some point flexible 
and at other points having strong inscriptions is not necessarily contradictory.
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The process of creation of a black-box
Stability in a network comes from black-boxing. When the evaluation method is 
black-boxed, it can be seen to become a natural part of the network. As seen in 
section 4.3.2, ANT theorists discern different ways to come to this black-box (e.g. 
the four moments of translation by Gallon - 1986a -  and the strategies for enrolling 
others by Latour - 1987; see section 4.3.2). In the case of an evaluation method these 
strategies could entail the search for (strong) allies. In our case, ITEM allied with PM 
and general management to impose itself onto the business managers. Moreover, PM 
problematised the problems of legacy systems and initial insights by ITEM 
problematised high IT costs -  both suggesting ITEM as the solution to these 
problems. Better enrolment, and ultimately the creation o f black-box, thus comes 
when the interests o f different actors are better aligned.
But what can be said about the black-boxing of ITEM in our case? ITEM comprises 
different components, including visions, philosophies and assumptions about what 
evaluation is, what information systems are and how they can be valued. However, it 
is a black-box that is enrolled in a different way than was intended. Some parts are 
discarded (e.g. the scoring in prioritisation), some parts are enrolled (e.g. the format 
o f the ITEM-report; the representation of IT projects; the role o f the Finance 
Department to calculate financial details) and some parts are enacted differently (e.g. 
‘irrational’ use o f the ITEM-report rather than the envisioned ‘rational’ use; the use 
o f the method in decision-making as one of the inputs rather than as the only input). 
All o f these parts are however not distinguishable from the ‘outside’; the black-box 
can be said to have been created during the enrolment. However, the association 
patterns concerned with ITEM cannot be moved to other networks or contexts and 
are unlikely to remain stable through time. ITEM cannot be considered an immutable 
mobile.
Intéressement devices and competing translations
One way to view a translation as successful is when it prevents both other 
translations taking place and a reversal of the translation. Describing a failure of 
translation, Vidgen and McMaster (1996) give an example of the latter. In their case 
where new technology fails and the intended translation is reversed due to the
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enrolment of (perceived) failures of the technology. The translation is reversed back 
to the old network (a state without the technology).
Gallon (1986a) describes the use of intéressement devices to “lure” the concerned 
actors to follow the project. This may differ from simple force to seduction or 
solicitation -  whatever is necessary to make other actors follow the intended 
translation. The intéressement devices used to interest actors in the intended 
translations can be any artefact which gets the job done (e.g. ranging from towlines 
to texts and conversations).
In our case, the adaptations of ITEM by PM can be seen to prevent other translations 
(by business managers) that translate ITEM into something that PM had not 
intended. The latter translated the ITEM-report not as an ‘objective representation of 
the expected results’ but more as a ‘means to get budget’, or as a ‘time-consuming 
activity that needed to be done’. One option mentioned to reverse ‘unwelcome 
improvisations’ by managers was, for example, to demand that the Finance 
Department make financial calculations or append ex post evaluation in an attempt to 
eliminate the political behaviour of managers which led them to overestimate 
benefits or underestimate costs. However, the effect o f such tactics is hardly likely to 
have the desired effects; politics cannot be eliminated by techniques (which are 
inherently political as well), though they might change the way such politics express 
themselves (Nijland, Berghout et a l 2002). The information manager is another nice 
example of an intéressement ‘device’ in our case study. When a number of business 
managers visited PM to complain about the cumbersome aspects of ITEM, the 
information manager o f that same business unit was used to persuade them to employ 
ITEM in spite of the amount o f time and energy it took.
Critique on disregard of social structures
ANT has been criticised for its disregard of broader social structures that influence 
the local phenomenon (Walsham 1997). ANT seems to stress the fact that social 
structures reside not only in the actions of people or in ‘memory traces’ (Giddens 
1984), but also in the network of heterogeneous material arrangements. But, it can be 
argued, these ‘memory traces’ and their implicit social structures also need to be 
analysed for deeper understanding.
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In our case study the limitation in this respect becomes apparent when we try to 
understand why some actors behave the way they do. Specifically the ‘irrational 
behaviour’, which ANT does not highlight, (such as politics, neglecting evaluation 
results and the like- see section 3.4.5) towards IT decision-making can be seen to be 
important to understanding the case. One would expect that such behaviour would 
result in the abandonment of the evaluation methods which have very incompatible, 
rational inscriptions. But, strangely enough, all managers perceived the new method 
(despite its flaws) to be an improvement with respect to IT evaluation. One possible 
explanation for this can be found in the social discourse where ‘rational thinking’ in 
managers dominates (which, for example, Walsham (1999) states as the ‘Western 
way of thinking’), and which argues that a rational method is always better than no 
method.
Another explanation for this phenomenon fi*om a critical perspective can be that the 
evaluation method has changed over time during its employment from its purpose to 
‘show the real IT costs and benefits’ to a ‘communication and decision aid’. It helps 
to explain both to employees and to general managers why certain decisions have 
been or should be made. Therefore it “creates a reality with more certainty and 
security for all involved” (McCabe, Knights et al. 1998). The method was altered 
from a rational method to a method that better supports the behaviour of the 
managers. This could even go so far that actors might accept the new method no 
matter what its underpinnings and inscriptions were as long as they are free to play 
their own preferred role.
In its disregard of social structures, ANT is a poor source on which to draw from 
when looking for explanations. It does not explain why certain actor-networks 
prevail over others. ANT does not uncover the origins of the interests o f actors. It is 
ahistorical and does not take into account institutionalised structures or the 
interpretive schemes by which actors make sense of the phenomenon. For example, 
many of the actors in the case can be seen to be influenced by a rational discourse. 
They hold a rational view of the problem and therefore seek a rational solution, and 
argue: “To attain better insight in costs and benefits of IT, we have to develop a 
technique that shows us these things”. This shapes the way they interpret events (e.g.
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seeing evaluation results as having low quality) and the way they act (e.g. sharpen 
the tools). Understanding it would involve analysing the rational discourse, the 
norms and values within the organisation o f IIC (and society as a whole) and 
possibly applying some theories of psychology to explain the behaviour o f the 
individuals involved - just as a theory o f biology would be required to understand the 
behaviour o f the scallops in the classic ANT study of their domestication (Callon 
1986a); and further inquiry would be needed to see if the interest o f slowing-down 
motorists comes from a respect for law and life (following traffic signs and 
warnings) or from selfishness (avoiding car damage by the speed bump), an example 
given by Latour (1999b; also see section 2.2.5). ANT is not helpful in gaining such 
understanding, neither was it intended to be. ANT simply assumes that all actors 
have interests or inscriptions leading to outcomes. They can only be uncovered by 
zooming in (or out) and opening the different black-boxes of actors. This still 
however does not address the lack of regard for historical developments and social 
structures which may have affected the construction, the interests and inscriptions o f 
the actor. Only by applying additional theoretical insights, for example, 
institutionalism (e.g. Powell and DiMaggio 1991) or structuration theory, as was 
suggested by Walsham (1997), could this lack be addressed. However, Latour would 
probably argue that the description given was not complete -  that to understand 
better, more inquiries (for example, by further studying actors’ behaviour) and 
descriptions should be made to make sense o f the situation; descriptions that stem 
from the case, not from generalised theories. Though such theories might point in a 
direction to look for more description, they cannot be the final conclusion.
In our case study we have shed light on possible influences in contextual elements by 
describing the environmental and organisational discourses and developments in the 
insurance industry in general and for IIC in particular (see section 5.2). In addition, 
we described, based on the interviews and texts, the motives o f different actors to 
explain their behaviour (see section 5.4). ITEM has been discussed to show where its 
inscriptions and underlying assumptions originate (see section 5.4.5 and 6.3.3). 
However, our research was not intended to uncover the different reasons for the 
(non-)employment of evaluation methods -  in section 3.3.4 we have listed numerous 
possible reasons and influential aspects -  in order to come to either an explanation 
for our particular case that could be applied to other cases, related to a particular kind
244
C h a p t e r ?
of social theory or to some sort of generalised conclusion on additional influential 
factors or discourses. Our research was aimed at understanding the employment 
process and ANT has provided us with a new perspective, helpful in this 
understanding.
Critique on lack of political analysis
Our case shows that to understand IT evaluation employment (or any organisational 
change for that matter), interests of actors should be perceived as being much more 
flexible than is usually accepted by researchers using ANT. Actors are willing to 
change their (political) inscribed behaviours, and they are not only stubbornly 
following their own interests. This is not just a matter of interesting other actors by 
‘force’ or ‘seduction’ (Callon 1986a), or actors conducting a war, but instead can be 
regarded as a mutual alignment. What we see is that ITEM with its inscriptions is 
both disciplining use and is disciplined in use, but not always in a violent way. From 
our case we conclude that actors (both human and non-human) are not 
‘deterministically’ bound to their own inscriptions -  they are flexible.
One might argue that this depends on the ‘strength’ of the inscriptions. If actors still 
can use the technology or innovation in another way than was intended, the 
inscriptions can be said to be weak. To talk about the politics of an artefact then is 
“nothing but a convenient shorthand for a situation where the strength o f the 
inscriptions of the artefact in question is very strong” (Hanseth and Monteiro 1997). 
Even so, ANT inherently has its struggle between seemingly fixed inscriptions on the 
one hand and networks never becoming stable on the other hand (Monteiro 1999). To 
what extent can a specific artefact or actor in a given context inscribe certain 
behaviour even though this behaviour may be challenged continuously? Even more 
so, ANT does not inherently question where a certain inscription originates: Whose 
intentions are inscribed in an artefact?
For evaluation methods, we observe that they ‘create a world’ by capturing reality in 
its reporting format. In our case, the originating inscriptions in ITEM can be traced 
back to PM, financial departments, IT Economics discourses and rational discourses 
(see section 5.4.5). But the case also demonstrates that actors are not that easily 
disciplined in viewing this world according to the method (see section 6.3.5) -
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although ITEM is changing work processes, it influences the actual decision-making 
process very little, being only one o f the inputs in the decision-making process. 
Though managers might be forced to use ITEM to get budget for their projects, it 
does not entail that ITEM has the power to translate them in its envisioned position.
We conclude that indeed politics are not easily understood from an ANT perspective. 
However, by alerting us to the political nature o f the process, ANT does encourage 
us to trace the particular political positions of the actors involved. In our analysis of 
the empirical data in Chapter 5 we uncovered some of the reasons different actors 
have for their actions (also see section 6.3.7), and in Chapter 6 we elaborated on how 
an interplay between the actions stemming from different interests shape the 
emergent character o f the employment of the evaluation method. However, we agree 
that more insight would be attainable if we would look more closely at the social 
structures and personal motivations of the different actors. As concluded in our 
critique above on ANT in its disregard of social structures, ANT does not provide 
any other means for better explaining politics than it does in using description.
7.3 .4  C onclu sion  on the theoretica l fram ew ork s
Diffusion theory has offered a structured approach for understanding the spread o f IT 
evaluation methods. It sensitised us to look for the influence o f aspects found to be 
influential in previous studies on diffusion of innovations and then to look beyond 
them. It uncovered the essential questions which were then answered on the basis of 
actor-network theory. Though ANT has limitations, it offered a perspective very 
different from that seen in the evaluation literature and practice, shedding new light 
on the paradox that was central to our thesis.
7.4 C o n c l u sio n
We started this research with a research question derived from the mainstream 
discourse of the IT and IS literature, i.e. evaluation methods as tools to be used with 
the expectation of leading to useful effects. Paradoxically, the seemingly innate 
qualities o f the methods did not lead to a broader employment o f them. By applying 
diffusion theory, we found interesting nuances -  some capable of being addressed by
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more sophisticated versions of diffusion theory, others more fundamentally requiring 
an alternative analytical logic. The latter took us to ANT.
Though ANT does not justify from generalised (for instance, social or psychological) 
theories why actors acted in the way they did (i.e. the root o f their rational and 
political behaviour), it helped us in gaining a new understanding. Prior 
understandings of evaluation methods as rational, neutral and objective tools that 
may be appropriated by organisations do not explain why the employment of these 
methods so often fail or are not considered at all. Instead, a new understanding is 
presented that the employment process involves an organisational change in which 
both the human and non-human actors (including the method itself) are decisive in 
the outcome. It is a process of mutual appropriation where the method that in the end 
gets enrolled is unlikely to resemble the initial intended outcome. In relation to 
Orlikowski and lacono (2001), who suggested five premises to theorise the IT 
artefact in IT research, we claim that evaluation methods are not natural, neutral, 
universal or given; that they are embedded in time, place, discourse and community; 
rather than being a whole, uniform and unified piece, they embed a multiplicity of 
components whose interconnection are often partial and provisional; they are neither 
fixed nor independent, but emerge from ongoing social and economic practices; and 
that they are not static or unchanging, but dynamic (ibid, p. 131). But not only is the 
method appropriated, also the organisation that uses the method has changed; it no 
longer is the same organisation as it was. In its turn, the method itself has 
appropriated the organisational actors.
This leads us to argue that the research question only is relevant in our old 
understanding of evaluation, where evaluation is considered neutral and having 
innate qualities and the evaluation employment process considered as a blue-printed 
plan to achieve preferred outcomes. The old view of evaluation is blind to relevant 
organisational changes that may however be different than expected outcomes. Thus, 
the relevant question is not whether organisations employ formal evaluation 
methods, but how an organisation appropriates an evaluation method in its situation 
and how both the organisation and the method are transformed during the process.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion -  A Possible Resolution to the Paradox
8.1 In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter concludes this thesis by giving an overview of the thesis and then 
discussing the limitations o f this study and suggestions for further research. It ends 
with explicitly addressing the contributions of this research.
8.2 O v e r v ie w  o f  t h e  r e se a r c h
In Chapter 1 we introduced our research question. We discussed earlier studies that 
showed that managers find it difficult to evaluate IT investments and that even 
though numerous concepts, methods and techniques have been developed to help 
managers make IT evaluations, paradoxically enough, very few organisations use 
them. The research question therefore is: “Why do organisations generally seem to 
be unsuccessful in employing IT evaluation methods that help them in clarifying 
costs and benefits of IT, even if they express the need for more insights into costs 
and benefits of IT?”
In Chapter 2 we discussed our ontological, epistemological and methodological 
position. From which philosophical background will we tackle the research question? 
We argued that the traditional conventional stance is inappropriate for developing a 
further understanding of IT evaluation employment, and we therefore opted for an 
interpretive constructivist stance. This led us to the case-study strategy as the 
research method for studying the employment process of an IT evaluation method at 
a Dutch insurance company.
In Chapter 3 we examined the literature on three distinct areas covered by the 
research question: literature on evaluation, employment of evaluation and 
organisations. We showed the complexity o f each of these areas, all of which are 
bound together in this research. Understanding the employment o f IT evaluation 
methods, within complex contexts such as organisations, requires a research 
methodology that is not limited (not reductionistic), but holistic in its approach and
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includes notions of social, economic, political, cultural and historical perspectives. 
We tried to avoid general managerialistic and technical approaches to IT evaluation 
which demonstrate oversimplified views on IT evaluation, on how organisations (and 
decision makers) operate and how the processes o f change (“employment”) take 
place.
In Chapter 4 we discussed two theoretical foundations for analysis, namely the 
difiusion theory and the actor-network theory, to guide us in understanding the case 
study. The diffusion theory was considered a proper starting point for understanding, 
given the research paradox concerning the lack diffusion of IT evaluation methods. 
The application of this theory showed interesting nuances (e.g. the notion o f re- 
invention) that could only be addressed by a more sophisticated version of diffusion 
than the traditional diffusion theory offered. This allowed us to address more 
appropriately the findings in our case study. However, some arguably more 
fundamental research findings (i.e. related to what gets employed and in what way) 
required an alternative analytical logic for understanding. To compensate for the 
limited understanding of complexity in diffusion theory, it was suggested we focus 
on the actor-network theory to aid us in gaining additional understanding. Although 
ANT has its own limitations, it was chosen to help explain the case and answer our 
research question.
In Chapter 5 the case study was described. We studied the context o f the case study 
which was development in the environment and information technology in the Dutch 
insurance sector. A detailed account is given o f the events that happened during the 
introduction o f a new IT evaluation method at IIC, a Dutch insurance company. 
These processes of evaluation employment can be seen to have had quite a dynamic 
and profound impact on the organisation.
The case study results were analysed in Chapter 6 using the theoretical insights 
established in Chapters 3 and 4. The diffusion theory can be seen to provide a 
framework for describing the case, but also showed a lack o f understanding with 
respect to explaining our paradox. Case specific details were discussed from an ANT 
perspective to argue that the evaluation method could be seen as an actor and the 
employment process an attempt to black-box it. It was argued that a process of
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mutual translation took place whereby the results of the process did not equal the 
intended outcomes.
Finally, in Chapter 7 the research question was addressed based on the insights 
gained from the case study. The major findings that were addressed in that chapter 
are discussed in a subsequent section, after we have addressed the limitations o f this 
research and offered suggestions for further research.
83 L i m i t a t i o n s  a n d  s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h
In this section we address the limitations of our research with respect to our case 
study and to our research in general, which leads to suggestions for further research. 
With respect to our case study, we identify two limitations. In the first place, the 
evaluation method under study only focused on ex ante evaluation, where at the 
outset of our research it was intended to study an evaluation method that 
incorporated more stages of the life cycle (described in section 3.2.1). Though initial 
plans (see plans in IIC-PM 1997) as well as renewed contemporary developments at 
IIC also intended to include both continuous monitoring during the execution of IT 
proposals and IT projects as well as ex post evaluation, these were not in place 
during the time of the case study. Issues such as the dynamics of continuous 
evaluation and monitoring of IT projects, accountability for the IT investments 
results and consequent adaptations of evaluation methods have been underexposed. 
IIC gave priority to the initial {ex ante) stage of IT evaluation. Unfortunately, no case 
organisations were found that use an evaluation method that spans the whole life 
cycle. We do however believe that much o f the new understanding our research 
presented will also apply to evaluation methods during the other life cycle stages. 
Further research should strengthen this assumption.
A second limitation was the fact that we were studying a phenomenon that is still 
very much on-going. No finite conclusions can be drawn about how which results the 
employment process will deliver. However it was argued in section 2.3.4 that this 
limitation was an opportunity as well. It allowed close interaction with the dynamics 
o f process under study. Furthermore, this research suggests that the employment of
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IT evaluation methods may be a long-term process for which finite conclusions may 
be very difficult to draw. The black-boxing of the evaluation method is constantly 
being challenged. Our research covered a period of 5 years, from 1996 to 2001. Still, 
we see that at IIC the evaluation method has not yet been black-boxed. Further 
research could provide more insight into the dynamic evaluation process such as 
conceptualised in this research. Additional new cases of longitudinal research could 
add to the understanding o f the evaluation process in further uncovering attempts at 
black-boxing. An interesting on-going research could for instance be done by 
revisiting the IIC case and studying the developments since 2001.
A more fundamental limitation in our research can be regarded as the use o f theories 
stemming from two different paradigms. In our research, we address two distinct 
theories, namely the diffusion theory and the actor-network theory. They have 
different fundamental assumptions relating to ontology and epistemology. Diffusion 
theory can be located on the spectrum of socio-technical theories, whereas actor- 
network theory is supported by the theory of the social construction o f technology. 
Diffusion theory in its approach displays an ontological realist assumption. It aims to 
uncover elements or factors of both the technological and the social. It attempts to 
predict and control outcomes better. Though not denying emergent and uncertain 
properties o f phenomena, in this attempt diffusion theory displays a linear cause-and- 
effect reasoning associated with a realist ontology. Its underlying assumption is that 
ultimately such uncertainties can be controlled if we have a better understanding of 
the phenomenon in which we are interested. Epistemologically it assumes that such 
understanding can come from a neutral observer who can uncover the mechanisms of 
the phenomenon. By contrast, ANT has an ontological constructivist assumption in 
that it assumes that the world consists of heterogeneous networks which are socially 
constructed, and actors who act from their interests and inscriptions and their 
interpretations of their environment. ANT, rather than assuming generalised facts 
that can be discovered about phenomena, is instead sensitive to their localised and 
situated specificities. Moreover, it denies differences between the social and 
technological and therefore differences in the alleged properties of each o f them. 
Epistemologically it assumes that the researcher is far from unbiased in the research, 
but should play an active role in, for example, choosing the boundaries o f the actor-
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network and which events or developments are deemed relevant to the 
understanding.
A problem arising from adopting and further exploring both o f these two distinct 
paradigms is that they may have influenced they way they are interpreted, which may 
have led to a simplistic understanding of them. Rather than applying diffusion theory 
to extend our knowledge of the influences in the employment o f an evaluation 
method, we have used it mainly to open up questions which it does not address. 
Moreover, we have highlighted aspects of diffusion theory with respect to re- 
invention and perception of characteristics, two notions that did not originally play a 
central role in diffusion theory. The influences of ANT have led us to pay more 
attention to these notions, possibly to the detriment of other notions in diffusion 
theory (e.g. the role of change agent and social networks). Moreover, we have 
acknowledged on-going developments in the stream of diffusion theory (see section 
4.2.5), many of which have brought more sophistication. Our use o f ANT also has 
been affected. Elements that have been proposed by different researchers, many of 
whom are adhering to the assumptions similar to diffusion theory, have influenced 
the way we have shaped our narrative about the actors, actor-networks and black- 
boxing processes at IIC. Though trying to avoid a simplistic use of ANT, in some 
ways we might have not been true to the nature of ANT. We have used our 
interpretation of ANT which comes from studying its literature and discussing the 
concepts with other researchers. However, we had no prior experience with using 
ANT before this study (see section 2.4). Comparing our results with similar studies 
on the employment o f an IT evaluation method can uncover and maybe overcome 
such limitations. Nevertheless, the exploration of both o f these theoretical 
approaches has been part of our learning process. It is only in hindsight that we fully 
appreciate their differences.
Another limitation o f our research is our focus on the employment of an IT 
evaluation method within an organisation. An issue that is outside the scope o f this 
research is IT evaluation across organisations within a wider context. Notions of 
costs, benefits and risks of IT become more complex when they span the boundaries 
o f one organisation. For example, issues such as ‘where do costs and benefits 
occur?’, ‘how are they divided?’ and ‘who is accountable for them?’ then become of
252
C h a p t e r s
increased importance. Developments such as the phenomenon of globalisation 
(Giddens 1991; Hanseth and Braa 2000) drive the need for evaluation methods that 
consider issues outside the borders of the organisation. In our case we see this in 
developments at FGU, where at the time of the research preparations were being 
made to unify evaluation methods across all its members worldwide. Research in 
understanding the employment processes beyond the border of one organisation 
seems to us a topic that solicits further study. Such a study may find the notions 
developed in this thesis interesting. Additional theoretical insights such as 
institutionalism and structuration theory were suggested in section 7.3.3 to inform 
such studies and to overcome the difficulties arising from ANT’s disregard for social 
structures.
8.4 R e s e a r c h  CONTRIBUTIONS
8.4.1 Theoretical contribution
So what? After having conducted this study, what have we gained? Where does this 
leave us? To answer these questions, we go back to our starting point. At the initial 
stage of this research, evaluation methods were seen as neutral and passive tools that 
could be used to get a better grip on costs and benefits. Suggestions by other 
researchers to address the paradox as to why these tools are so difficult to employ 
often led to suggestions to better ‘sharpen the tools’ (e.g. Parker, Benson et a l 1988; 
Serafeimidis and Smithson 1995b; Gunasekaran, Love et a l 2001). For example, add 
more criteria (e.g. measure risk in addition to costs and benefits; also measure 
intangibles), define better what is meant by certain definitions (e.g. have a new 
definition on how the value o f information can be measured), extend the scope o f the 
method (e.g. to include life cycle evaluation) and shape the tool to certain contexts or 
types of information systems (e.g. use different criteria for different types of 
organisations or information systems). The lists of evaluation methods thus 
developed continues to grow -  the question is: Who will be using them?
The diffusion theory suggests shifting the focus fi'om solely perceiving the 
characteristics of the method to including the process of diffusion. Long lists of 
elements can be constructed to determine which are influential in the employment of 
IT evaluation methods (see section 3.3.4). Elements that not only relate to the 
method itself, but also to the process of employment and the context in which this
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process takes place (Symons and Walsham 1991). We have argued that statistically 
determining which elements are most influential (‘critical success factors’) is 
inappropriate for such a complex, social phenomenon as the employment o f IT 
evaluation methods by organisations. Generalisations fail to account for the highly 
situational and contextual aspects o f the social phenomenon of our study. Instead 
detailed case studies, based on an interpretive stance, should provide insight into how 
evaluation methods are employed. With the background of an interpretive researcher, 
we are inclined to seek understanding of the interpretations the (human) actors 
involved give to the evaluation method and the process of its employment, and to 
understand how this shapes their actions. This approach however still views the 
method from a rather passive perspective: the method is being interpreted and acted 
on.
A critical perspective illustrates that the evaluation method is not actually as neutral 
as some would believe. It packs different worldviews and intentions and thereby 
shapes others. It is inscribed by them. But this inscription is not as fixed and definite 
as some critical researchers would argue. ANT shows that through the interaction 
between actors, an actor-network results. It is not one that is carefully blue-printed by 
a limited number of actors, but one that results from interactions between actors. 
ANT takes us further in understanding by giving the evaluation method an active role 
in the shaping of this network. We have argued the evaluation method could be 
viewed as an actor actively involved in the process of its employment. The 
evaluation method not only shapes the way it is appropriated and ‘enacted’ by its 
surrounding actors, but also appropriates these surrounding actors itself. The notion 
o f translation in ANT shows that the evaluation method is assigning roles to its 
surrounding and constituent actors and it displaces them to new positions in the 
actor-network: actors are positioned to change their work processes, receive new 
responsibilities and gain novel prerogatives.
Looking beyond the unidirectional notion of translation, we have argued that a 
process o f mutual translation takes place. The evaluation method is translating actors 
but is in fact translated itself as well. Inscriptions are not ultimately strong and 
deterministic; values, interests and beliefs not fixed. The employment of the method 
can be regarded as a ‘battle’ in its energetic acting of the actors, imposing their
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interests on each other; but not with is negative connotation. The ‘battle’ is not 
something to be avoided, but arguably the natural process of IT evaluation 
employment. It denotes that something actually is changing; that the employment 
process and its associated organisational change are actually taking place. If such a 
battle was not evident, the process would only be symbolic, ultimately having no real 
impact.
Actors all act differently which results in an (unpredictable) emergent process. They 
find the weaknesses in the inscriptions and make use of them; they increase the 
strength of inscriptions and they follow anti-programs. What finally gets employed 
does not resemble the initial ideas and inscriptions o f the evaluation method. 
Through time the evaluation method changes radically under the influence of a 
diversity of actors. This might even be the reason why in many cases the attempted 
employment of a method is said to have failed even though it often has had a 
significant impact in its translation of other actors, as was seen in our case study. 
Moreover, the actor-network does not become stable, but remains constantly 
challenged -  actors (including the evaluation method) constantly attempting to 
translate each other further. To talk about the success or failure of the employment is 
problematic, since there is no end-point where one can say the method has been 
employed -  it is constantly changing and being translated.
In sum, this thesis asserts that having come from a perspective where the evaluation 
method is a passive artefact, even a neutral tool, with innate qualities and proceeding 
on to an understanding of the evaluation method as an active actor, helps to 
understand the process of employment o f an evaluation method. Difficulties in 
employing IT evaluation methods can be understood better if the method is perceived 
as an actor, who has to be acted upon, acts itself and finds ways to interest associated 
actors. We have demonstrated in our research that such a perspective gives a better 
understanding than the prior conceptions o f IT evaluation methods. The focus on 
attempts of translations by all actors involved (including the method) is a good 
starting point to analyse and understand how the employment o f evaluation methods 
takes place. It allows us to review the paradox of why organisations do not employ 
evaluation methods when clearly there seems reason to do so. Our new construction 
o f evaluation and its employment resolves this paradox by arguing that it is not a
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matter of whether organisations employ formal evaluation methods, but rather how 
they appropriate such evaluation methods in their situation. This appropriation results 
in emergent outcomes that are unlikely to resemble initial concepts. Outcomes in the 
employment o f methods can be understood as situated cases o f outcomes of mutual 
translation where actors (both the method and other actors) have been translated to 
varying degrees. Perceived failures are outcomes where such translations have not 
occurred, have failed (i.e. reversed translations) or have translated the evaluation 
method beyond recognition of its initial concepts.
This construction of IT evaluation ultimately gives us better understanding of the 
employment o f IT evaluation methods in organisations. It does not provide a simple 
answer to our research question, but rather explains that the research question only is 
relevant in our old understanding of evaluation. Behind it hide too narrow views on 
evaluation (as being neutral and having innate qualities) and unrealistic assumptions 
on evaluation employment (expecting planned outcomes). In our new understanding, 
evaluation methods are not neutral neither are there generalised reasons (i.e. 
particular influential factors) that can account for difficulties in IT evaluation method 
employment; at least no reasons other than the old myopic view of evaluation itself. 
The paradox central to this thesis is solved by viewing evaluation methods as actors 
and their employment as emergent processes of black-boxing. This position gives us 
a better understanding of the use o f IT evaluation methods in organisations.
8.4.2 Practical contribution
Our new conceptualisation of IT evaluation can be seen to have some practical 
implications. Viewing employment processes as emergent rather than processes that 
can be controlled and directed may lead to an uneasy feeling among practitioners and 
managers involved in IT evaluation. As was discussed in section 3.2.6, a shift from a 
conventional to a constructivist paradigm may lead to fear o f loss of (alleged) control 
and certainty about outcomes of initiatives. Rather than offering widely applicable 
practical guidelines to improve the employment process, this study offers something 
else. It suggests that we should pay attention to the localities o f IT evaluation 
employment processes. This includes a consideration of the inscriptions and
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assumptions underlying the proposed evaluation method in order to understand why 
the method acts the way it does.
Furthermore, deviations from plans on the employment process should not be 
regarded as disruptive. Local adaptations and ongoing accommodations of evaluation 
methods are necessary to make and keep them relevant to particular contexts and 
situated work practices. These accommodations cannot be known upfront and 
typically have to be enacted in situ.
It should be noted that the new conceptualisation of IT evaluation must be related to 
other shifts in conceptualisations, such as what constitutes an organisation and how 
decision-making is conceived. For example, perceiving an organisation as a machine 
(e.g. one of the metaphors as described in section 3.4.2), evaluation methods are then 
considered tools that allow for better control of the machine. Decision-making in 
such a view is based on an attempt to improve the efficiency and effectiveness o f the 
machine. From such paradigms, previous conceptualisations of IT evaluation are 
very reasonable and obvious. The implications of this research work the other way 
around, however. Adopting a conceptualisation of IT evaluation employment as an 
actor entails adopting a paradigm that views organisations as socially constructed 
entities and decision-making as having both overt and covert functions, in essence 
being pluralist rather than unitary. Thus one cannot simply adopt the view that 
evaluation methods are actors, but at the same time hold on to conceptualisations of 
organisations as machines or as unitary. The new conceptualisation of an employed 
evaluation method needs to be accompanied by a wider conceptual vision on related 
subjects such as organisations, evaluation and decision-making. It is only then that 
the new understanding o f the IT evaluation employment process makes sense.
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Appendix: Adoption-Diffusion in Information Systems Research
Some examples of empirical studies on the adoption-diffusion in information systems research - from 
Pitchman 1992 adapted by Lefebvre and Lefebvre 1996
Authors
Adoption-
diffusion
phenomenon
Source of data Adoption-diffusionfactors Major results
Ball et al. 
(1987): 
Data Base
Adoption of 
database- 
management 
systems by 
industrial firms
Questionnaires 
from 24 
members of 
the Boston 
Chapter of the 
Society for 
Information 
Management
Organizational 
characteristics 
(communication 
effectiveness, number 
of engineers and 
scientists in 
management, etc.)
IT group
characteristics (stage in 
Nolan’s life cycle) 
Information sources 
(journals, 
advertisements, 
salespersons, technical 
staff; etc.)
Organizations with high 
R&D commitments and 
a large number of 
engineers and scientists 
in management are more 
likely to be early 
adopters
Leonard-Barton
(1987):
Interfaces
Adoption of SSA 
by individual 
system 
developers
Survey of 145 
programmers, 
analysts and 
supervisors in 
three sites in a 
natural- 
resource firm
Perceived innovation 
characteristics (value, 
feasibility o f use) 
Organizational 
influences (reward 
systems, support 
systems, client 
preferences)
Personal 
characteristics 
(demography, skills, 
years of experience)
Client preferences, 
adopter attitudes, 
training in SSA strongly 
discriminate adopters 
from nonadopters 
Years of experience, 
perceived accessibility 
of consulting, supervisor 
desires, and 
acquaintance with an 
advocate are moderately 
discriminating
Raho et al.
(1987):
MIS Quarterly
Diffusion of PCs 
in industrial firms
Questionnaires
from 412
(randomly
selected)
DPMA
members
Educational 
commitment 
(uncommitted, passive, 
active, strategic as per 
McFarlan and 
McKenny’s model)
Phase of diffusion 
significantly related to 
level of educational 
activities
Leonard-Barton 
and Deschamps
(1988): 
Management 
Science
Adoption of an 
expert system by 
individual sales 
personnel
Telephone 
survey o f 93 
salespeople in 
dozens o f sales 
sites of a 
multinational 
computer 
company
Personal 
characteristics 
(innovativeness, job- 
determined importance, 
subjective importance 
of task, task-related 
skills, software-use 
skills, sales 
performance) 
Managerial influences 
(perceived management 
support, management 
urging)
Management was more 
likely to be viewed as 
having “suggested” or 
“required” use of the 
system by people rating 
“low” on all personal 
characteristics (except 
software-use skills)
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Davis (1989): 
MIS Quarterly
Study 1 : Current 
use of mainframe 
productivity 
software by 
white-collar 
workers 
Study 2:
Predicted future 
use of PC 
graphics software 
by MBA students
Study 1 : 
Questionnaires 
from 112 users 
in IBM 
Canada’s 
development 
laboratory 
Study 2: 
Questionnaires 
from 40 
students 
attending a 
large
university
Studies 1 and 2: 
Perceived 
technological 
characteristics 
(perceived usefulness, 
perceived ease of use)
Study 1 ; Perceived 
usefulness and ease of 
use, both highly 
correlated with self- 
reported current use 
Study 2: Perceived 
usefulness and ease of 
use, both highly 
correlated with self- 
reported predicted future 
use
In both studies, ease of 
use appears to be a 
causal antecedent of 
usefulness, with little 
direct effect on use
Davis et al.
(1989): 
Management 
Science
Current use and 
predicted future 
use of a word- 
processing 
package by MBA 
students
Two waves of 
questionnaires 
(14 weeks 
apart) from 
107 MBA 
students 
attending a 
large
Midwestern
university
Perceived 
technological 
characteristics 
(perceived usefulness, 
perceived ease of use) 
Expectations o f  salient 
referents 
Attitudes
Behavioural intentions
Perceived usefulness 
and ease of use have a 
significant direct effect 
on behavioural 
intentions over and 
above their effect 
transmitted through the 
mediating attitude 
construct
Behavioural intention to 
use is significantly 
related to actual self- 
reported use
Gatignon and 
Robertson
(1989): 
Journal o f 
Marketing
Adoption of 
laptop computers 
by sales 
organizations
Questionnaires 
from 125 
senior sales 
officers in US 
firms
Adopter industry 
competitive 
environment 
(concentration, price 
intensity, demand 
uncertainty, 
communication 
openness)
Supply-side factors 
(vertical coordination, 
supplier incentives) 
Decision-maker 
characteristics 
(information 
preferences and 
exposure) 
Organizational 
characteristics 
(centralization, selling- 
task complexity)
Adoption is associated 
with high vertical 
integration and high 
supplier incentives in the 
supply industry and high 
industry concentration 
and low competitive 
price intensity in the 
adopter industry 
Decision-maker 
characteristics 
(preference for negative 
information and 
exposure to personal 
information sources) 
predict adoption
Huff and Munro
(1989):
Journal o f 
Information 
Systems 
Management
Adoption of 
microcomputers 
by individuals
Personal 
interviews 
with several 
dozen
microcomputer
users
Perceived innovation 
characteristics (relative 
advantage, 
compatibility, 
complexity, trialability, 
observability)
Anecdotal confirmation 
that microcomputers 
diffused quickly because 
of favourable perceived 
characteristics
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Brancheau and
Wetherbe
(1990):
Information
Systems
Research
Adoption of 
spreadsheet 
software by 
individual 
accountants and 
managers
Questionnaires 
from 70 
accountants 
and managers 
in 18 Fortune 
1000 firms
Adopter characteristics 
(age, education, 
exposure to media, 
interpersonai- 
conununication 
exposure, opinion 
leadership, external 
social participation, 
etc.)
Communication- 
channel types (mass 
media or interpersonal) 
Communication- 
channel sources 
(external or internal to 
company)
Cumulative adoption 
follows S-shaped curve 
using logistic function 
Early adopters are 
different from later 
adopters, as predicted by 
Rogers (1983) 
Mass-media channel 
types-extemal sources 
are more important at 
the knowledge stage; 
interpersonal channel 
types-intemal sources 
are more important 
during persuasion
Cooper and 
Zmud (1990): 
Management 
Science
Adoption and 
difiusion of MRP 
systems within 
industrial firms
Telephone 
survey of 52 
members of 
the American 
Production and 
Inventory 
Control 
Society
Innovative
characteristics (task- 
technology
compatibility, technical 
complexity)
High task-technology
compatibility
(continuous
manufacturing methods, 
make-to-stock marketing 
strategies) and low 
technological 
complexity (e.g., fewer 
parts per bill of material 
and per finished good) 
positively related to 
MRP adoption but not 
difiusion
Gurbaxani
(1990):
Communications 
o f the ACM
Cumulative 
adoption of the 
BITNET 
computing 
network by 
universities
Quarterly 
BITNET 
Network 
Information 
Center records 
and other 
sources (1981- 
88)
Adoption modeled as a 
function of the number 
of previous adopters 
and the time
Three functions were 
used: Gompertz, 
logistic, and
exponential. The logistic 
clearly provided the best 
fit with significant 
statistics for all model 
parameters
Gurbaxani and
Mendelson
(1990):
Information
Systems
Research
Cumulative 
adoption of IT  by 
US firms
Archival data 
on total IT 
spending by 
large US firms 
from industry 
publications 
(1960-87)
Adoption modeled as a 
function of the level of 
previous IT spending 
and the time
Three price-modified 
functions were used: 
Gompertz, logistic, and 
exponential. Confirmed 
that exponential (price) 
terms were significant in 
all three cases, implying 
that a purely behavioural 
explanation for IT 
adoption is incomplete
Kwon (1990): 
ICIS
Proceedings
Difiusion of IT  in 
the administrative 
offices of a 
southeastern 
university
Field survey of 
department 
heads, 
opinion 
leaders,” and 
MIS
coordination” 
for 74
administrative
offices
MIS maturity (age,
applications,
equipment)
MIS climate 
(management support, 
user involvement, 
management attitude) 
Work-unit size 
Network behaviour 
(centrality, sources, 
intensity, link sources, 
link intensities)
Extemal-communication 
intensity positively 
correlated with IT 
difiusion for work 
groups with a favourable 
MIS climate
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Nilakanta and 
Scamell (1990): 
Management 
Science
Initiation, 
adoption, 
implementation 
of database- 
requirements 
analysis and 
logical-design 
tools by 
industrial firms
Questionnaires 
from more 
than 70 lead 
database 
designers in 17 
Houston-area 
organizations
Characteristics 
(perceived utility, skills 
to use, etc.) of 15 
information sources 
(books, periodicals, 
etc.) and 13 
communication 
channels (telephone, 
library, etc.)
Hypotheses linking 
characteristics of 
information sources and 
communication channels 
to difiusion not 
supported (only 12 of 90 
regression coefficients 
significant at P  values 
ranging from 0.05 to 
0.15)
Note on abbreviations: DPMA, Data Processing Management Association; IBM, 
International Business Machines Corp.; ICIS, International Conference on 
Information Systems; MBA, master of business administration; MIS, management 
information science; MRP, material-requirements planning; PC, personal computer; 
R&D, research and development; SSA, structured systems analysis.
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